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v
The aim of this thesis is to discuss the semantics of FQs (fuzzy quantifiers),
formal semantics in particular. The approach used is fuzzy semantic based
on fuzzy set theory (Zadeh 1965, 1975), i.e. we explore primarily the denota-
tional meaning of FQs represented by membership functions. Some empirical
data from both Chinese and English is used for illustration.
A distinguishing characteristic of the semantics of FQs like about 200 stu¬
dents and many students as opposed to other sorts of quantifiers like every
student and no students, is that they have fuzzy meaning boundaries. There
is considerable evidence to suggest that the doctrine that a proposition is ei¬
ther true or false has a limited application in natural languages, which raises
a serious question towards any linguistic theories that are based on a binary
assumption. In other words, the number of elements in a domain that must
satisfy a predicate is not precisety given by an FQ and so a proposition con¬
taining one may be more or less true depending on how closely numbers of
elements approximate to a given norm.
The most significant conclusion drawn here is that FQs are compositional in
that FQs of the same type function in the same way to generate a constant
semantic pattern. It is argued that although basic membership functions are
subject to modification depending on context, they vary only with certain
limits (i.e. FQs are motivated—neither completely predicated nor completely
arbitrary), which does not deny compositionality in any way. A distinctive
combination of compositionality and motivation of FQs makes my formal
semantic framework of FQs unique in the way that although some specific
values, such as a norm, have to be determined pragmatically, semantic and
inferential patterns are systematic and predictable.
A number of interdisciplinary implications, such as semantic, general lin¬
guistic, logic and psychological, are discussed. The study here seems to be
a somewhat troublesome but potentially important area for developing the¬
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Introduction
Suppose this might happen in real life. While preparing a party, Mary asked
John to buy about 20 beers and a few apples. John had to decide exactly
how many beers and apples he would buy. In a shop he hesitated for a
while then bought IS beers and five apples. Once Mary saw the things
John bought she seemed satisfied. Although this is a hypothetical example
of communication with words like a few and about 20, in fact this kind of
communication happens very often in our everyday life. If we closely examine
our language, most expressions have a fuzzy1 boundary. For instance, an
essay could be not bad, a girl may be rather pretty, a pile of papers might
be 20 or so, and someone may have many friends. This kind of expression
enables us to speak about a far greater variety of topics than those precise
numbers would allow. The questions that arise are: what kind of linguistic
1Sainsbury (1991) argues that it is inappropriate to say that some concept has a fuzzy
boundary, because the term boundary must be understood as a precise one, otherwise
there is no boundary at all. Therefore, Sainsbury suggests using bouniariless. Nev¬
ertheless, it seems to me that something with a fuzzy boundary is not the same as
something without a boundary at all. Take about 20 years old as an example; there is
uncertainty about its boundary or there is disagreement towards the precise boundary
of the concept. That is, whether or not 16 or 26 is within the boundary is undetermined.
However, this does not mean that the concept is boundariless, because we would not
agree if one says that a one-month old baby is within the boundary of about 20 years
old (see page 182 for further discussion on this point).
1
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theory lies behind it, and particularly what kind of formal interpretation can
we come up with?
For many years it seems to have been taken for granted that propositions, at
least declarative propositions, are either true or false. However, it is found
that the conventional two-valued logic approach cannot accurately represent
natural languages; not even three or four-valued logic can do the job properly
(see McCawley (1981) for further discussion). The reason is that there are
propositions denoted by sentences in natural languages that are true (or
false) up to a point, i.e. neither completely true, nor completely false. For
instance, in the sentence Mary is about 20 years old, the expression about 20
years old has an uncertain meaning boundary. Accordingly, its truth value
could be a matter of degree. This cannot be handled by any conventional
theories. Although both three-valued and four-valued logics seemingly have
an undefined value to represent the degree of truth, all they do is just conflate
any value which is not all-or-none type into a general category without any
further structured exploration.
As an illustration, according to conventional truth conditional semantics, the
sentence Mary is about 20 years old is true if and only if there is an individ¬
ual called Mary and she is about 20 years old. This allows a biconditional
statement—u satisfies the formula about n(x) iff u is in the set of about n.
It leaves about n as an unanalysed primitive, and does little to capture the
meaning of it. As Klein (19S0) points out, the treatment utilizes a semantic
metalanguage in which fuzzy expressions occur, and presupposes the notion
of fuzziness. This kind of treatment is not particularly informative or useful.
\Ye need an account which can define expressions like about n adequately.
FST (Fuzzy Set Theory, Zadeh 1965) can do a better job in that it captures
degrees of truth, which will be demonstrated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 below.
The study of FQs here concentrates on semantics, with little account of syn¬
tax and phonology. The reason is that the very issue of FQs' semantics is
so complex that it is more than enough to deal with for a thesis of lim¬
ited length. It would be wiser to tackle one aspect of FQs adequately than
to touch on several aspects superficially. However, a further study of FQs
interfacing phonology, semantics and syntax would be of benefit.
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In terms of organisation of the thesis, the presentation is in four parts. In
the first part (Chapters 1 L 2) I shall give a general discussion of the issues
involved such as terminology, approach and methodology, the distinction
between ambiguity, vagueness and fuzziness, causal factors of fuzziness, and
a review of previous work. Following that, the second part (Chapters 3 &;
4) is a discussion of the semantics of FQs. Chapter 3 is an empirical study-
based on the data in Channell (1983) and Zhang (myself). Chapter 4 is a
discussion of pragmatic effects and compositionality of FQs. In the third part
(Chapters 5, 6 & 7), a formal semantic account of FQs. is proposed in which
FQs are treated as fuzzy operators. The fourth part (Chapter 8) contains
interdisciplinary implications and conclusions. The four parts are logically-
arranged. Part one provides background knowledge. Part two discusses
the semantics of FQs from different aspects. Part three provides a formal
framework. Finally, implications and conclusions are drawn up.
1.1 Survey of the fundamental notions
Two notions need to be clarified at the outset: fuzzy and FQ.
1.1.1 Fuzzy
How can the membership of the set of twentyish be defined (putting aside
contextual factors: the membership of twentyish for a person's age and for a
medical measurement could be different)? In other words, how old does one
have to be to be twentyishl 15? 16? 17? 18? 19? 20? 21? 22? 23? 24? 25?
Obviously, any attempt to fix a single answer will be impossible. Expressions
like this are considered as fuzzy ones to which an application of a particular
referent or state of affairs is not a clear-cut case.
Furthermore, such a sentence as Mary is twentyish may very often be neither
true, nor false, nor nonsensical; but only true to a degree. For instance, if
Mary is exactly 20 years old, the sentence might be 100% true. If Mary is
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15 years old, the sentence might be 60% true. If Mary is 40 years old, then
the sentence might be totally false. The reason is that the membership of
twentyish is fuzzy, i.e. some elements in the domain neither definitely belong
to the set nor definitely do not belong to it.
It is imperative that the concept fuzzy used in this discussion has nothing
to do with the negative part of its literal meaning, like misuse, mistaken.
or not well defined. In fact, the term fuzzy is a technical term, and has a
precise definition throughout the discussion. However, it appears that the
term fuzzy sometimes confuses people. Accordingly, it has been suggested
that the term continuous could replace the term fuzzy. For example, fuzzy
logic could be called continuous logic. It seems that whatever it is called
makes little difference, as long as we keep it well defined (see Section 1.2
for further discussion on the distinction between fuzziness. ambiguity and
vagueness).
Fuzziness occurs in two layers with respect to two types of language users
(individual and group). The individual type means that an FQ is defined in
correspondence with an individual's view. Fuzziness occurs on an individual
level, when an individual, Mary for instance, is unsure about the boundary
of a twentyish man. The group type, on the other hand, means that an FQ
is defined corresponding to the views of a group of people. An FQ may be
viewed as non-fuzzy at the individual level, but not necessarily at a group
level. For instance, Mary may say that an interval for a twentyish man is
from 15 to 25; John might insist that it is from 16 to 24. What follows is that
at an individual level the expression is not fuzzy at all, because Mary and
John are individually certain about it. If we examine it at a group level the
expression could be viewed as a fuzzy one, since Mary's and John's responses
are different and they may not reach a unified decision.
It is empirically proven that fuzziness at an individual level is less than
that at a group level. For example, Wallsten et al (1986a) conclude that
the membership function of fuzzy terms is useful and reliable for individuals,
rather than the group (see Section 2.2 for the details). Our data in Chapter 3
also showed that there was indeed a discrepancy among the subjects in terms
of intervals they designated for FQs.
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1.1.2 Fuzzy quantifier
The quantifiers2 that are most often referred to are all, a, the, any, and some.
These are called logical quantifiers, because their meanings are not context-
dependent. What I intend to explore here is another kind of quantifier, known
as FQs, which is context-driven. The generic term FQ covers a collection of
quantifiers whose representative elements are: several, many, few, a few,
about 10, approximately 5, nearly 10, 10 or so, 10-odd and 3 or 5.
An FQ is defined here as a quantifier which has no clear-cut meaning bound¬
ary in terms of what precisely the number should be. What is special about
an FQ is that it generates, in an approximate fashion, a set of numbers. For
instance, when John says that Mary is 20 or so, he means to say that Mary's
age is within a permissible latitude (i.e. a possible interval which is appro¬
priate for an FQ) allowed by 20 or so. We may say that 20 or so is certainly
less than 2,000 or so, or There are many students in the hall logically entails
There are several students in the hall. However, we axe less sure about the
precise boundaries of many and 20 or so.
FQs have the property of being context-dependent. For instance, many may¬
be interpreted differently in the following two sentences: Many people are in
my room and Many people are in Tian Anmen Square. Due to the different
sizes of my room and Tian An'men Square, many would be interpreted as
having a narrower interval in the former than in the latter (see Section 4.1.2
for further discussion). We term quantifiers like many as non-standard quan¬
tifiers or non-logical quantifiers in the sense that they are context-dependent,
as opposed to so-called logical quantifiers (e.g. all, a, the). They are also
called natural language quantifiers (e.g. Moxey and Sanford, 1993b). It
should be noted that FQs are typical natural language quantifiers rather
than atypical, since there are many more FQs in natural languages than
so-called logic quantifiers.
2In this thesis, the term quantifier is used as defined in Barwise and Cooper (1981),
where a quantifier is a noun phrase: determiner + noun. However, for the convenience
of exposition, I may leave the noun out from time to time.
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1.2 Fuzziness—vagueness—ambiguity
In research, keeping terms clearly defined is important in preventing con¬
fusion among readers. It appears that fuzziness, vagueness, and ambiguity
represent different linguistic phenomena; hence there is a need to identify
these differences.
There is a clearer distinction between ambiguity and the other two than be¬
tween vagueness and fuzziness. In fact, some researchers do use fuzzy and
vague interchangeably. For instance, at the beginning of this century Peirce
(1902: 748) gave his definition of vagueness:"A proposition is vague when
there are possible states of things concerning which it is intrinsically uncer¬
tain whether, had they been contemplated by the speaker, he would have
regarded them as excluded or allowed by the proposition." This definition of
vagueness fits the characteristic of fuzziness in my terms. The differentiation
between fuzzy and vague may be insignificant in other studies and using one
or the other is purely a matter of preference, but. in some linguistic areas
the two terms are defined in a different sense, such as in Kempson (1977)
(see Section 1.2.2 for further discussion). This is a point which should be
addressed.
1.2.1 Fuzziness
The term fuzzy is defined in Crystal (1991: 148) as:
"A term derived from mathematics and used by some LINGUISTS
to refer to the INDETERMINACY involved in the analysis of
a linguistic UNIT OR PATTERN. For example, several LEXI¬
CAL ITEMS, it is argued, are best regarded as representing a
SEMANTIC CATEGORY which has an INVARIANT core with
a variable (or 'fuzzy') boundary, this allowing for flexibility of
APPLICATION to a wide range of entities, given the appropri¬
ate CONTEXT. The difficulty of defining the boundaries of cup
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and glass has been a well-studied example of this indeterminacy.
Other items which lend 'fuzziness' to language include sort of.
rather, quite, etc."
It is interesting that Crystal states that fuzzy is derived from fuzzy mathe¬
matics. It indeed appears that researchers who have a science background of
some sort tend to use fuzzy, perhaps because the term fuzzy comes from the
term fuzzy set proposed by Zadeh (1965). and was originally used in fuzzy
mathematics. Similarly, if one talks about something related to FST one
may prefer to use the term fuzzy. That is one reason I chose to use the term
fuzzy in this work, rather than vague; the other being that, as mentioned,
some linguists (e.g. Ullmann (1962) &: Kempson (1977)) have already de¬
fined vague linguistically in a different sense (see next section for a detailed
discussion). It is therefore wiser and clearer to use the term fuzzy with a
fresh application.
Crystal does not list the term vague in his A Dictionary of Linguistics and
Phonetics. He might consider the term fuzzy more technical-oriented than
vague, and it has a distinguishing feature in terms of its connection with
fuzzy mathematics.
An influential work on fuzziness is Zadelrs (1965) FST. He suggests that
fuzziness can be formally handled in terms of a fuzzy set, a class of entities
with a continuum of grades of membership. Such a set is characterized by a
membership (characteristic) function which assigns to each entity a grade of
membership ranging between zero and one, notated as [0, 1] (see Section 5.2
for more discussion).
Lakoff (1973a) applies FST to the stud}- of meaning. He points out that
there is a certain degree of fuzziness around componential boundaries. To
consider bird-likeness, it appears that robin is a central member, as it belongs
to bird-likeness completely. Bat is a peripheral member as it hardly belongs
to bird-likeness. Thus, a better way of representing the meaning of bird-
likeness, especially the referential meaning of it, is to rank relevant members
as to the degree of their bird-likeness—the degree to which they match the
core member of bird-likeness. Here is a bird-likeness hierarchy, reproduced




chickens, ducks, geese (1-1)
penguins, pelicans
bats
The hierarchy is not a bad approximation. Also, some experiments carried
out by Heider (1971) have shown a distinction between central members of
a category and peripheral members of the category. She surmises that if
subjects have to respond true or false to sentences of the form .4 (member)
is a (category)—for example, .4 chicken is a bird—the response time would
be faster if a member is a central member (a good example of the category)
than if it is a peripheral member (a poor example of the category). Some of
the examples of central and peripheral category members that emerged from
her study are listed in Table 1.1:
TABLE 1.1: Heider's examples
Category Central Members Peripheral Members
toy- ball, doll swing, skates
bird robin, sparrow chicken, duck
sickness cancer, measles rheumatism, rickets
metal copper, aluminum magnesium, platinum
sport baseball,basketball fishing, diving-
vehicle car, bus tank, carriage
body part arm, leg lips, skin
Heider's work shows clearly that category membership is not simply a yes-
or-no question, but rather, a matter of degree. Different individuals may-
have different category-rankings depending on their experiences, their world
knowledge and their beliefs.
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Supposing that instead of asking about category membership we ask about
the truth values of propositions that assert the category membership. The
degree of truth corresponding to the ranking of category membership in (1.1).
is listed in (1.2), adapted from Lakoff (1973a):
a. A robin is a bird. (true)
b. An eagle is a bird. (less true than a)
c. A chicken is a bird. (less true than b)
d. A penguin is a bird. (less true than c)
e. A bat is a bird. (false, or at least very far from true)
/• A cow is a bird. (absolutely false)
We have to make it clear that the examples given here have to be understood
in terms of ordinary language. Scientists might make (a), (b), (c) and (d)
absolutely true, and (e) and (f) absolutely false. Based on the scientific
conception, the fact that a penguin is not a typical bird does not make it
less true than that a penguin is a bird. For more discussion of FST, see
Section 5.2.
1.2.2 Vagueness
Kempson (1977: 124-128) defines four types of vagueness:
1. Referential vagueness, where the meaning of a lexical item is in principle
clear enough, but it may be hard to decide whether or not the item can
be applied to certain objects;
2. Indeterminacy of meaning, where the meaning of an item itself seems
indeterminate;
3. Lack of specification in the meaning of an item, where the meaning is
clear but is only generally specified;
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4. Disjunction in the specification of an item's meaning, where the mean¬
ing involves an either-or statement with different interpretation possi¬
bilities.
What happens in (1), referential vagueness, is that we do not have clear-cut
criteria to distinguish the extensional meaning of items like city or town:
mountain or hill; forest or wood: and house or cottage. For example, the
relationship between the expression city and a place called Perth in Scotland
is not absolutely clear, i.e. it is not certain if Perth in Scotland can be called
a city.
Let us look at Kempson's example, John's sheets, to illustrate (2): indeter¬
minacy of meaning. It may be used to describe not only the sheets John
owns, made or designed, but also the sheets which go on the bed in which
he is going to sleep. There is indeterminacy of meaning when John's sheets
stands in isolation, because there are several possible interpretations of it.
This example is used by Kempson to consider the phenomenon of one general
term (e.g. John's sheets) having different possible meanings.
In fact, it seems that John's sheets could also be seen as an example of (4)
disjunction. It involves a few interpretation possibilities as shown in (2a) in
Fig. 1.1 below. However, it is not a case of fuzziness as far as my definition of
fuzziness is concerned, because if we talk about fuzziness of John's sheets, we
would look into whether the extensional meaning of John's sheets is clear-cut
or not. If the expression is fuzzy, then we cannot be certain whether or not
some of those possible interpretations are in the denotation of the expression.
This can be represented in Fig. 1.1:
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John's sheets
/ / I \ \
II I \ \
John's sheets





M3 M4 M5 Ml M2 M3 M4 M5
(2b)
9 9 9 9 9
(2a)
FIGURE 1.1: John's sheets
Fig. 1.1 shows that in (2a) the relations between John's sheets and those
possible meanings (i.e. Ml. M2, ...) are certain. i.e. they definitely belong to
John's sheets. This is what Kempson's example exhibits. On the other hand.
(2b) reveals the uncertainty between John's sheets and its possible meanings.
This is what a fuzzy expression would depict.
In addition, indeterminacy of meaning of John's sheets in (2a) could be re¬
solved in context. We may be able to pick up one of those interpretations
which fits in a certain context. On the other hand, for (2b) context may not
resolve fuzziness (see page 19 for further discussion on contextual effects).
So. John's sheets is not fuzzy in my terms.
Then, in terms of type (3), lack of specification, Kempson says:"The simplest
example of lack of specification is an item like neighbour which is unspecified
for sex, or for that matter, race, or age, etc. It can be applied to people as
disparate as a tiny, five-foot Welshman studying Philosophy, and a six-foot
Ghanaian girl who has seven children and who only did four years" schooling".
However, this appears to be a type of generality. There is uncertainty over
whether Perth is a city or not, but there may be no dispute about both the
Welshman and the Ghanaian girl being neighbours. The expression neighbour
is a general term, i.e. unspecified in Kempson's terms.
There is a distinction between unspecified and fuzzy. The concept of unspec-
ification concerns an expression not constituting or falling into a specifiable
category, whereas the concept of fuzziness concerns an expression having an
uncertain extensional denotation. For instance, Kempson calls the expression
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neighbour unspecified in terms of sex, age or race. We say that the expression
is fuzzy, because we do not know whether or not a person living one mile
away is a neighbour. What fuzziness concerns is if an entity is denoted by
an expression, but not the nature of the entity. As far as the example of
neighbour is concerned it can be both unspecified (as Ivempson implies) and
fuzzy (as I imply).
In terms of type (4), Kempson discusses or in the sentence The applicants
for the job either had a first-class degree or some teaching experience. The
implication that or contributes to the sentence is that one of the two con-
juncts is true, or possibly both are true. That is to say or in this instance
may or may not be used in an inclusive sense: an applicant could have a
first-class degree, or some teaching experience, or both. Then, the sentence
given would be either true or false totally. This is not a case of fuzziness.
because a fuzzy sentence such as About 200 students left, would have a degree
of truth.
To conclude, of Kempson's four types of vagueness only type (1) presents a
case of fuzziness in my terms, characterized by having no precise extension
for an expression.
1.2.3 Ambiguity
Ambiguity is defined as: expressions which have more than one unrelated
meaning. An expression is ambiguous if it has several paraphrases which are
not paraphrases of each other. One example often quoted is:
Flying planes can be dangerous. (1-3)
This sentence is ambiguous, since the expression flying planes itself has two
unrelated meanings: planes which fly and the flying of planes by people. This
can be illustrated in Fig. 1.2:









FIGURE 1.2: Ambiguity example
In Fig. 1.2, flying planes has two paraphrases which are not paraphrases of
each other. In what follows, the distinction between ambiguity, vagueness
and fuzziness is to be explored.
1.2.4 Distinction between the three concepts
First, let us look into the distinction between fuzziness, ambiguity and gen¬
erality. It appears that fuzziness deals with uncertain extensions, ambiguity
with more than one unrelated meaning, and generality with lack of content.
Fine (1975) explores this by providing some hypothetical examples. Sup¬
pose that the meanings of predicates, nicei, nicti, nice3, are given by the
following clauses:
Predicate m'cei is fuzzy, because its meaning is under-determined. As shown
in (1), n is mcei iff n > 15 and n is not nicex iff n < 13. That is, the range
from 13 to 15 is an under-determined area; we do not know if the area should
or should not go to nicex. To give an example, The students' number is about
200, we might say that 199 is definitely about 200 and 500 is definitely not
(1) (a) n is nice 1 iff n > 15,
(b) n is not nicex iff n < 13:
(2) (a) n is nice2 iff n > 15, (1.4)
(6) n is nice2 iff n > 14;
(3) n is nice3 iff n > 15.
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about 200, but we are less certain whether or not 290 is about 200. So. about
200 is fuzzy in the sense that its meaning is under-determined.
On the other hand, nicto is ambiguous, because its meaning is over-determined
Namely, n is nicti iff n > 15 and n is nice2 iff n > 14, then nice2 could have
two values simultaneously, i.e. 14 and 15. A term that has two values at the
same time is over-determined. For example, bank is ambiguous because it
has two readings: the rising ground bordering a lake or river; and a financial
institute. Finally, nictz is highly general or un-specific. because n is nicc.3 iff
n > 15. That is to say. any number above 15 is nicc3. which is a non-specific
meaning. For instance, the meaning of item is considered to be general in
the sense that it does not specify the nature of the things it denotes.
Sorensen (1990) also discusses the differences between ambiguity, generality
and fuzziness (vagueness in Sorensen's terms). Sorensen says that the dis¬
tinction is crucial for avoiding confusions emanating from the locution "Word
w means either x or y or r". Under the generality reading, this "meaning
fork" says all utterances of the word mean a disjunction of subclasses, as
in "'Child' means boy or girl". Let read "it' means r", and suppose
that w ranges over utterances of a word (or statement) and r^.r-y rn are
alternative readings. Then, a general term always means: either x or y or r.
i.e.
Under the ambiguity reading the utterances have a disjunction of meanings
(or senses) as in "'Bank' either means a financial institution or the side of a
river". An ambiguous term always either means z or means y or means r, i.e.
Under the fuzziness reading the utterances all mean the same thing but we
do not know which precise meaning that is. Each alternative is a definition
designed to hold for all utterances of the word, as noonish either always
(w)Mw{ri V r2 V ... V rn). (1.5)
(w){Mwri V MWT2 V ... V MWTn). (1.6)
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means within one minute of noon or always means within two minutes or ....
A fuzzy term either always means x or always means y or always means c.
i.e.
(w)MWTl V (•w)MWT2 V ... V (iv)Mwr„. (1.7)
Next, a discussion about homonymy and polysemy will make the distinction
between ambiguity, vagueness, and fuzziness clearer.
Homonymy and polysemy
In terms of the concepts of word and lexical item, I consider that the set of
lexical items is a subset of the superset of words. For instance, there is one
word tap. but two lexical items: to give someone a tap on the shoulder, and a
water tap. The Chinese word hui "ability/a meeting'3 has at least two lexical
items: a meeting and ability. Moreover, each lexical item can be divided into
different semes. For example, the lexical item hui 'ability', has at least two
semes: can and understand.
At the level of words, if a word has more than one unrelated meaning, then
we term it homonymy. An example of homonymy is the word tap, since
its two lexical items, as mentioned above, are not semantically related. At
the seme level, if semes derived from the same lexical item are semantically
related to each other, then we call it polysemy. Consider the Chinese word
hui in the following sentences:
3From hereon, FQs in Chinese are represented by pinyin—a common phonetic system
used to symbolize Chinese characters. The English translation is in single quotes.
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Wo hui shuo Yingwen.
'/ can speak English.'
Wo hui yi de diandiantou
I understand meaning particle nod
'/ nodded understandingly
The two semes—can and understand—in (a) and (b) represent two different
but related meanings in that presumably if one can deal with something then
one would understand what one is doing.
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FIGURE 1.3: Chinese example of homonymy and polysemy
It is shown that there are three levels: the word level, the lexical item
level, and finally the seme level. Correspondingly, there are two relations:
homonymy and polysemy. Homonymy is a property of a word represented
by the relation between its lexical items. Polysemy is a property of a lexical
item represented by the relation between its semes. The question is how
these three levels and two relations are connected to the distinction between
ambiguity, vagueness and fuzziness. Let us examine Fig 1.4:
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Homonymy Polysemy
bank mouth
/ \ / / \ \
bankl bank2




(of a river) (of a vessel) (of a person)
related
FIGURE 1.4: English examples of homonymy and polysemy
It appears that ambiguity is associated with the word level and is connected
with homonymy only, e.g. the word bank illustrated in Fig. 1.4. Vagueness,
on the other hand, is represented by polysemy, as mouth in Fig. 1.4. as is
fuzziness. Fuzziness and vagueness are not connected with homonymy. For
instance, fuzziness between vermilion and pale red exists in terms of polysemy
under the lexical item red. In terms of levels, fuzziness and vagueness are
associated with all three levels, the word, the lexical item and the seme.
Furthermore, a fuzzy expression is defined as an expression which has no
clear-cut boundary. However, a vague expression is defined as an expression
which has more than one related meaning, and the question of whether these
meanings have clear-cut meaning boundaries is irrelevant. For instance, the
meaning boundary of about 200 is not determinate, which concerns fuzziness.
On the other hand, vagueness concerns more than one related meaning: for
example, John's book has the book John owns, the book John wrote, the
book he has been reading, the book he has been told to read, the book he
was carrying when he came into the room. etc.. Whether or not these mean¬
ings have a clear-cut boundary does not concern vagueness. What fuzziness
concerns in this case would be whether or not the denotation of each possible
meaning of John's book is determinate. For instance, the book John wrote is
fuzzy, because authorship is fuzzy—how much of the book would John have
to write to become one of its authors?
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Next, a distinction between the three phenomena can be made by looking at
their connections with context.
Contextual factors
It is known that elimination of ambiguity can be carried out if an ambiguous
word is associated with a given context. For example, punch is ambiguous.
It means to hit in I was punched by him: or a drink in I made gallons of rum
punch for the party.
This may also be the case for examples of vagueness, i.e. vagueness may also
be removed by referring to context. For instance:
a. I read John's book, which was written by his father.
b. John and Mary have both written books and I have just managed
to get John's book.
(1.9)
From the context we know that in (a) John's book means the book he owns,
not the one he wrote: whereas in (b) John's book means the book he wrote,
not the one he bought. When John's book stands as an isolated lexical item,
it is vague; but the vagueness could be removed once it is associated with
context.
However, in the case of fuzziness even an adequate context is irrelevant to
defuzzification. For instance, Mary is about JO years old is fuzzy; because
we cannot reach an agreement of the exact numerical value of about 20 years
old, the sentence remains an approximation in whatever context. This re¬
veals that fuzziness is inherent, but vagueness and ambiguity are contextually
resolvable.
Finally, it appears that ambiguity has two forms: syntactic form and lexical
form. To take an example of syntactic ambiguity—the sentence Young men
and women came to my party yesterday has at least two readings. However, it
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seems that vagueness and fuzziness are primarily involved with the meaning
per se, i.e. different syntactic structures do not produce vague/fuzzy mean¬
ings. This further differentiates ambiguity from fuzziness and vagueness.
An overall profile of the three concepts corresponding to various parameters
discussed above, is summarized in Table 1.2:
TABLE 1.2: Ambiguity—vagueness—fuzziness
homo/poly Clear-cut More than Context Syntactic or
boundary one meaning resolved semantic
Ambiguity homonymy yes/no yes yes syn/seman
Vagueness polysemy yes/no yes yes semantic
Fuzziness polysemy no no no semantic
The table shows that the three concepts differ in several aspects. They are
examined at the three levels (word, lexical item, and seme) and connected
with the two relations (homonymy and polysemy). It is my contention that
ambiguity is associated with the level of words, is related to homonym}- only,
and is represented by both syntactic and semantic forms. In contrast, vague¬
ness and fuzziness of an expression do not emerge from syntactic structure.
Vagueness and fuzziness can be examined at all three levels of word, lexical
item and seme, but are primarily related to polysemy. In general, vagueness
and fuzziness are under-determined, and ambiguity is over-determined. In
terms of whether or not ambiguous and vague expressions have a clear-cut
boundary, the answer is yes and no. For example, John's sheets is vague
in that it has more than one related interpretation, such as the sheets John
bought or the sheets John made, etc. Whether or not the meaning bound¬
ary for these interpretations is fuzzy is not an issue as far as vagueness is
concerned, as is ambiguity, i.e. it may be fuzzy or it may not. Finally, an
ambiguous or vague term has more than one meaning (e.g. bank or John's
book), but not a fuzzy term. A fuzzy term may not have a determinate mean¬
ing boundary, but it has only one meaning. For example, about 20 means a
number approximate to 20. We say that a fuzzy term has no more than one
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meaning in the sense that although a fuzzy term may have more than one ex¬
tension, it only has one intension, which differs from a vague or an ambiguous
term (see Section 7.2 for more discussion on intension and extension).
In conclusion, the discussion in this section verifies that the term fuzziness
has nothing to do with misuse, and is indeed a technical term. Fuzziness
differs from ambiguity and vagueness in that it is not simply a result of a
one-to-many relationship between a term and its subsets, (e.g. John's book).
nor a list of alternative meanings of an expression (e.g. bank). Fuzziness is
defined in terms of the denotation of an expression. Fuzziness is inherent
in the sense that it is not resolvable even with resort to context. On the
other hand, vagueness and ambiguity may be contextually resolved, i.e. some
readings can be eliminated by incompatibility with a given context4.
1.3 Types of FQs
The types of FQs are examined in terms of the way they are constructed.
There are three types of FQs which will be discussed in this work.
1.3.1 The three types
TABLE 1.3: Types
Type I: few, a few, many, a lot
Type II: about n, n or m, n-ish, nearly n, n or so, n-odd
Type III (semi-FQs): fewer than n, more than n, at least n.
(n and m indicate numerals.)
4It may be argued that the claim that fuzziness is not resolvable by context is a theoretical
assumption: it is not empirically testable because there is no way, at least at the moment,
we can extract context from a linguistic discourse.
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In terms of Type I FQs, more can be listed: not quite all, nearly all. most,
very many, an awful lot. a majority, a comfortable majority, quite a lot, quite
a few, several, not a lot, not many, only a few, hardly any, very few. We
will only investigate a proportion of these FQs listed. FQs in Type I do not
have numerals like n and m which occur in Types II and III. For example, in
about 20, 20 is a number required for FQs in Types II and III. The number
could be a single number like 20 in about 20, or two numbers like 20 and 30
in 20 or 30.
In terms of the semantics of the three types, most of the FQs in Type I
are proportional, except FQs like several and a few (at least, the two have
less sense of proportion). FQs in the other two types are cardinal. Gener¬
ally speaking, proportional FQs are semantically more complex than cardinal
FQs. That is because a cardinal FQ decides whether a set has certain prop¬
erties based on the number of entities in the set. However, a proportional
FQ also has to consider the relation between the sets involved. For instance,
we may interpret about 20 students left by just checking how many students
left. With Many students left, we also need to decide whether or not the
set of students who left, compared to some norm in a given context, is a
significant number. The interpretation of proportional FQs requires more
than just checking some straightforward numbers in a relevant set. We will
elaborate on this throughout the following discussion.
In terms of construction, some FQs of Type I have only one element (besides
the common noun), like many. On the other hand, FQs in Types II and
III must have more than one element: approximator (e.g. about) + numeral
(e.g. 200) (see Section 1.3.2 for a definition of approximator). Approximators
have to appear with numerals to result in approximations. It is clear that
this constraint applies equally to all the approximators that fall into Types
II and III, such as nearly, or so, odd and more than. However, FQs in Type I
do not have the form of approximator + numeral, a form that FQs in Types
II and III must have.
A difference between Type III and the rest is that the former may, in a math¬
ematical sense, have a clear-cut boundary. For instance, we may say that
more than 20 has a precise interval: from 20 to positive infinity. However,
in ordinary language more than 20 would be understood as an FQ having a
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fuzzy interval, just like any other FQs. That is the reason I consider FQs of
Type III as semi-FQs, which will be discussed fully in Section 3.2.3.
1.3.2 Adaptor and fuzzifier
Approximators5 are of two types: adaptors and fuzzifiers. An adaptor oper¬
ates on an item to modify it to a certain extent, and is exemplified by sort
of6 and very. On the other hand, a fuzzifier operates on an item resulting
in a fuzzy expression, and is exemplified by about and or so.
What differentiates an adaptor from a fuzzifier is that an adaptor operates
on an item which is a fuzzy expression. All it does is alter the meaning
of the fuzzy expression to a certain degree. For example, the adaptor very
in very many may alter the original fuzzy meaning of many to a certain
degree, i.e. intensifying it. A fuzzifier, however, operates on an item which
is a non-fuzzy expression. What a fuzzifier does is create a fuzzy meaning.
Thus, the fuzzifier about combines with an exact number 200 to result in
an FQ denoted by about 200, i.e. about makes the meaning boundary of
about 200 fuzzy. In other words, adaptors can only make a quantity change
while fuzzifiers can make a quality change. Most approximators, such as
very, about, are function words—words without contentive elements. They
do not denote entities, i.e. they do not denote individuals (e.g. the word
table denotes a class of individuals) or events (e.g. the word festival denotes
a class of events).
Usually, an approximator has only one function, either as an adaptor or
a fuzzifier. However, there is at least one exceptional approximator: -ish,
which has a dual function. For instance, if -ish combines with a non-fuzzy
5Approximators are also termed as approximatives in Moxey and Sanford (1993b) and
Wierzbicka (1986). For instance, for about 20, 20 is the numeral, and about is the
approximative.
6I would draw attention to a subtle difference between the two readings of sort of. sort
of (kind of) and sort of (somewhat or to a modest extent). For instance, a sort of bird
means a kind of bird, whereas sort of a bird means somewhat a bird. In this paper, sort
of is used consistently to mean somewhat or to a modest extent.
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expression like in twentyish, it acts as a fuzzifier; whereas it could also modify
a fuzzy expression like reddish, in which it acts as an adaptor.
Fuzzifiers tend to appear with numbers. Anywhere that a number occurs,
a fuzzifier can be added to the number and result in an FQ, except where
exactly or something like that is used. For instance, I have been in Britain for
about four years can still be acceptable and meaningful without the fuzzifier
about. It is in this sense that I term about and the like as fuzzifiers which
bring a fuzzy reading to expressions and propositions which would otherwise
usually be precise'.
Adaptors rarely combine with an FQ formed by a. fuzzifier. For example,
we do not say sort of about 200, where sort of is an adaptor and about is
a fuzzifier. One thing both adaptors and fuzzifiers have in common is their
effect on the truth values of the propositions associated with them. For
instance, the truth value of the proposition 198 is 200 would be false; 198
is about 200 may be true. Also, the truth value of Steam is a gas would be
different from the truth value of Steam is sort of gas. Jim Miller (personal
communication) points out that the latter assertion places the steam on the
periphery of the set of gas, whereas the former assertion leaves it open how
central steam is in the set. As Prince et al (19S0) suggest, the addition of
an approximator to a proposition Pi results in the formation of a proposition
Pj, where i ^ j.
My definitions here are in the same vein as in Prince et al (19S0). They define
an approximator as affecting the propositional content, either by adapting a
term to a non-prototypical situation (e.g. sort of a bird) or by indicating that
some term is a rounded-off representation of some figure (e.g. about 20). In
their terms approximators differ from what they called shields, which affect
the degree and type of speaker-commitment that is inferred by implicating
that the speaker is uncertain because she/he speaks from knowledge or beliefs
acquired via plausible reasoning or that she/he has no direct knowledge but
7It is noted that even exact numbers may be understood as fuzzy. For example, often
the sentence I have been in Britain for J, years may well mean no more than I have been
in Britain for about 4 years, i.e. the fuzzifier is unstated in the former sentence but
implied by the context or understood by people.
Chapter 1. Introduction 25
is attributing the belief to a particular other. The taxonomy is illustrated in












''sort of'' ''approximately'' ''I think''
''somewhat'' ''about'' ''probably''







FIGURE 1.5: Types of Hedges
It is claimed by Prince et al that approximators affect the truth condition of
the propositions associated with them. Adaptors and rounders all implicate
non-prototypicalness. In contrast, shields do not affect the truth condition
of t he propositions associated with them. Thus, the truth value of A robin
is a bird and I guess/according to Mary a robin is a bird shall be the same.
The only effect of the latter is that the speaker implicates that she/he is
not fully or personally committed in the usual or unmarked way to the belief
that the relevant state of affairs actually pertains. Shields are not my interest
here—we will concentrate on approximators.
1.4 Causal factors for fuzziness
In this section the matter of where fuzziness comes from will be discussed.
Through the discussion the nature of the semantic imprecision of FQs will be
revealed. It is expected that clarification of this will deepen our discussion
of the semantics of FQs.
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Ullmann (1962: 118) delineates the following causal factors of fuzziness:
1. Generic character of words;
2. Meaning is never homogeneous (i.e. it is context-bound):
3. Lack of clear-cut boundaries in the non-linguistic world;
4. Lack of familiarity with what the words stand for.
He explains (1) as words referring to '"not single items but classes of things or
events bound together by some common elements". For instance, the word
bird generates a set of objects where "to have feathers" could be considered
as a common element. But, the objects in the set dilfer in some other aspects,
and we do not have a precise concept to represent them. This is seen as a
conflict between language, thought and the world, which will be discussed in
Section 1.4.1.
Factor (2) shows that interpretation of meaning is context-dependent; Ull-
mann's implication is, as Channell (1983) points out, that ultimately exact
interpretations will appear. In fact, this might not necessarily be the case
for fuzziness. For instance, it is suspected that the meaning of There are
about 10 people in the classroom may not be precise no matter what kind of
context it is put into.
Factor (3) says that fuzziness is caused by the real world. Contrary to this,
it is claimed in Section 1.4.1 below that fuzziness is not a characteristic of
reality. Factor (4) says that the reason for the existence of fuzziness is that
we are unfamiliar with what the words stand for. A word could be unfamiliar
to a child, a foreigner, or even a native adult speaker. If we do not know
what a word stands for then we do not know its meaning. However, this is
not a causal factor for fuzziness defined in this work. We define fuzzy as a
technical term; it means an expression has no clear-cut meaning boundary.
For example, we may be absolutely sure about the meaning (definitional
meaning, to be precise) of city, but we are less sure whether or not a particular
place qualifies as a city. This kind of fuzziness differs from a situation where
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a particular person happens to not know what the word city means at all.
So, factor (4) does not seem to be a causal factor, as far as the definition
of fuzziness in my terms is concerned. Next, we shall discuss a number of
causal factors for fuzziness.
1.4.1 A language concept
This section explores the issue of fuzziness as a language concept rather than
a property of reality. It is argued that fuzziness exists because thought,
language, and the world do not allow definitive mappings, since they consist
of entities of different types.
Locke—the 17th century philosopher of language and mind, author of the
Essay Concerning Human Understanding—did not believe that language is
divine and natural. He claimed that language is created by people, who
sort and dominate objects by the sensible qualities which they find in them.
Lack of a universal understanding of the world leads to a lack of accurate
and sharp criteria for defining the denotation of expressions (e.g. twentyish).
That is, fuzziness seems to emanate from people's minds. More specifically,
fuzziness is caused by human indecisiveness in applying a linguistic item to
some element of a domain.
Locke devised in Book Three of the Essay an account of meaning which he
called semantic individualism. That is, the interpretation and understanding
of meaning depend on each individual. Moreover, meaning varies in differ¬
ent situations. Locke claimed that each individual understands words in his
own particular way, owing to the impenetrable subjectivity of ideas to which
words are tied. Fuzziness is indeed associated with subjectivity, since com¬
prehension of the same expression depends greatly upon our backgrounds,
world knowledge and experience. For example, answers to the question Is
Mary beautiful? may differ according to people's varying aesthetic criteria;
our differing tastes enhance different aspects of a meal.
Taking Locke's semantic individualism as a basis, it appears that because
each individual has his own understanding of meaning, semantic imprecision
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inevitably occurs. Furthermore, even with one individual there might also
be inconsistencies in interpretations as a result of having no clear-cut criteria
in defining fuzzy expressions.
Goocher (1965) provides empirical evidence which suggests that people's in¬
ferential activities indeed cause fuzziness in terms of interpretation of ex¬
pressions like often and seldom. Take going dancing as an example; those
who disliked and had little experience of the activity tended to give higher
frequency quantifiers than those who enjoyed and had more experience of it.
For the former, going dancing once a week might be often, but it might be
seldom as far as the latter is concerned8.
However, there is a view claiming that fuzziness is a characteristic of reality.
For instance, Ullmann (1962) says that one of the four causal factors for
fuzziness is "lack of clear-cut boundaries in the non-linguistic world." An
example is sea water. Generally speaking, sea water means the salt water
in the sea. However, the sea water in the natural world is usually mixed up
with rain water and water of other kinds. Thus, the distinction of sea water
is difficult to make in practice. Objective fuzziness is even adopted as the
basis of an ancient fable. Once, Aesop's drunken master made an unrealistic
promise that he would drink up all the sea water. When he sobered up. he
turned to Aesop for help. The suggestion given by Aesop was to quibble
that what the master had promised was to drink unadulterated sea water,
but the water in the sea was actually not pure. Aesop took advantage of the
fuzziness of sea water to save his master from embarrassment by confronting
people who were waiting by the seashore.
I do not agree with the assumption that the fuzziness of sea water comes
from the fact that sea water itself is fuzzy. Sea water itself, like anything
else in the world, is just physical stuff. It is neither fuzzy nor precise, it just
exists in the world. The fuzziness of the expression is caused by the fact that
people are not capable of defining it a precise denotation, at least in ordinary
8Newstead (1988: 59) comments that it is possible that this finding is a special case
of an effect of the expected frequency, since those who like the activity or indulge in it
regularly might have a higher expected frequency for such an event. For more discussion
on the role of expectation of language users, see Section 2.4 and Section 4.1.2.
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language. That is, the fuzziness of sea water is caused by providing no sharp
criterion for defining the concept. Similarly, we can say that the expression
of a tall man is fuzzy, but not that the man himself is fuzzy just because we
are not sure whether he is tall or not.
Opposing the view that there ai'e fuzzy objects in the world is the view that
the world is precise. Tye (1990) disagrees with the view that the world is
precise, as do I. However. I do not incline to believe his view that there
are fuzzy concrete objects in the world. Tye is in favour of Ullmann's idea
mentioned above. The example Tye gives is Mount Everest. He thinks that
there is no line which sharply divides the matter composing Everest from the
matter outside it. Therefore. Everest's boundary, in Tye's view, is fuzzy, i.e.
Mount Everest is a fuzzy object. He says:"Let us hold that something x is a
borderline of F just in case x is such that there is no determinate fact of the
matter about whether x is an FT (1990: 535-536)
How could we know that a concrete object has borderline parts? Tye does
not elaborate on this. Is it somehow that the object itself illustrates it? We
have little evidence to say so. A reasonable explanation seems to be that only
human beings can set up some criteria by which those concrete objects are
classified and accommodated. Consider Mount Everest again. The reason
for its physical boundaries not being precise is, as Tye says, that there is
no line which sharply divides the matter composing Everest from the matter
outside it. Then, Tye draws his conclusion that Mount Everest itself is fuzzy.
However, it is obvious that Mount Everest itself cannot possibly draw any
line—precise or fuzzy. It is we. as human beings, who give criteria to the
concept of Mount Everest. Mount Everest is fuzzy because we cannot reach
an agreement on its denotation, but Mount Everest itself is just something
which unconsciously exists in the world.
Another example is rainbow. Although using a kind of non-ordinary lan¬
guage, physicists may somehow be able to identify the denotation of rainbow,
in ordinary language, it is fuzzy. In terms of the visual colour spectrum we
cannot decide precisely where the edge of a rainbow is, i.e. there are bands,
but no bounds. It again appears that the object in the world being called
rainbow is neither fuzzy nor precise, just something in the sky. When people
try to identify the edge of it, they may not come to an agreement. So, it is
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the expression of rainbow that is fuzzy, rather than the object itself. My view-
is shared by Russell (1923), Black (1937), Fodor (1977), Fine (1975), Danell
(1978), and Schmidt (1974). They all agree that fuzziness is a phenomenon of
language, not of reality. Moreover, even if our perception of something (e.g.
rainbow) in the world were absolutely accurate, language communication of
such information could not be (see the next section for the details).
To sum up, it is claimed that fuzziness is a property of language and hu¬
man inferential activity, but not a property of concrete objects in the real
world. Fuzziness is due to the fact that there is no precise correspondence,
i.e. a mismatch, among human thought, language and the real world; they
are different in various aspects. As far as linguistics is concerned we say
that the denotation of an expression is fuzzy, and is a matter of linguistic
categorisation. Cognitive property may be significant in the way the world is
structured by humans, but fuzziness (in denotation) is essentially a linguistic
concept.
1.4.2 Lack of need for preciseness
In this section, we discuss the lack of need for preciseness in language. Con¬
sider the sentence, Mary is twentyish, which has a fuzzy meaning. In com¬
munication, there may be no need to make the sentence precise after all.
That is, this fuzzy sentence may just serve our communicational purpose
well; a precise sentence is simply not required. Another example is Mount
Everest. It is true that there is no sharp criterion to decide where to draw
a line which divides the matter composing Mount Everest from the matter
outside it. Nevertheless, the fact is that there is usually no need to do so in
day-to-day conversation anyway.
This factor is compatible with Grice's (1975) conversational principles. He
outlines cooperative principles which see certain maxims followed in conver¬
sational situations:
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Maxim of Relevance: Do not say something that is not relevant. , m
Maxim of Quantity: Do not say more than you need to say. ^
In the case of fuzziness, the two maxims play a key role; in particular, the
Maxim of Quantity, i.e. people should not say more than they need to say.
Then, the question is how people communicate with each other appropriately
if Locke's account of semantic individuality (see Section 1.4.1 for more details)
is the case. In other words, how can an individual elicit a common meaning
which can be understood by other people? On this point, Locke presented
an account of secret reference. What he meant by this is that there is a
presupposition of meaning among people, by which they can understand
each other up to a point. Locke thought that each individual has a private
language that might make absolutely adequate communication difficult, but
it does not mean that people cannot communicate at all. Language users
have a common secret reference that makes communication in an approximate
fashion possible.
Empirically, Locke's secret reference account is verified in our tests. It was
found that there was a high agreement on typical members of an FQ. For
instance, in Channell's (1983) test (see Appendix 1, Table 2.2). most subjects
agreed that 15 was in the meaning boundary of about 15 people, i.e. 15 was
considered as a prototype. The test results showed that the fuzziness tended
to emerge in a peripheral area. Using Locke's account of secret reference,
subjects had a kind of common understanding about the typical member of
about 15 people, which is also called public meaning in Locke's terms. It is
speculated that semantic individualism, by and large, appears in the area
of the peripheral members of an expression. Because language users have a
common understanding of the best examples of expressions in a given context,
it should be no problem for them to communicate with one another.
There is another explanation about how people communicate with fuzzy
language. Although the extension of a fuzzy word is interpreted differently,
its intensional denotation may be consistent among users. For instance,
many may well have very different numerical values corresponding to various
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given contexts. Its intension (a significant number compared to a norm),
however, could remain consistent over contexts and among language users.
Successful communication among language users may be due to a common
understanding of the intension of fuzzy words, rather than the extension (see
Section 7.2 for more discussion of the matter of intension and extension).
Lyons says: "We communicate with one another for the most part successfully,
as far as the application of words like 'dog' are concerned, only because we
do not usually find ourselves operating in the fuzzy or indeterminate areas of
a word's meaning"(19S6: 70-71). If by this he means people use fuzzy words
to communicate without consciously being aware of the fact that they are
fuzzy, then it seems only partially true. It might be the case that people do
know that words like dog are fuzzy, but they are able to deal with it as it is
and do not think that the word needs to be precise. Fodor (1977: 212) holds
a similar view. She states: "A realistic view of natural language surely must
recognise that ordinary people often do use the word bird without intending
to include penguins, or use the word fish intending to include whales. To
what extent do we really care, in our everyday conversation, whether the
words we use carve nature at its joints?"
To sum up. although a fuzzy term is imprecise, very often there is no need
to specify a precise boundary for the term. People may communicate well
enough, no matter knowing or not that they are using fuzzy language. There
might be some situations in which a precise numerical value for an FQ is sim¬
ply not needed. Furthermore, an intensional meaning, such as a significant
number for many, may just serve communicative purposes well (see Moxey
and Sanford (1993b) for further discussion of this point).
1.4.3 Need for fuzziness
It is claimed in the last section that in some situations, there is simply no
need for precision. In this section, we discuss the need for fuzziness, and its
important role in communication. Communicative need is indeed another
causal factor for fuzziness.
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As argued in Section 1.4.1. it could be the case that human perception and
cognition are not fuzzy, but the concepts and language required for commu¬
nication are. Linda Moxev (personal communication) argues correctly that
in order to convey a distance or a quantity we have to have an appropriate
set of linguistic labels which can be scaled in a similar way by different lan¬
guage users. These labels only approximately describe the actual quantity
to be described. Thus even if our perception/cognition were 100% accurate,
our communication of such information could not be. For example, given
a particular scene in the sky, people might easily perceive exactly the same
(or very similar) shape/range of colours etc. The range of words we have
to describe such scenes, however, is much more severely limited than our
perception, and the label chosen by different people will be different. In fact,
the label chosen by one individual may differ from one occasion to the next
because of the function which the scene is playing in the communication.
That is why we have to use fuzzy expressions.
We need to have a means of communication which is flexible enough to cope
with the indefinite variety of our thoughts and experiences. In languages,
fuzzy expressions refer to categories of individuals or events, not just single
items, so they can function as such a means. For instance, about 200 could
be understood as denoting a set of numbers, where some numbers in the
set, say 190, are seen as more typical or better members than others, say
ISO. Moreover, FQs can be used to generalize over several instances. For
example, a person is asked how many friends he has: he may answer a few
because the number may be consistent with this description, but varies from
time to time. It is not the reality which is fuzzy, nor our perception, but the
requirement of communication needs fuzziness.
We may all experience times when we feel like fuzzy communicating or feel it
is better to communicate in this way. Fuzzy language can make our language
communication more adequate and efficient. It appears that fuzziness is
needed as much as precision, which is stated in Moxey and Sanford (1993b:
epilogue):
"Every day, in many situations, we use expressions which seem to
provide us with only vague information. The weather forecaster
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tells us that 'some showers are likely in Northern regions during
the night', a statement which is vague with respect to number of
showers, location and time. Yet such messages are informative,
and often it is not possible for the producer of the message to be
more precise. A tutor tells his students that 'only a few students
fail their exams outright'. This does not give a precise incidence.
Yet it might be equally misleading to do so. For example, to
say that 12% failed outright last year says nothing about other
years, while to say an average of S% over the last five years says
nothing about variability. VVe argue that a precise, numerical
statement can be sometimes more misleading in reality than a
vague statement."'
The usefulness and necessity of fuzzy language in communication has been
ignored for a long time by philosophers and linguists. As Lyons (19S1: 203)
says, their attitude to fuzzy language is "a highly prejudiced and unbalanced
view" and
"Not only is it frequently, and erroneously, associated with the
view that all sentences have precise and determinate meanings;
it is based on the equally erroneous assumption that clarity and
the avoidance of vagueness and equivocation are always desirable,
regardless of what language game we are playing."
In fact, fuzziness plays a very important role in language communication.
Channell (1994: Ch.S) gives a list of purposes and situations for using fuzzy
language. Here are some items on the list, with examples provided by me.
(1) Giving the right amount of information. In Grice's (1975) view of the
Maxim of Quantity, we should not say more than we need to. Fuzzy terms
are needed for conforming to this rule of conversation, by giving the right
amount of information appropriate for a given situation, not too little and
not too much. For instance, when John's daughter came back from a school
fair, he asked her: "How many people were there?". She answered:"A lot.'"
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,4 lot, as an FQ, might give just about the right amount of information John
wanted to know. He didn't expect to be given a precise number for people
who went there.
(2) Deliberately withholding information. People tend to use fuzzy language
on purpose, in order to withhold information. For example, a middle-aged
lady is asked about her age, she might say over 30 years old, when in fact
she is 39 years old.
(3) Lacking specific information. Naturally, if one does not know precise
information about something, one has to give as close an approximation as
possible. For instance, if one does not know exactly how many people in a
room, but has a rough idea that there might be about 20 people. Then, one
has to use about 20 people to answer the question "How many people are in
the room?"
(4) Self-protection: If one wants to safeguard against later being shown to
be wrong, even though one knows the exact information, one might like to
use fuzzy language. For instance, a lecturer knew exactly 200 students pre-
enrolled for his course, but when being asked, he may prefer to say about
200. The reason is that there might be some changes later on, so he uses the
FQ as a safeguard.
Channell also demonstrates some other purposes and situations of using fuzzy
language: using language persuasively; lexical gaps; displacement; power and
politeness; informality and atmosphere; and women's language. It is inter¬
esting to note that Channell says that some respondents who took part in her
test told her that women use more fuzzy expressions than men do. Moreover,
in applied linguistics, Brown (1979) from his observations of foreign speak¬
ers of English, makes a point that fuzziness is needed in terms of language
appropriateness.
The causal factors for fuzziness discussed in this section can complement each
other. Sometimes we may be able to define an expression precisely, but we
still leave it fuzzy, because there is no need to specify. For instance, one may
know Mary's precise age, but one still says Mary is twentyish because there
is no need to be precise. At other times, there is indeed a need to specify
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an expression precisely, but the mismatch between language, thought and
the world prevents us from doing so. Let us consider the example Mount
Everest. If for some reason we really need to know precisely where the line is
which sharply divides the matter composing Everest from the matter outside
it, we may find ourselves unable to do so. Also, there could be a situation
in which we are able to specify a fuzzy expression, but it would not be
socially appropriate, e.g. to specify a lady's age precisely. Certainly, there
would be cases where several factors are involved simultaneously. To consider
the sentence Mary is tall, we may have different interpretations in terms of
whether she is tall or not; meanwhile there could also be no need to specify
her precise height.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that there are two kinds of fuzziness. One
could eventually be made precise, such as the kind of fuzziness emerging from
lack of knowledge. This kind of fuzziness can be dealt within the framework
of a theory called the supervaluation theory (see Chierchia Sz McConnell-
Ginet (1990) for a discussion of the theory). The other kind of fuzziness is
caused by other factors rather than lack of knowledge. This kind of fuzzy
term cannot be made precise, which may be dealt by FST (see Chapters 5,
6, and 7 for more discussion).
In conclusion, on the one hand the mismatch between language, thought,
and the world creates fuzziness. On the other hand, often it is not pre¬
cise meaning we want, and fuzzy terms play a significant part in language
and communication. Our discussion shows that language is fuzzy because
it cannot be precise, need not be precise, and communication is sometimes
improved by not being precise. Fuzziness is viewed here as a characteristic of
language, but not of reality. Thus, a need for studying fuzziness in languages
is justified.
1.5 Approach and methodology
Although fuzziness is an important aspect of language, it has not yet received
enough attention in linguistics. There is also no well-established linguistic
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approach to it. A general approach used in my work is fuzzy semantic. It
explores FQs in terms of their denotational meanings represented by mem¬
bership functions.
1.5.1 Denotational approach
In the same vein as in Cann (1993), a denotation is defined here as consisting
of two things: intension and extension (see Section 7.2 for further discussion
of this). The reasons for using a denotational approach here are fourfold.
Firstly, the denotational meaning of linguistic expressions is a primary con¬
cern in semantics. Semantics differs from syntax, logic and psychology in
that semantics deals predominantly with the denotational meaning of ex¬
pressions. One of the criteria of an adequate semantic theory is this: A
semantic theory must provide an account of the relation between linguistic
expressions and what might be called things in the world. Also, one of the
principles of semantics states that core meaning is determined by the rela¬
tion between linguistic expressions and the entities that they refer to. In
other words, denotation forms part of the basis of semantic theory. Espe¬
cially in truth-conditional semantics, the denotational meaning is used to
judge whether or not a proposition is true. That is, from the point of view
of truth-conditional semantics, we must have some denotational meaning in
mind to be able to assess the truth or falsity of a proposition. For example,
the truth value of About 200 students left depends on whether or not the
number of students who left was approximate to 200. So, as far as seman¬
tics is concerned, denotational meaning of expressions requires investigation.
The denotational theory has been well established and has proved extremely
fruitful in the study of semantics, although there is still some debate on it.
It is thus expected that a denotational approach will be useful for the study
of FQs here.
Secondly, there is a need for the extensional denotation of FQs in commu¬
nication. In some situations, we do need to know the numerical value of an
FQ, although in an approximate way. As an illustration,
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Husband: There will be many people coming tonight for our party,
we'd better prepare enough food.
Wife: How many roughly?
(1.11)
In this anecdote, it appears reasonable for the wife to ask for an approximate
number to prepare food for the party.
Thirdly, researchers have reported that subjects experienced little difficulty
coming up with numerical values in one form or another (e.g. Mosteller and
Youtz 1990). This claim is also supported by a large percentage of subjects
who were able to give numerical intervals in my Chinese test (see Chapter 3
for the details). In the Chinese data (see Appendix 2, Table 2.2), out of
24 items studied, 100% of subjects marked numerical intervals for 13 items:
99.9% — 97.78% for 9 items; and 81.48% for two items. In Channell's (1985)
English data (see Appendix 1, Table 1.2), out of 32 items tested 100% of
subjects marked numerical intervals for 15 items; 99.9% - 90% for 12 items:
only 5 items were below 90%. This empirical evidence provides a foundation
for a denotational approach in the sense that the denotational meaning of
FQs can be elicited.
Finally, the study of the denotational meaning has an important role in
emerging technologies, such as Expert Systems. For instance, a simulation
processing has to somehow represent a degree of uncertainty or confidence,
in order to simulate human expertise or experience. FQs are often used by
experts. For instance, one may say that Give a few minutes to cool the soup
down, then stir it for another 5 or so minutes. This piece of information is
fuzzy. The question then is how to make machines to process these FQs. To
solve this kind of problem, a denotational study is needed.
However, it could be said that there is no need for specific numerical values
in understanding of FQs. For example, many in There were many people in
my room may simply imply that there were more than a normal number in
the room. Also, few in There were few people in my room could just suggest
that there were less than a normal number in the room. What matters in
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these two sentences is the inference, or some other information conveyed
by them, rather than numerical values. This may be reasonable from the
point of view of other fields, but not from a semantic point of view which
has been explained above. In particular, the idea that the numerical value
is a dismissible matter is less obvious with, for example, Type II FQs. In
the sentence There were about 50 people in my room, the numerical value of
about 50, however crude, appears to be a main concern, as far as semantics
is concerned.
Indeed, sometimes we may only use intensional denotation of an FQ in com¬
munication, rather than its extensional denotation. In other words, it could
be that in non-experimental situations, a few often means a small number
and does not get mapped to a more fine-grained scale at all. Although in
some situations a few in A few students went to the party may mean a small
number and its numerical value may not be a concern, we cannot then claim
that a few does not have an extensional denotation at all, because it is equally-
true that we do use the extension of a few, say 4 in a given context, in com¬
munication. Although pragmatically we may not always need to know the
extensional denotation of a few, in a semantic theory we must have some pro¬
vision for explaining its intension, extension, and the relation between them.
What concerns semantics is the issues of how the extension of an FQ is de¬
termined by its intension, and extensional meaning, i.e. numerical meaning
in the case of FQs is part of the meaning for most, if not all, expressions.
I am aware that in some situations, the numerical values between FQs, e.g.
a few students and few students, may not be differentiable. However, it does
not mean that the two are extensionally equivalent or they have no extensions
at all, since a few and few may differ extensionally in some other situations9.
Another example: in some situations, few and very few may not be different
in numbers. However, in the sentence There were few customers in the shop
yesterday; there were very few customers today, few and very few may not
convey the same numerical value. Very few probably means a smaller number
9A1so, taking the morpho-syntax seriously, few students and a few students are not equiv¬
alent. Indeed, the use of the indefinite signals that a non-numerical meaning is intended,
but there is still a relation between the cardinality of a few and that of few with respect
to some norm as denoted by students.
Chapter 1. Introduction 40
compared to that of few. The point is that we cannot claim that a few and
few, similarly few and very few, are the same in numbers, since a few differs
in meaning from few if there is some situation in which the former is the case
but not the latter, and vice versa.
It must be made clear that the denotational approach promoted in my work
is different from an approach called the uni-dimensional approach (see Moxey
and Sanford (1993b) for further discussion of the problems of this approach).
The general idea of the uni-dimensional approach is that the meaning of FQs
can be and should be captured by scale-values adequately. One of its ultimate
goals is to provide some kind of codification for regulating the meaning and
usage of fuzzy terms (see Mosteller and Voutz (1990) for a discussion of
codification). However, my work here attempts to capture general semantic
patterns of FQs in terms of their denotational meanings, not codification of
any sort. It is not my interest to map each FQ into a fine-grained scale to
get some kind of precise numerical value.
As argued above, as far as the semantics is concerned, denotational meaning
of FQs is important to explore. However, it is not assumed that FQs cannot
and should not be explored from other perspectives. For example, FQs may
also be examined from the point of view of pragmatics or psychology, where
how context affects the meaning or how people understand FQs would be in
focus. Moxey and Sanford (e.g. 1993b) have done some important work on
FQs by using a multi-dimensional approach. They have proved on empirical
grounds that other aspects of meaning differ between quantifiers, such as
attentional focus10 and inferential pattern (see Section 2.4 for a review of
their work). I do not assume that FQs only differ numerically; in fact I
agree that they may differ in some other ways, as argued by Moxey and
Sanford. However, my interest in this work is the denotational meaning, so
non-numerical aspects of FQs will not be my focus here.
10An attentional theory on natural language quantifiers has been developed by Moxey and
Sanford (1993b) (see Section 8.4 for the details).
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1.5.2 Membership function
Denotational meanings of FQs here will be represented by membership func¬
tions as defined in FST (see Section 5.2 for the details). FQs in my work
are defined as fuzzy semantic units by assigning them a grade of membei'ship
and a degree of truth for sentences containing such units. In the case of FQs,
conventional semantic theory is regarded not as an empirical hypothesis, but
as a default truth. It tends to make a rigid distinction between semantic units
and to represent an over-simplified form that does not capture the richness
of FQs in natural language. For instance, there is no absolute boundary for
FQs like about 200 people, but the all-or-none principle of the conventional
theory cannot represent the fuzzy semantics. It appears that fuzziness can
be reasonably handled within the framework of fuzzy semantics led by FST.
This will be demonstrated throughout the following discussion.
The method used in this work is primarily theoretical, i.e. my main focus
is the theoretical semantics of FQs, formal semantics in particular. Some
sample empirical data from Chinese and English will be discussed for the
purpose of illustrating the possible semantic trends and how my formal se¬
mantics would work with more appropriate membership functions. Although
it would be surprising if every language turned out to be identical, there
should be some common patterns to be observed. This kind of pattern will
be explored and formalized in my work. It is important to make clear about
the capabilities of my formal system and its relationship to the statistical
results. Because my data here is a sample, it will not be considered as a
justification of my formal treatments. All the membership functions used in
my formal semantic framework are hypothetical.
Finally, the focus in my study here is the semantics of FQs with respect to
ordinary language, not scientific language. That is, I am interested in the
FQs in the context of natural language. This is an important point to be
borne in mind since an expression may be interpreted differently depending
on whether it is considered in ordinary language or scientific language. For
instance, colour terms are fuzzy in day-to-day language, but there are precise
scientific definitions for each colour term.
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1.6 Conclusion
A fuzzy quantifier, as a technical term, is a quantifier with a "hazy" meaning
boundary, such as about 20 and many. Being used here as a technical term,
it is not fuzzy at all in the sense that it is appropriately defined. Approxi¬
mators, such as about and very, have a function to fuzzify or modify. Given
that language is relatively efficient and the functional vocabulary more so,
the fuzzification and modification determined by an approximator must be
different from those defined by all others. What are these membership func¬
tions? How do they vary? How can we define FQs1 semantics using them?
The following chapters will discuss these questions.
FQs are indeed an important linguistic phenomenon to be studied in linguis¬
tics. Because of their unique characteristic of having a hazy boundary, the
non-standard theory, FST, is employed in my work here. I am aware of the
fact that FQs can be explored through some other perspectives, but in my
semantic work here it is essential to explore the denotational meaning of FQs
represented by membership functions.
2
Previous work on fuzziness
In this chapter, we will review the following works: Black (1937) concern¬
ing consistency, Wallsten et al (1986a) concerning membership functions,
Mosteller and Youtz (1990) concerning codification, Moxey and Sanford
(1993b) concerning pragmatic effects, and Wachtel (19S1) concerning a for¬
mal treatment for FQs.
2.1 Black's work
As early as 1937, Black proposed a quantitative description of fuzzy items,
called a consistency profile. He defines the consistency of application of a
term T to an element s, s G 5, as:
C(T, s) = limjfr
M —► oo (2.1)
N —* oo
where M stands for the number of positive judgments that T applies to s,
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N the number of negative ones, and lim stands for a limit of M or N. The
consistency profile is then defined as the function C(T, s) over the domain of
applicability S. This can be represented in Fig. 2.1, reproduced from Black
(1937):
FIGURE 2.1: Hypothetical consistency profile
As Hersh and C'aramazza (1976) point out, Fig. 2.1 exhibits a typical example
in which the most doubtful cases correspond to C(T, s) = 1, i.e. 50% yes
and 50% no. This profile, then, is used to define the fuzziness of a term by
taking the slope of the curve from point b to point c, shown in Fig. 2.1. as
an index of fuzziness.
The quantitative description proposed by Black assumes the consistency of
fuzzy items in terms of their denotational variations. This differs slightly
from Zadeh's (1965) FST in that Zadeh makes a quantitative description
of a fuzzy item by focusing on its membership function (see Section 5.2 for
further discussion of this point), rather than its consistency of application.
However, there is a similarity between them in that they all consider the
application of fuzzy item as a matter of degree.
Hempel (1939) develops (2.1) further, to restrict the range of C to a closed
interval 0 to 1. His definition is:





where the consistency of application of a term T, to an object s £ 5 will have
a range in [0, 1], and the borderline cases take on values of about 0.5.
Importantly, Black assumes that fuzziness must be characterized with con¬
sistency, i.e. the variability of applications of an item has to be predictable
and regular, otherwise there would be no way for us to make some kind of
distinction between them. His assumption is empirically justified, in part, by
the data in Wallsten et al (19S6a) where the membership function is reliable
on an individual basis (see Section 2.2 for the details).
What I intend to study in my work is compositionality which shares Black's
idea in that there must be something common among FQs, otherwise se¬
mantic theories would not make much sense (see Section 4.2 for a discussion
on compositionality). One of my ultimate goals in this thesis is to pull out
common properties of FQs, and formalize them.
Wallsten and his colleagues (Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick and Forsyth
1986a, henceforth Wallsten et al; Rapoport, Wallsten and Cox 1987) inves¬
tigate ways by which the meaning of probability terms, in specific contexts
and to individuals, can be represented adequately. They employ a technique
similax to the membership function defined in FST, i.e. employing [1,0] to
indicate a degree ofmembership. There is little empirical work done on mem¬
bership functions per se, although there is considerable theoretic literature
on FST. Wallsten et aTs work claims, on empirical grounds, that a mem¬
bership function is useful for representing the meaning of fuzzy terms, like
toss-up and improbable. Their empirical data elicited from sophisticated and
technically elegant experiments enhance the theoretical idea of the notion
2.2 The work of Wallsten et al
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of membership function in FST. They established and assessed membership
functions by using a modified pair-comparison procedure in two experiments.
In the first experiment, ten probability terms were tested: they were almost
certain, probable, likely, good chance, possible, toss-up, unlikely, improbable,
doubtful, and almost impossible. Twenty graduate students were recruited as
subjects. There were three sessions, and three parts in each session. Session
one was for practice only and the other two were for collecting data. For
each session, part one elicited an interval for a given term. The results of
this part were then used to determine the unique probabilities to be used in
Parts 2 and 3 for each subject. The second part of the session was to present
one probability term with a pair of spinners which were radially divided with
segments of opposing colours denoting different probabilities, as shown in
Fig. 2.2, reproduced from Wallsten ct al (19S6a: 350).
Doubtful
i l I I t l i i l
FIGURE 2.2: Sample experimental scenario
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Subjects estimated the degree to which one probability rather than another
was better described by a probability term. For instance, subjects had to
judge, as shown in Fig. 2.2, that the term doubtful was better described by
the probability shown in the left-hand spinner or the probability shown in
the right-hand spinner. By moving the arrow along the line underneath the
two spinners, subjects indicated to what extent one probability was better
than the other. If the left spinner was considered absolutely better described,
the subject would move the arrow to the far left. On the other hand, if the
right spinner was absolutely better described, then one would move the arrow
to the far right. Leaving the arrow in the middle indicated that the term
was equally well described by the two spinners. The probabilities on the two
spinners were changed from trial to trial, and varied factorially for each term.
Based on various scaling models, membership functions were plotted for each
term against probability values which were derived by calculating the degree
of displacement on the line using a conjoint-measurement theory (Norwich
and Turksen, 1982, 1984; Sjoberg, 1980).
Part 3 reversed the procedure, conducted to validate the results of Part 2.
That is, on trial a spinner representing a particular probability was written
at the top of the screen, and two probability terms were presented below
it. In the same manner as Part 2, the subject moved the arrow on the
line segment to indicate the degree to which one term rather than another
better described a particular probability. For instance, the arrow position on
the line indicated to what extent a probability 0.3 was better described by
doubtful than likely.
The results showed that individual subjects were reasonably stable over ses¬
sions, despite the fact that there was no probability term for which all sub¬
jects' membership functions had exactly the same shape. For Parts 2 and 3,
data were analyzed at the individual level. Membership functions were rep¬
resented by the shape of curves plotted against probability values given by
each individual. It is concluded by Wallsten et al that subjects can compare
degrees of membership in such a way that leads to a consistent, meaningful,
and interpretable scaling of fuzzy meanings, according to either a ratio model
or a different model.
It turned out that 67% of membership functions observed were interpretable
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as meaningful test results, 30% of these weremonotonic, and 31% were single-
peaked. Thirty-three percent were not interpretable because they were mul-
tipeaked, which was explained by Wallsten et al as measurement error. After
the first experiment,Wallsten and his colleagues realized some problems with
sampling probabilities over ranges specified by individuals, i.e. individual¬
izing the stimuli for each subject. All the trials in Parts 2 and 3 depended
on a single determination of an upper and lower probability for each term
obtained in Part 1. Then, if a subject made an error in Part 1, that error
would be carried through all the subsequent results, making the compari¬
son between subjects more difficult. To provide more complete and reliable
membership functions for each subject, a second experiment was conducted.
In the second experiment, eight subjects were selected who had given rela¬
tively consistent and more reliable membership functions in the first experi¬
ment than the other 12 subjects. This time, the stimuli were reduced to six
probability terms—almost certain, almost impossible, unlikely, and possible
were dropped out. There was no Part 1, instead probabilities were selected
on the basis of results from Experiment 1 and the same values were used
for all subjects. The subjects' performances were similar to those described
earlier, in spite of some minor response procedure change.
The results for the second experiment were more interpretable, with 56% of
membership functions as monotonic and 44% as single-peaked. Again there
was little within-subject variability over sessions, but there was considerable
difference between subjects, except for toss-up. Toss-up was given similar
single-peaked functions by all eight subjects, whereas none of the other five
terms was given precisely the same function by any two subjects. This can
be illustrated as in Fig. 2.3, reproduced from Wallsten et al (1986a: 360-361).
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FIGURE 2.3: Probability
The functions are coded as follows: D = doubtful; GC = good chance; Pr = probable; T
= toss-up; I = improbable; L = likely.
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As shown, for those monotonic functions, the best described probability is
at the end of the range, whereas for those single-peaked functions, it is at
the centre of the range. Wallsten and his colleagues conclude that the more
extreme probability terms tend to have monotonic functions, and more cen¬
tral terms tend to have single-peaked functions. They also believe that the
judgments obtained were highly reliable, and satisfied a set of necessary con¬
ditions required for measurement of membership. The results, they claim,
were fitted well with the scale values extracted by appropriate algebraic mod¬
els (Budescu & Wallsten, 19S7). It is also concluded that theoretical issues
regarding the use and understanding of probability phrases are more appro¬
priately investigated at an individual level rather than a group level.
The construct of the membership was further validated by the work in
Rapoport, Wallsten and Cox (1987). In their work, a comparison between
a direct (magnitude estimation) and an indirect (graded pair-comparison)
procedure was carried out through establishing membership functions for
some probability terms. It is concluded that there is consistency in terms
of membership functions obtained from the modified pair-comparison, direct
estimation, and ranking procedures. Indirect procedure is slightly more ac¬
curate than the direct procedure, but the direct estimation technique may
obtain sufficiently good results in general.
It is empirically shown by Wallsten et al (1988: 42) that the interpretation
of a probability term appears to depend on context. The data in Fillenbaum
et al (1987) yield that the function representing a term for a given individual
is located more centrally and covers a broader interval when the phrase is
received from, rather than selected for communication to, another person.
Moreover, base rate (Wallsten, Fillenbaum &: Cox 19S6b) and desirability of
the events (Cohen 1986) also have an impact on the function of a probability
term.
The work done by Wallsten et al lays an empirical foundation for my claim
that the meaning of FQs can be represented by membership functions. Also,
their findings on context effects provide empirical evidence for my discussion
on the relation between FQs and context (see Chapter 4 for more discussion).
Wallsten et al make an assumption that fuzzy terms investigated in their
Chapter 2. Previous work on fuzziness 51
work are compositional in that the shape of curve generated by a term would
be the same. On the other hand, Moxey and Sanford (1993b) do not agree
with this on the grounds that the shape may change. My work will show
that compositionality is not about the shape of curves, otherwise it would
not sustain at least in the case of FQs; I agree with Moxey and Sanford that
context may alter the shapes (see Chapter 4 for further discussion on this).
Mosteller and Youtz (1990) explore the possibility of codification for proba¬
bility and frequency items. They gathered empirical data from 20 different
studies in which 52 expressions were tested. A comparison shows that the
variation of numerical averages of opinions on quantitative meaning of 52
items was modest, although they were tested in a variety of populations (e.g.
students, physicians, other medical workers, and science writers), formats of
questions, instructions, and contexts. The consistency is claimed to suggest
that the test results may be useful for codification.
Mosteller and Youtz conclude that it is possible to offer codifications by
determining what these terms mean to the people who use them, and see how
satisfactory people find them. For instance, they found that likely was judged
to represent an average proportion of 0.71 of the time with an interquartile
range of about 0.15. That is to say, if one says something is likely, then one
means that it occurs about 71% of the time plus or minus 7.5%. This kind
of average is codified in their work for a number of probability and frequency
expressions. It is claimed that codification achieves a better communication
in that expressions codified can be used and interpreted consistently.
The codification idea is also promoted in the work done by Kong et al (1986).
Their study, conducted through a nationwide interactive computer network
based at the Massachusetts General Hospital, was carried out to test the
meaning of commonly used probability terms. For 12 expressions used in the
test, there was little variation in the median values assigned to them among
the three groups: physicians, medical students, and other professionals. Also,
2.3 Mosteller and Youtz's work
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the same order remained in terms of means for seven of the 12 expressions
compared to those found in an earlier study by other researchers, although
numerical values assigned to the seven items were not the same. It is then
concluded that consistency among groups of professionals is encouraging for
the future prospect of codifying the meaning of such expressions. The in¬
vestigation of codifying is needed to standardize the variation in the use of
probability terms. The average numerical values presented in the work could
well be used to enhance communication among medical professionals and the
like.
The effort put into codification shows that there is a desire to have a relatively
consistent assignment to a fuzzy expression, and it is indeed not difficult to
get an average from different contexts and different individuals. The question
is whether or not this kind of codification is acceptable and adequate. In
discussing Mosteller and Youtz's work, H. Clark (1990) says that the meaning
of tall means "greater than some norm in height", which should not change
over contexts. What changes is the normal height we infer in order to fill out
the meaning of tall with respect to a certain context. We are likely to infer
different heights for tall when it is used in tall grass vs tall tree1. Clark states
that fuzzy items discussed in Mosteller and Youtz have the same property
as tall, i.e. they are relative adjectives or adverbs. For instance, often really
means "often relative to C"; it varies from context to context (see H. Clark
(1990) for a detailed discussion). Any codifications by averaging over contexts
would not be adequate in the sense that we cannot possibly exhaust all the
contexts.
While Wallsten and Budescu (1990) applaud the work done by Mosteller
and Youtz (1990), they also state that regularity should not be taken to
suggest that a major codification of the language of probability is a goal
to be pursued, for at least four reasons: consistent individual differences;
personally vague meanings; context effects; and the necessity of fuzziness.
It is argued that probability phrases should not be made to appear more
precise than they really are. There are situations in which the nature of
'What Clark talks about may also be explained as a difference between intension and
extension of a word (see Section 7.2 for the details); that is, the intension of a word is
relatively independent of context, but not its extension.
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fuzzy judgment is useful information in and of itself. Communication about
uncertainty should always be as precise as possible, but never more precise
than warranted by the data.
It appears to me that Mosteller and Youtz's work for codification could be
useful for some situations where a specific value for a fuzzy term is required.
For example, in the case of weather broadcasting, we may need to know
a numerical value for some fuzzy items, say likely. Then, codification can
be considered as one of those alternatives to achieve this goal. However, as
Wallsten and Budescu (1990) point out, in ordinary language fuzzy terms are
not precise, and there is no need to make them precise (see Section 1.4 for
more discussion). Also, codification is not universally applicable, especially
to those complex fuzzy terms. For example, codification might be much
easier for about 200 people than for many, while 200 can act as a norm, but it
is hard to get a unitary norm for many in isolation. It could be 10, or 1,000,
very much depending on context.
It is concluded that codification can be done if required for a certain purpose,
but it would be mistaken to overestimate its usefulness. It appears to me that
as far as the semantics of fuzzy expressions is concerned, it is the semantic
structure that is important, not those specific values. This point will be
addressed throughout the following discussion.
2.4 Moxey et aVs work
Moxey et al (e.g. 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 & 1995) have
done extensive research on natural language quantifiers in terms of how they
are understood, Teasoned and used. They aim at:
1. Investigating what differentiates quantifiers from one another in terms
of conditions of use.
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2. Examining how the understanding of quantified statements might fit
into more general accounts of language understanding, and of reason¬
ing. (Moxey and Sanford, 1993b: 111)
Since my work here concentrates on the semantics of FQs, Moxey and San-
ford's work of the effect of context on the interpretation of FQs will be
reviewed in detail.
One of their experiments was carried out for testing the proportions denoted
by FQs like many in three different contexts. The subjects were 450 univer¬
sity students who were presented with one of the following, where QUANT
represents a quantifier:
"The residents association's Xmas party was held last night in the town hall.
QUANT of those who attended the party enjoyed what might be called the
social event of the year." (Residents Association condition)
"At yesterday's party conference, Mr Cameron spoke about the effects of ed¬
ucation cuts on British universities. QUANT of his audience were convinced
by his conclusions." (Party Conference condition)
"A survey has recently been carried out to find out whether or not female
students prefer to be examined by female doctors. QUANT of the local
doctors are female." (Survey condition)
Subjects were divided into 30 independent groups of 15. One third of those
groups (150 subjects) were presented with the Residents Association text,
another third with the Party Conference text, and the remainder with the
Survey text.
Within each of the above texts, QUANT was replaced with one of the follow¬
ing ten quantifiers: few, a few, very few, only a few, quite a few, not many,
many, very many, quite a lot and a lot. One tenth of the subjects (15 sub¬
jects) in each topic condition were presented with one of the ten quantifiers.
On a separate sheet of paper, each subject was then posed a question. One
third of the subjects in each of the above conditions were then asked the same
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questions. For instance, subjects presented with the Residents Association
text were asked "What percentage of the residents do you think enjoyed the
Xmas party?"
One of the findings was that the higher the expectation manipulated in the
three contexts above, the higher the percentage assigned to quantifiers. Thus,
our prior expectations about the proportion of an FQ play a role in interpret¬
ing FQs, i.e. the interpretation depends in part on one's prior expectation
about what the'proportion being described might be. Initially, this effect
was discovered only in the category of high-ranking quantifiers. In a later
experiment (Sanford, Moxey & Grant, submitted) where ten quantifiers were
tested in ten contexts rather three contexts as in the former test, it was found
that a good linear relation existed between the interpretation given to each
quantifier and the base rate of expectation associated with each context,
however much weaker. It appears that contextual effects do exist among
lower-ranking quantifiers, if sufficient situations are manipulated.
Some empirical study on levels of interpretation of FQs has also been car¬
ried out by Moxey (1986) and Moxey and Sanford (1993a), the only work
of this kind. They set three basic conditions which created three different
base rate frequency expectations. A total of 192 subjects were divided into
three groups. They were all university students. One group was tested for
level 1 meaning (sentence meaning): what percentage the quantifier denoted
literally. A second group was tested for level 2 meaning (speaker's mean¬
ing): what proportion they thought the speaker had expected before the
speaker discovered the facts. A third group was tested for level 3 meaning
(listener's meaning): what proportion the speaker thought the listener might
have expected before the listener heard the quantified statement.
The findings showed that the quantifiers affected levels 2 and 3, and propor¬
tions estimated for some quantifiers differed between levels. For instance,
quite a few was given a low value in both levels 2 and 3, which means that
less had been expected than what really happened. Quantifiers, such as very
few, few, not many and only a few were given a higher value in level 2, but a
few was given a low value in the same level. Similarly, those negative quan¬
tifiers obtained a higher value in level 3, except few. So, it indeed appears
that the interpretation of natural language quantifiers involves one's prior
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expectations about what the proportion being described might be. There
are other contextual factors that can affect the interpretation of FQs, which
will be elaborated in Chapter 4.
Apart from their contributions to the issue of contextual effects on FQs,
Moxey and Sanford also investigate quantifiers from a non-numerical per¬
spective using an interdisciplinary approach—psychology integrating with
linguistics and logic. In Moxey and Sanford's view, a multi-dimensional in¬
vestigation is needed for adequately studying natural language quantifiers
(see Section 8.4 for further discussion). One of the major contributions
Moxey and Sanford have made is to argue that other aspects of meaning
differ between quantifiers, in addition to numerical meaning. For example,
it is argued that when combining with a quantifier, very may not intensify
numerical value, instead very in very few enhances the strength of claim. It is
also argued that FQs in communication may not be mapped into a numerical
value in a fine-grained scale. People do not necessarily need to compute a
fine-grained scale for each single FQ they use (see Moxey and Sanford (1993b)
for further discussion).
In terms of language understanding and language use, Moxey and Sanford's
points on FQs are plausible. I incline to their view that FQs can be explored
in other aspects, apart from their numerical values. For example, we may-
explore the cognitive meaning of FQs by investigating a wider range of issues,
like the intention of speakers, attentional focus (see Section 8.4 for further
discussion), etc. We may look at a relation between meanings and their
functions, a kind of communicative/psycho-linguistic relatjpn. Moxey and
Sanford's work puts forward plausible insights from a different perspective,
which is certainly worthwhile pursuing. While I agree that FQs do differ
in other aspects of meaning, as far as semantics is concerned denotational
meaning of FQs needs exploration (see Section 1.5.1 for my arguments).
So far, we have reviewed a few empirical works. Next, we will review a formal
account on FQs. Two more formal theories associated with FQs, FST and
GQT (Generalized Quantifier Theory, Barwise and Cooper 1981), will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
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2.5 Wachtel's work
Wachtel's (1980,. 1981) treatment for a number approximation is to designate
an interval in which an appropriate round number is a kind of prototype while
other numbers in the interval are supposed to have certain membership with
regard to the round number. The membership of one number n, situated on
one side of the round number, equates to another number m's membership,
situated on the other side with the same distance away from the round num¬
ber n. YVachtel proposes that an approximation containing approximately is
true for an interval of numbers, whose central point is the prototype. The
length of an interval in any given case is determined by a function from C
(a set of contexts) into F (a set of rounding functions). This function draws
from a domain of numbers into a set of numbers to select an appropriate
approximating number or numbers. The notion of round number is used in
a technical sense defined as in (a) in (2.3) below, where R is a function from
a set of contexts C into a set of rounding functions F, and N is a set of
numbers. Fis a set of functions from TV to N, and is defined as in (b), where
|n| is the absolute value of n. The expression about is treated as denoting a
function from numbers and contexts into sets of numbers. This function is
represented as about \ and is defined as in (c). For all n € A and all c € C,
a. For all n, m G N and all c £ C, n is an appropriate round number
for m in c iff R(c)(m) = rc;
b. F= {f. (x,y) [f(x) = y -* (z)[\z - y\ < \x - y\ -> f(z) = y]]};
c. about'(n, c) = {z: R(c)(x) = n}.
(2.3)
R selects the rounding function that is operative in the context of utterance.
A proposition, such as John has about 20 apples, is true in context c if and
only if 20 is an appropriate round number in c for the number of apples that
John has—i.e. if and only if the number of apples that John has is a member
of about'(20, c).
To show how (b) in (2.3) works, let us examine the following relation:
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x y z n z y X
FIGURE 2.4: An illustration
The function in (b) assumes that the function of "if z, then y and F' is valid
if and only if taking n as a prototype, z is nearer to n than y and x are, y in
turn is nearer to n than x is.
YVachtel (1981) expands the treatment in (2.3) in order to reply to Chan-
nelTs (1980) objections to the analysis of approximations outlined in Wach-
tel (19S0). He claims that different approximators can be handled within
the same framework he proposes in (2.3), with no radical changes. The for¬
mula that begins by taking into account the symmetrical distribution of a
number approximation exemplified by approximately n, also applies to skew¬
ing number approximations exemplified by n or so. He says that although
the function F given in (2.3b) appears to induce a symmetrical distribution,
skewing approximators can also be handled by F. The simplified version of
the expanded formula is given as follows (see Wachtel (1981) for details):
Let .4 = {i, j, k, 1} where i and j are non-skewing approximators, which only
differ in their permissible latitudes; and k and / are skewing approximators
which also only differ in their permissible latitudes. H — {hi,li2, h3. ...},
which is a function from number to number, indicating non-skewing or skew¬
ing approximations. G = {<71, g2, gz, •••}, which is a function from context
to context, indicating different lengths of permissible latitudes. Then, for all
n € N and all c E C,
a. i'(n, c) = {z : R(gi(c))(x) = /ii(n)};
b. j (n, c) = {x : R(g2(c)){x) = h^n)};
c. k'(n,c) = {z : ^(^(cjXa:) = h2(n)}]
d. l'(n,c) = {x : R(g3(c))(x) = h3(n)}.
(2.4)
It is shown that the only difference for i and j is g\ for i and g2 for j, i.e. they
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differ in lengths of permissible latitudes in various contexts. The similarity
between i and j though is that they are both non-skewing approximators,
having the same hi. Now, k differs from i in having a different h, meaning k
is a skewing approximation whereas i is a non-skewing one. Finally, / differs
from i, j and k in both g and h. It appears that the above treatment does
cover both skewing and non-skewing FQs.
Comparing (2.3) and (2.4), the general framework involving Fand R remains
unchanged, although in the latter some parameters are added. A general
formula is shown in (2.5), where A is the set of approximators. For all a €
A. there is some pair {g, h} € G x H such that, for all n € N and all c € C.
a'(n, c) = {x : R(g(c))(x) = h(n)}. (2.5)
That is, R and F remain unchanged, and the introduction of G and H is for
the specification of the semantics of each individual approximator.
Channell (1983: 208) states that the problem with Wachtel's account is its
extreme generality which leads to counter-intuitive predictions. She says "For
the number approximation, because it treats all numbers as equally available
for use in approximations, equivalence is predicted, such as:
a. This is approximately one inch long.
b. This is approximately 2.067 cms long.
(1 inch = 2.067 cms)2
which is clearly wrong, given all we know about differences between round
and non-round numbers."
In fact, in my view it is a misunderstanding to assume that Wachtel's account
predicts (a) and (b) in (2.6) are exactly equivalent. According to Wachtel,
the mapping function itself should be the same for the two sentences above,
2However, usually. 1 inch = 2.54 cms, the current author notes.
(2.6)
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but this does not predict the equivalence of their actual values. On the
contrary, the problem of round and non-round numbers could be sorted out
by the function of G, defined in (2.4), since different lengths of an interval
could be made by G. That is, g(a) and g(b) could make the intervals of (a)
and (b) in (2.6) different.
Wachtel takes contextual factors into account in his formal treatment of
number approximations. There is ample evidence to indicate that context is
an important factor in specifying an FQ's meaning boundary. For instance,
Hormann (1982) reports that people typically think of a few mountains as
being four-five mountains, while a few crumbs means eight crumbs (see Chap¬
ter 4 for more examples). In my treatment of FQs here, I shall also take
contextual factors into account (see Chapter 6). Wachtel's work conveys the
idea of prototypability well, and it is mainly on the shape of curves (sym¬
metrical and skewing). However, in his framework, there is no provision for
membership function and degree of truth. This makes his work limited in
dealing with FQs. In my formal treatment, membership function and degree
of truth are primary issues to be investigated (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7 for
further discussion).
2.6 Conclusion
The review in this chapter shows that there may have regularities in the
semantics of FQs, and it is proven empirically that membership function
is indeed reliable on an individual basis. Moreover, contextual factors can
affect the interpretation of FQs. It is then concluded that for any adequate
semantic theory of FQs, the role of context must not be neglected.
It appears that there is little work which explores FQs in terms of semantic
patterns and membership function. In particular, it is not yet clear whether
or not FQs are compositional, and if so on what grounds. There is a need to
work on these issues; my work here is an attempt to meet the need.
What follows is an empirical study of FQs in both Chinese and English, and
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what is aimed for is common semantic properties of FQs. There will be a
comparison between English and Chinese FQs, in order to explore similarities
(and differences) between them.
3
An empirical study of the
semantics of FQs
In this chapter, we will analyze the semantics of FQs based on empirical data
from Channell (1983) and Zhang (the current author). The study of FQs in
this chapter is intended to observe semantic trends statistically. Although
the data here is a sample and the data analysis is preliminary, they serve
my purposes. The data is meant to give a starting point for the theoretical
analysis later1.
3.1 The data
In both Chinese and English data, a numerical experimental method was
used to test a possible interval of a given FQ. Channell did an elicitation test
mainly on English FQs in Type II, such as about n, n or so and n or m. My
questionnaire data covered Chinese FQs in Types I, II and III.
x0n the other hand, the restricted usefulness of such sample data for a theoretical treat¬
ment is borne in mind (see page .41 for further explanation on this).
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3.1.1 Zhang's questionnaire for Chinese FQs
A pre-test was carried out on the questionnaire. The aim was to test the
hypothesis that subjects were able to designate a numerical interval for FQs.
This was a prerequisite of the main study. FQs were chosen from standard
Mandarin Chinese, some being the equivalents of FQs in English tested in
Channell's (1983) work, to enable a comparison between the two sets of
data. A total of 60 FQs were tested, and each subject was presented with
all 60 FQs. The questionnaire, presented in standard Mandarin Chinese, is
enclosed in Appendix 3 and its English translation is enclosed in Appendix
2.
A total of five subjects were tested, all of them native speakers of Mandarin
and postgraduates at the University of Edinburgh. The results showed that
all five subjects were able to give a numerical interval for FQs tested.
Main Test:
The ultimate objective was to investigate semantic patterns of FQs in Chi¬
nese.
Method:
Data was gathered through a questionnaire. The response rate was 97%. The
percentage of subjects who were able to give an interval is listed in Appendix
2, under the title "%subjects marking intervals" in column 2 of each table.
This column indicates how well subjects judge FQs in intervals.
Subjects: A total of 135 Mandarin-speaking adults, most of whom were
university students in either the UK or China, completed their questionnaires.
To elicit serious responses, subjects were told that the questionnaire was for
academic research.
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Materials:
The questionnaire was the one used in the pre-test. For discussion in this
thesis I chose 24 out of the 60 FQs because they roughly matched those
tested in Channell (1983). In doing this I intended to compare the English
data with the Chinese.
These FQs all have imprecise meaning boundaries, i.e. they are non-logical
quantifiers. They are commonly used natural language quantifiers. Most
FQs were tested in isolation. I anticipated that some FQs, like many, could
hardly be designated an interval without a given discourse. So subjects were
invited to mark intervals for many and the like out of 100; that is, subjects
were expected to tell How many out of 100 is many. They were also told to
give an interval in percentage for some of the FQs.
I also wished to examine how contextual factors might affect the designation
of FQ intervals. Therefore I presented two FQs embodied in a sentence to
compare them with the same FQs tested in isolation. The results will be
discussed later.
Design and Procedure:
The questionnaires were distributed in person to those subjects in Edinburgh
and the rest were sent through the post to China. Once the subjects com¬
pleted the questionnaire they either handed or sent them back.
Every subject saw all 60 FQs presented and gave one numerical interval for
each of the 60 FQs, i.e. each subject estimated 60 intervals in total. They
were told to make just one choice for each FQ and to come to a decision
independently. They were also invited to make comments if they wished to.
One hundred and thirty-five subjects means 135 intervals for each FQ tested.
To obtain a histogram for each FQ, every given interval was divided into
n equally spaced numerical values, using the AWK (Aho et al, 1988) pro¬
gramme. For instance, a given interval 180-220 was divided into a range
of numbers—180, 185, 190, 195, 200, 205, 210, 215, 220. A histogram was
then made up by taking all 135 such ranges of numbers into account, in 95%
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confidence. For the calculation of test results I used the statistics package
BMDP (see Appendix 2 for the details). As an illustration, for 2,000 ren
zuoyou 'about 2,000 people' the histogram was given as below.
























































FIGURE 3.1: 2.000 ren zuoyou 'about 2,000 people'
Notes:
1. The mode number underneath the histogram indicates the most frequent occurrences. There are some
cases where for an FQ the mode number is a set of numbers rather than a single number. For instance,
in Fig. 3.1 a set of numbers from 1,950 to 2,050 are all mode numbers.
2. In my Chinese test, there were only five FQs tested which had 100% agreed mode numbers (see Appendix
2, Figs. 2.10, 2.13, 2.16, 2.17, and 2.20). 79% of FQs tested had no 100% agreed mode numbers, i.e. the
mode number was given by less than the total of 135 subjects. For instance, in Appendix 2, Fig. 2.15, the
count for the mode number is 129 rather than 135. This indicates that although the FQs are all fuzzy, we
could perhaps say that some are fuzzier than others, because there is a lower agreement on their mode
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numbers.
3. Each number on the Y-axis corresponds to a score on the X-axis. The more stars a number gets the
higher grade of membership it gets and the more typical a member it becomes. For instance, in Fig. 3.1
the number 2,000 gets the most stars, which means it is more typical of 2,000 ren :uoyou 'about 2.000
people' than, for example, the number 2,350.
4. For the formulas of computing standard deviation. kurtosis and skeu-ness, refer to (10.1), (10.2) and
(10.3) in Appendix 2.
Here the FQ is represented by a membership function over the [1.0] inter¬
val. In the histogram, and throughout the following, the ordinate denotes
two things, the count in the first column and the midpoint in the second.
The count indicates how many subjects estimated the particular number
corresponding to the second column as a member of about 2,000 people. For
instance, 100% of subjects (i.e. 135 counts shown in the first column) thought
that the number 1,950 shown in the second column of the same row was in
the boundary of the FQ, whereas only 20 subjects thought 2,200 would be.
The abscissa denotes membership values representing the degree to which
an individual number on the ordinate (second column) is a member of the
FQ. The grade of membership function was derived by dividing the count
in the first column by 135 (total number of the subjects). This is a ratio
representing a particular count against the best estimate. For instance, the
membership of 2,000 is 1, obtained by dividing 135 by 135; and 2,100 has
a membership value of 0.73, obtained by dividing 98 by 135. As mentioned
above, most FQs in my test were not given 100% agreed mode. That means
that they could not have a full membership 1. For example, for jiangjin 200
ren 'nearly 200 people', the mode was 111, divided by 135; then its maximum
grade of membership was 0.S2, as shown in Appendix 2, Fig. 2.9.
Results:
The results, displayed in detail in Appendix 2, show the following trends:
1. People were able to estimate a numerical interval;
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2. There was variance between subjects, which represented fuzzy meaning
of FQs;
3. The same kind of FQ had the same kind of semantic behaviours.
To test the effect of context I deliberately set two FQs which were tested both
with and without a given linguistic discourse respectively. When I tested
them in isolation subjects were asked to designate an interval in percentage
for daban ren 'majority of people', and the same for shaoban ren 'minority
of people'. In testing these two in context of utterance I presented them




























The test results are shown in Table 3.1 (see Appendix 2. Table 2.2. Group
2).
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TABLE 3.1: Effect of context
























Note: The number here denotes percentage.
Items 1 and 2 are context independent, whereas items 3 and 4 are context
dependent. The scores in column 3 (%subjects designating interval) show
that subjects felt more confident in designating FQs in the context than
out of it. The percentage of subjects designating intervals in isolation was
81.48%, which is lower than 97.7S% for the FQs which were judged in the
two sentences given in (3.1).
Furthermore, in column 5 the modal interval (20-30) given to item 4 is lower
than that of item 2 (30-40). The mean in column 4 also varies corresponding
to the item with or without a contextual setting. Conversely, there are some
comparative similarities. For instance, the mode number in column 5 is the
same for each item with or without context.
In general, there is no significant difference in Table 3.1. One of the reasons
for this may be that the two FQs tested, majority of people and minority
of people, are not known as typical FQs (e.g. many). If some typical FQs,
like many people, are tested, the test result may be different. What can be
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concluded from the test results here is that some FQs vary over context less
than others.
Further discussion of the test results and a comparison with Channell's results
will be carried out in Section 3.2 below.
3.1.2 Channell's elicitation test for English FQs
Channell (1983) discusses two t)rpes of expressions, number approximations
(e.g. about ten) and fuzzy category identifiers (e.g. a film or something like
that). The former is my interest here. Her test had two main objectives:
1. To test the hypothesis that number approximations designate intervals
of numbers;
2. To find out the length of intervals which different approximations desig¬
nate, and the placing of the intervals relative to the exemplar number(s)
present.
Channell used 26 first-year University of York students as subjects for her
elicitation test, which consisted of 32 examples of putative number approx¬
imations. Some were attested examples from her data and the rest were
invented sentences. The test items contained four different approximators
(about n, n or so, n or m and not less than n) and a. selection of exemplar
numbers (see Appendix 1 for the details).
Before seeing the test materials the subjects heard a short taped extract
of a conversation in which an approximation was used. They then read a
transcript of it, in which the approximation was underlined2. Then, subjects
2Channell explains that one of the purposes for doing this was to "encourage them to
believe that every test item they read was an attested example from my corpus of data.
For this reason also, each item was written between quotation marks. I wanted to
encourage them to act, as far as possible, as hearers of the test stimuli: that is, rather
than ask themselves 'Do I say this and what do I mean when I do?', to ask 'If I heard
this, what would I understand?'"
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were given test papers to designate intervals of various approximations that
appeared in 32 examples.
For detailed test results, refer to Appendix 1. Table 1.2 in that appendix
displays general results for about/(a)round n, n or m, n or so and not less
than n. Table 1.3 gives special results for n or m approximations.
3.1.3 Remarks on the written instructions
I am aware that the way in which FQs are tested can influence how they are
interpreted. For instance, the wording of a question as well as the way it is
presented may affect the test results. To minimize bias, written instructions
similar to those employed by Channell were used in my Chinese test. C'han-
nell gave a sequence of numbers and the subjects were expected to mark
their intervals on it. The written instructions each subject saw in her test
are reproduced below:
Example:
"You find you get five or six articles and they're all very much the same."
Someone who thought this could ordinarily refer to anywhere between three
and eight articles (inclusive) would mark their answer as:
1 2 (3 4 5 6 7 8) 9 10
IF YOU FIND THE NUMBERS GIVEN NOT EXACT ENOUGH PLEASE
WRITE IN ANY ADDITIONAL NUMBER YOU NEED. PLEASE WORK
ALONE.
Compare this with my written instructions:
Example: ji (ge) 'several' (no English equivalent for the measure noun (ge))3
3From hereon, for presenting a Chinese FQ, an item bracketed is a measure noun or
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Someone who thought its interval could be numbers between 2 and S (inclu¬
sive) would give their answer as 2-8.
As shown, instead of giving a sequence of numbers I simply invited subjects
themselves to provide an interval, the reason being that it might somehow
mislead subjects if any kind of sequence of numbers is provided. For instance,
Channell presented a sequence of numbers / 2 3 \ 5 6 7 8 9 10 for five or six
articles, indicating that she presupposed the permissible latitude allowed by
five or six articles would be somewhere within the range of 1-10. Therefore,
subjects would hesitate to go beyond the given range, possibly bringing about
biased responses. Furthermore, if a subject is asked to mark about 20.000
people with a given sequence of. say 15.000 16.000 17.000 18.000 19.000
20.000 21.000 22.000 23.000 24-000 25,000. and then wants to designate
an interval of, say 18,500-21,500. the numerals are not shown in the given
sequence. The subject may feel uneasy about changing the given sequence,
suspecting the new sequence he gives to be inconsistent with that provided.
Having considered these potential problems, no sequence at all was provided
in my Chinese questionnaire.
numeral classifier. It is a word used with a noun which shows the sub-class to which
the noun belongs. Measure nouns play a very important role in Chinese; there are over
50 of them. Chinese has an extensive system of measure nouns. For instance, wu shi
(lou) niu 'fifty head of cattle' is an obvious enough measure noun to the speaker of
English. Less obvious are measure nouns like (ben), a volume, as in Ta you yi (ben)
shu 'She has one (volume of a) book', or the all-purpose measure noun (ge) as in Ta
you wu (ge) pingguo 'She has five (of them) apples'. For this (ge) there is no English
equivalent. In Chinese, it is always preferable to put (ge) after numerals than to use
no measure noun at all. Therefore, in my Chinese test I put (ge) in FQs like liang,
san (ge) '2 or 3', san, wu (ge) '3 or 5' and shi'er, san (ge) '12 or 13'. In addition, for
Chinese n or m approximations, a Chinese comma is often needed. It should note that
the shape of a English comma used here is slightly different from a Chinese comma. For
the convenience of word-processing, I use the English comma here.
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3.2 A semantic analysis
In our data discussed above, each respondent gave a lower bound and an
upper bound for an FQ that estimated the range of acceptability. To give
membership functions, histograms were computed as shown in Fig. 3.1 above.
They depict the semantic tendency of an FQ which will be investigated in
this section.
The following semantic analysis is primarily based on the empirical data, but
to discuss FQs in a wider range our analysis will not be limited to the range
that our data covers.
3.2.1 FQs in Type I
FQs of this type, such as few, many and most, are generally regarded as iden¬
tifying proportions. For instance, few signals a low approximate percentage,
say fewer than 50%; on the other hand, most indicates a high approximate
percentage, say more than 50%.
Then, FQs of Type I can be divided into two sub-types: FQs denoting a
larger proportion and FQs denoting a smaller proportion4. Some Type I
FQs may be arranged in a sequence, e.g. few—many—almost all. Few in
the left most denotes a smaller proportion and almost all in the right most
denotes a larger proportion. The proportions denoted by the FQs in the
sequence increase gradually from the left end to the right end.
4Here, the concepts of small or large are of course defined in a relative way. For instance, it
could be said that a few denotes a smaller proportion when compared to many, whereas
a few represents a larger proportion when compared to few.
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Less variable
In my Chinese test the modal interval estimated by subjects, for ji (ge)
'several' was 3-5; for yiiie ren 'quite a few people' was 20-30; for xuduo
ren 'many people' it was 70-80. It appears that several represents a smaller
interval than quite a few and many.
The variability of degree of fuzziness can be represented or measured by
standard deviation. Standard deviation is the most frequently used measure
of variability or dispersion of a distribution, i.e. the degree to which scores
vary from the mean. It is standard in the sense that it looks at the average
variability of all the scores around the mean, and all the scores are taken
into account. The figures for standard deviation (see Appendix 2, Table
2.2. Group 1) consistently increase from ji (gc) 'several' to xuduo rcn "many
people': 2.13 for ji (ge) 'several*. 12.88 for yixie rcn 'quite a few people" and
19.75 for xuduo ren 'many people*. Several is less variable than the other
two.
This claim is also supported by other empirical data. Let us examine Fig 3.2,
reproduced from Moxev and Sanford (1993b).
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FIGURE 3.2: FQs in Moxey and Sanford
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In Fig. 3.2, from a few to the left, small-denoting FQs change little with
context. On the other hand, from a few to the right, FQs are more variable
with context.
One of the explanations for this phenomenon, as stated in Moxey and Sanford
(1993b), is that FQs which denote larger proportions are unmarked in the
sense that an FQ of this sort is the name for a continuum as well as for
a proportion on the continuum. For instance, in English many can be the
name of a continuum (e.g. How many people are there'?), as well as naming
a proportion on the continuum (e.g. There are many people). It appears
that many in the interrogative sentence does not denote a proportion at all;
whereas it does denote a proportion in the declarative sentence. On the other
hand, its antonym few is marked, because the question How few people arc
there does not name a continuum, but limits a proportion that is only part of
the continuum. In other words. How few people are there indicates that the
presupposition for the question is that there are few people. Because FQs
denoting smaller proportions are marked (e.g. few), they are less changeable.
Another explanation can be given in terms of logical entailment in the ma¬
terial sense. FQs denoting larger proportions logically entail FQs denoting
smaller proportions. For instance, many entails a few. However, the reverse
does not hold, i.e. a few does not entail many. As Moxey and Sanford
(1991b) state: "In this sense smaller denoting quantifiers are dependent on
the interpretations given to larger denoting quantifiers, and this gives them
less room for manoeuvre." For instance, very few is near to zero, and few is
not far from zero either. Similarly, we do not normally say about 1 person
and about 1 cent, since there is nothing much to approximate from zero to 1.
So. FQs denoting smaller proportions can only vary within a limited scope,
because they are marked and logically dependent on FQs denoting larger
proportions.
What can be added is that some Type I FQs often denote an interval rather
than a proportion. For example, in Chinese ji (ye) 'several' may be viewed
as denoting an interval say 2-8, i.e. the variance of ji (ge) 'several' may be
limited within the interval. However, it is not the case for xuduo 'many',
which could be 5 in one context, 2,000 in another. Thus, FQs that may-
denote an interval appear less variable. If this is so then FQs in Types II
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and III are less fuzzy than most FQs in Type I because they all denote an
interval, such as about 20 students.
Furthermore, it appears that FQs on the both ends are less variable than
FQs in the middle of a sequence. Supposing there is a sequence of Type I
FQs: (none), few, many, almost all, (all). Then, items on two ends of the
sequence appear less variable than items towards the central. Few normally
would not mean more than 50%, and almost all would not mean fewer than
50%. However, many may mean either more than 50% or fewer than 50%.
Basically, the proportion denoted by many is supposed to be larger than a
norm with respect to a given context, but it is not necessarily more than
50%. For instance, a sentence Many Chinese are restaurant owners might
describe a situation in which the number of owners who are Chinese is pro¬
portionately greater than the number of owners of non-Chinese nationality.
As an illustration, suppose in Edinburgh there are 2,000 restaurants and the
percentage of Chinese owners is, say, 10%. Then, the proportion expressed
by the sentence Many Chinese are restaurant owners is significant, despite
the fact that the number of Chinese owners may be nowhere near half of the
total number of restaurant owners in Edinburgh.
The claim that some FQs in Type II are less fuzzy is also applicable to other
types of FQs. For example, in my Chinese data the standard deviation of
liang. san (ge) '2 or 3" is 0.93, but 1.33 for san, wu (ge) '3 or 5' (see Appendix
2. Figs. 2.IS and 2.19). There may be two reasons for this. One is that liang,
san (ge) '2 or 3' has its prototypical numbers adjacent, so its histogram was
more pointed. The other is the floor effect, i.e. liang. san (ge) '2 or 3' is
nearer to zero (see Section 4.1.1 for more discussion of the floor effect), so it
is less variable and fuzzy.
Different shapes
It appears plausible to say that there are two kinds of curves that FQs in
Type I may generate: single-peaked and monotonic, although we do not have
empirical data on Type I FQs with a monotonic curve. A general trend is
that FQs on the two ends tend to be monotonic, and FQs in the middle tend
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to be single-peaked. This can be represented in Fig. 3.3.
As we can see from Fig. 3.3. few and almost all have a monotonic curve, while
a few has a single-peaked one. It would be counter-intuitive, for example, to
give a monotonic curve to a fete in both English and Chinese. My data also
showed a single-peaked curve for ji (ye) 'several' (see Appendix 2. Fig. 2.1).
The trend for Type I FQs here parallels with the findings in Wallston el
al (19S6a). where probability and frequency terms were studied. The data
showed that doubtful and good chance on the near ends were mostly given a
monotonic curve, but toss-up in the middle was unanimously given a single-
peaked one. Refer to Section 2.2 for more discussion.
3.2.2 FQs in Type II
Approximators in Type II FQs approximate the prototypical number to make
an approximation. FQs in Type II are exemplified by nearly 300, about 200,
200 or so and 200-odd. This type of FQ differs from the FQs in Type 1 in
that the former has a salient number like 200 in about 200, whereas FQs. such
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as many and several, in Type I do not have this kind of numeral involved.
However, FQs in both types have one thing in common: imprecise meaning.
A" zuoyou 'about n'
FIGURE 3.4: 2.000 rcn zuoyou 'about 2,000 people'
According to my Chinese data shown in Fig 3.4, any number which falls
outside the interval of 1,500-2,500 would not be considered a member of
2.000 ren zuoyou 'about 2.000 people'. In fact, all about n approximations
in our data showed a similar shape of distribution, as shown in Fig 3.5 and
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It is expected that about n, approximately n assign an interval most likely
with n as a prototypical number, by which a set of appropriate numbers arc
selected. Take about 200 as an example; its interval would be approximate
to 200. In Chinese, there are a few FQs which have similar meaning as n
zuoyou 'about n', such as dayuc n and n shangxia. In English, there arc also
similar FQs as about n. such as around n and approximately n. It is expected
that about n, approximately n have single-peaked curves, lake about 2.000
people as an example: as illustrated in Fig. 3.1. the curve is single-peaked
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Fig 3.6, reproduced from Chinese and English data (see Appendix 1. Figs.






FIGURE 3.5: About n in Chinese data
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FIGURE 3.6: About n in English data
From Fig. 3.5 (Chinese data) and Fig. 3.6 (English data), we can see that
a single-peaked distribution centred by prototype n. is shown in all the six
about n FQs. which indicates a homomorphism among these about n FQs.
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It appears evident that these functions of about n displayed in the two sets
of figures are similar for about in English and zuoyou 'about' in Chinese, i.e.
they are translational equivalents.
Finally, with -ish approximation, it is expected that about twenty people
would have a similar curve as twentyish people would have. In other words,
n-ish approximation is similar to about n in generating a single-peaked curve
around n.
N (,/zhi) m 'n or m'
N or m approximation differs from those considered above in that it has two
numbers—n and m. In Chinese, an n or m approximation can be made either
by putting a comma or zhi 'reach" between n and m (e.g. liang, san (ge) '2
or 3' versus shi zhi ershi '10 or 20').
The detailed data for n or m illustrated in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 are
reproduced from Appendix 1, Table 1.2 and Appendix 2, Table 2.2, Group
6.
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TABLE 3.2: N or m in English data
No Item title Mode
1 3 or 4 metres 3.50
2 4 or 5 regions 4/5
3 6 or 7 hours 7
4 8 or 9 feet 9
5 S or 10 students 8
6 15 or 20 people 16/17/1S
7 70 or 80 people 75
S 3 or 4 hundred
pounds 350/375
9 2 or 3 thousand
people 2250
10 2 or 3 thousand
gallons 2500
TABLE 3.3: l\r or m in Chinese data
No Item title Mode
11 liang, san (ge)
'2 or 3'
3
12 san, wu (ge)
'3 or 5'
4
13 shi'er, san (ge)
'12 or 13'
13
Of 13 items from Tables 3.2 and 3.3, only five of them (items 1, 7, 8, 10, 12)
were given a mode number which was the mean of n and m. Interestingly, 11
out of 13 items were given a mode which was the mean or above the mean
of n and m. Only four out of 13 items had a mode that was below the mean.
Several items have more than one mode number. Five out of 13 items take
the m in n or m as their mode numbers (items 2, 3, 4, 11 and 13). For
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instance, item 3, 6 or 7 hours, has 7 as its mode number0.
N or m has some features that need to be explored in greater depth. Firstly,
the two numbers (n and m) given are relevant to the interval designated.
This is displayed in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 (see Appendix 1. Table 1.3 and
Appendix 2, Table 2.3):
TABLE 3.4: A* or m in English data
No Items ^subjects %subjects Vc subjects %subjects
specifying specifying specifying specifying
interval cont. int. bounded nos below nos above
both n and m by it and m n 77)
1 3 or 4 metres 57.7 76.9 30.8 73.1
2 4 or 5 regions 100.0 57.6 50.0 46.1
3 6 or 7 hours 69.4 8S.5 42.3 80.8
4 8 or 9 feet 88.5 73.1 46.2 ' 65.4
5 8 or 10 students 96.2 77.0 61.5 57.7
6 15 or 20 people 92.3 77.0 65.0 69.2
7 70 or 80 people 80.8 88.5 57.7 65.4
8 3 or 4 hundred pounds 69.2 61.5 30.8 53.8
9 2 or 3 thousand people 69.2 76.9 41.1 65.4
10 2 or 3 thousand gallons 73.1 76.9 57.7 57.7
Mean over
10 items: 79.6 75.4 48.3 63.5
5One may argue that this could be just a chance effect, i.e. given two numbers, the
mode must be one or the other. In fact, this is not necessarily the case. For instance,
subjects did give 3.5 as the mode number of 3 or J metres in Channell's test shown in
Table 3.2. Perhaps, the effect of the denotation of the head noun (i.e. whether it is
count or mass) on the interpretation of the FQ also plays a role here. That is, because
metre is a measure plural, subjects were able to give 3.5 as the mode number. For more
discussion of the effect of a head noun, see Section 4.1.2.
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11 liang. san (ge)
'2 or .3" 100 50.36 0.01 49.63
12 san. wu (ge)
'3 or 5' 99.99 42.96 0.01 55.56
13 shi'er, san (ge)
'12 or 13' 99.99 30.37 34.81 63.7
Mean over
3 items: 99.99 41.23 11.61 56.3
Note: Column 3 indicates the percent age of subjects who specified the interval of an n or
to approximation as the one containing both n and m. Column 4 indicates the percentage
of subjects who specified the interval of an n or m approximation as the one being bounded
precisely by n and m. Column 5 indicates the percentage of subjects who specified the
interval of an n or m approximation below n, and the last column indicates those above
m.
As we can see from Table 3.4 and Table 3.5, of 13 items tested the mean
percentage of subjects marking both n and m as part of the interval was 79.6
for English, 99.99 for Chinese. It appears that the n and m are relevant to
the designation of a permissible latitude for n or m approximation, although
they are not necessarily the mode number.
Secondly, the interval for n or m does not necessarily take n and m as the
two outermost numbers. Our data showed that the percentage of subjects
marking the interval bounded precisely by the two numbers was 75.4 for
English and only 41.23 for Chinese.
Channell (1983) claims that one of the constraints on n or m approximation
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is that n must be smaller than m. It may be the case in English, but not
in Chinese. For instance, in Chinese it is perfectly appropriate to say san,
Hang (ge) '3 or 2' in which n is bigger than m. However, Channell points out
correctly that or can also be associated with non-approximate expressions.
For instance:
Zhang has two or three apples. (3.2)
Sentence (3.2) has at least two readings: one means that the number of apples
Zhang has involves a possible approximation, e.g. from 1 to 7 as observed in
my Chinese data (see Fig. 3.7); the other reading is that Zhang has either
exactly two or exactly three apples. In the second reading, or does not act
as a fuzzifier.
In terms of a proposition containing an n or m approximation, or is neither
used as inclusive (e.g. in the sentence You must be working very hard or be
ill, because you look pale) nor exclusive (e.g. in the sentence He told me that
he did not know what to do: stay or leave), because the interval of n or m
is supposed to be an interval that could also be designated beyond both n
and m. In other words, an n or m approximation represents not only one
possibility (exclusive) or two possibilities (inclusive), but many alternatives
(a set of appropriate numbers). This special feature distinguishes or in an
7i or m approximation from any other conventional or. In other words, al¬
though or, both in the case of an n or m approximation and in the case of
conventional usage, represents alternatives, an n or m approximation should
not be considered to be equivalent to other conventional or cases.
It is shown in our data that n or m tends to have a single-peaked curve,
the same as about n (see Appendix 2, Figs. 2.18, 2.19 and 2.20). However,
hypothetically speaking n or m could be bimodal, depending very much on
the value of n and m in n or m approximations. Let us examine Fig. 3.7
(reproduced from Appendix 2, Fig. 2.IS) and Fig. 3.8.
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FIGURE 3.7: lianq. san (ge) "2 or 3,
number
FIGURE 3.S: shi zhi ershi110 or 20'
Chapter 3. An empirical study of the semantics of FOs SG
As my Chinese data show, if the two prototypical numbers in n or m are
adjacent (or close to each other like san. wu (yc) "3 or o"), then it most likely
generates a single-peaked curve as shown in Fig. 3.7. On the other hand, it
is suspected that shi :hi ershi 40 or 20" in Fig. 3.S. where 10 and 20 are not
adjacent, may have a bimodal curve. This appears to be the case in English
as well. So. it appears that" the meaning of an n or ni approximation may
practically depend on the semantic properties of the head noun, as well as
the difference between n and m.
X duo 'n-odd' and n or so
In Chinese. 300 duo "200-odd means a little bit won than 300. It differs
from n or so in English in that it would most likely lake n as a lower bound.
n or so would not. i.e. 300 or so may very often include some number below
200. Our data show that 300 duo ren "200-odd people" has a distribution
which expands upwards from 200, as shown in Fig. 3.9 (see Appendix 2. Fig.
people
FIGURE 3.9: 200 duo ren "200-odd people'
We can see from Fig. 3.9 that the distribution is expanded upwards. Let us
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then examine Channell's data for 500 pounds or so in Fig. 3.10 (see Appendix
1. Fig. 1.5):
FIGURE 3.10: 500 pounds or so
Comparing Fig. 3.10 with Fig. 3.9, we can see that the n or so distribution
in Fig. 3.10 spreads out below the n much further than n-odd in Fig. 3.9.
although both of them tend to expand upwards. As a result, the mode
number for n-odd in my Chinese data was consistently given as a number
greater than the numeral n. while in » or so of English only 3 out of 10
had been given a mode number which was greater than n. This is shown
in the Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. reproduced from Appendix 1. Table 1.2 and
Appendix 2, Table 2.2. Group -1.
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TABLE 3.6: N or so in English
Item title Mode
a bottle or so 1
2 spoonfuls or so 2.5
6 or so books 6
10 lbs or so 10
10 or so litres 10
200 or so people 200/210
500 pounds or so 500
















This is due to the fact that in Chinese, 200-odd means a bit more than 200,
i.e. the approximation is supposed to be above n. But, in English it would
not be unusual if one judges 195 to be in the interval of 200 or so.
With respect to similarities between n or m and n or so, Wachtel (1981) says
that if one treats so as a pro-numeral, both types would in fact fall into a
single category of n or m approximation, where m is either a specific numeral
as in n or m, or a pro-numeral as in n or so. In addition, so being understood
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as a proform is also consistent with its many other uses as a proform, such
as in I hoped that I could have gone to visit my parents during this summer
vacation, but I did not do so.
Jiangjin n 'nearly n'
Nearly n has not received as much attention as about n and n or so. In fact,
the existence of this type of FQ acts as a kind of balance with regard to
n-odd in that the distribution of the nearly n approximation tends to expand
downwards as opposed to n-odd. Let us examine Table 3.S. reproduced from
Appendix 2. Table 2.2. Group 3.











It is shown in Table 3.8 that the three items were all given a mode which
was not n, but a number less than it.
The similarity between n-odd and nearly n is that none of them have n as
their mode number. However, only 28% of responses counted the number 200
as a member of the interval for jiangjin 200 ren 'nearly 200 people"; whereas
47.4% of responses counted 200 as a member of the interval for 200 duo ren
'200-odd people'.
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3.2.3 FQs in Type III (semi-FQs)
FQs in Type III are called semi-FQs in the sense that they have some special
characteristics that ordinary FQs do not have (see Section 1.3.1 for further
discussion of this point). In Chinese, they are exemplified by n yishang "more
than n' and n yixia "fewer than n\
Semantically speaking, more than n may have a curve with an open-ended
upper limit, and fewer than n may have a curve with an open-ended lower
limit. On the other hand, pragmatically speaking, what is commonplace for
more than n or fewer than n is a single-peaked curve (see Chapter 4 for an
explanation in terms of the relationship between semantics and pragmatics).
For example, we would not interpret more than 20 people in More than 20
people went to the party as a positive infinity in ordinary language. It would
be something like from 20 to 30. If it is over 30 people, according to Grice's
(1975) cooperative principles (i.e. "One should not say more than one needs
to sav" in particular) we should say more than 30 rather than more than 20.
Thus, semi-FQs indeed have fuzzy meaning boundaries, as do other types of
FQs, but they can be relatively less fuzzy in a semantic sense.
In Wachtel's (1981) terms semi-FQs are called partial specifiers. It is pre¬
dicted that they shall specify upper (e.g. at most n) or lower (e.g. at least
n) limits. For instance, not less than n would designate intervals which do
not go below n. However, in ChannelFs data, 27 and 24 percent of subjects
respectively gave intervals below n for the two not less than n approximations
tested (see Appendix 1, Table 1.2). Based on her data, Channell (1983: 97-
101) claims that not less than n and the like are actually used to approximate
in the same way as other FQs, such as n or so.
However, it appears that Channell's claim is not correct. First, not less than
n may indeed have a monotonic curve in a semantic sense, but n or so may
not. Even in Channells English data, the test results for n or so and not less
than n were not quite the same. The following in Fig. 3.11 is a comparison
between not less than n and n or so, reproduced from Channell's data, (see
Appendix 1, Figs. 1.5 & 1.7).
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pound
FIGURE 3.11: A comparison
As shown in Fig. 3.11, both curves have an upper bound of 750. However,
an obvious difference between them is that the distribution of 500 pounds or
so is below the number 500, much further than not less than 500 pounds. A
majority of subjects felt that the lower bound of not less than 500 pounds
should not go below 500. Thus, it appears that in English, n or so and not
less than n are not equivalent.
Let us then examine more than n and n-odd in Chinese data. To an extent
my Chinese data support Wachtel s idea that more than n. as well as fcu-rr
than n. is a partial specifier. None of my subjects gave intervals above n for
fewer than n, and below n for more than n (see Appendix 2. Tables 2.-1 N"
2.5). More than n is illustrated here in Table 3.9. reproduced from Appendix
2, Table 2.4:
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"more than 200' 28.36 70.15 0 29.85
200 ren yishang
"more than 18.7 58.06 0 41.94
200 people'
Mean over
2 items: 23.53 64.11 0 35.9
As shown in Table 3.9, 23.53% of subjects marked the upper bound of more
than n as positive infinity6, whereas none of the subjects marked the upper
bound of the three tested items of n-odd as positive infinity (see Appendix
2, Table 2.2, Group 4). This implies that in Chinese, more than n and n-odd
are semantically differentiated.
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.9, 64.11% of subjects marked n as a lower
bound of more than n, and no one marked the lower bound below 200. On
the other hand, there were a few subjects who did think that the lower bound
of n-odd could be below n (see Appendix 2, Figs. 2.12. 2.13 & 2.14). This is
compatible with the English data shown in Fig. 3.11 in that a small number
of subjects thought that the lower bound of not less than n could go below n.
In addition, as we can see in Table 3.9, more subjects (64.11%) thought the
lower bound of more than n should be exactly ra, rather than some numbers
above it (35.9%).
Likewise, by comparing nearly n and fewer than n, a similar result is found.
Let us examine Fig. 3.12 and Fig. 3.13, reproduced from the Chinese data
(see Appendix 2, Figs. 2.9 & 2.22).
6I suspect that to be able to give positive infinity represents a high level of knowledge
that my subjects had. Most of them were university students who were doing a science
degree. It would be interesting to examine the performance of other groups of people.
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FIGURE 3.12: Jiangjin 200 ren 'nearly 200 people'
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Count Hidpoint One star indicates approximately 3.11 occurrences
"
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FIGURE 3.13: 200 yixia "fewer than 200'
Comparing the two figures, it can be seen that the number 200 plays a precise
boundary role in fewer than n, but not in nearly n. No subjects marked a
number above 200 in fewer than 200. On the other hand, some subjects did
mark above 200 for nearly 200 shown in Fig. 3.12. So in Chinese data, the
numerals in semi-FQs—more than n and fewer than n—may be taken as the
outer limits of FQs. This is, however, not the case for other FQs, like n-odd
and nearly n.
Interestingly, within the Chinese data there were contrasting test results
between 200 yishang 'more than 200" and 200 ren yishang 'more than 200
people'. For the former, the modal interval was 200—|-oo; for the latter it
Chapter 3. An empirical study of the semantics of FQs 95
was 200-300. This also applies to 200 yixia 'fewer than 200' and 200 ren
yixia 'fewer than 200 people'. Consider Table 3.10 (see Appendix 2, Table
2.2, Group 7):










'more than 200 people'
200-300
200 ren yixia
'fewer than 200 people'
100-200
Why has this happened? It seems that ren 'people' has some impact. The
subjects tended to designate an interval for more than n (without people) or
fewer than n (without people) in a more mathematical sense. This was rep¬
resented by giving a modal interval 200—boo to 200 yishang 'more than 200'
and -co-200 to 200 yixia 'fewer than 200'. While considering FQs combined
with ren 'people', the subjects then gave 200-300 as the modal interval for
200 ren yishang 'more than 200 people' and 100-200 for 200 ren yixia 'fewer
than 200 people", as shown in Table 3.10. So, ren 'people" indeed had a
significant effect on the results.
In Channell's data (see Appendix 1, Figs. 1.6 & 1.7), subjects did not think
that positive infinity could be given as the upper bound of not less than n
pounds. This is because in her test not less than 500 pounds was embedded
in the sentence The repair bill certainly would not be less than 500 pounds.
With reference to the repair bill, it would sound odd to give positive oo for
the upper bound of not less than 500 pounds. Also, the other tested FQ, not
less than 150 pounds, was set in the sentence She was wearing a dress costing
not less than 150 pounds, it is again quite understandable why subjects did
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not mark an interval with positive infinity as its upper bound. It would
be unusual if one says the dress she was wearing cost an infinite amount,
i.e. pragmatically the situation described is not plausible. In other words,
comparing test results of more than n in Chinese and not less than n in
English, although both can mean a number between n to positive infinity,
none of the subjects in the English test gave a positive infinity. It is suspected
that pragmatic factors play a role here, because not less than n was tested in
a sentence. On the contrary, more than n in Chinese was tested in isolation
(see Section 4.1.1 for further discussion).
For more examples, let us look at the fewer than n approximation in Ta¬
ble 3.11 (see Appendix 2. Table 2.5).



























0 53.63 46.37 0 24.81
Mean over
2 items: 23.88 53.8 46.2 0 20.62
On specifying the number 200 as the upper bound, there is no big difference
between the two items listed in Table 3.11, 54.48% vs 53.63%. Also, there
was no one who specified the upper bound above 200, as no one specified the
lower bound below 200 for 200 yishang 'more than 200" and 200 ren yishang
'more than 200 people' shown in Table 3.9. However, the percentage (46.2%)
specifying the upper bound of fewer than n as a number below n is higher
than the percentage (35.9%, shown in Table 3.9) specifying the lower bound
of more than n above n.
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There were 23.8S% of subjects who thought the lower bound of 200 yixia
'fewer than 200' should be negative oc. However, no subject gave negative
og for 200 ren yixia 'fewer than 200 people". Apart from mathematical or
non-mathematical considerations, it is common sense that there can never
be negative people. It may be because of this that no single-subject gave
negative infinity as a lower bound for 200 ren yixia 'fewer than 200 people'.
On the other hand, for 200 ren yisliang 'more than 200 people', although the
percentage giving positive oo as its upper bound was lower than that of 200
yishang 'more than 200', there were still IS.7% of subjects who thought that
the upper bound of 200 ren yishang "more than 200 people' was positive oo.
However, this is not at all the case for 200 ren yixia 'fewer than 200 people".
Moreover, there were more subjects (24.81%) marked 0/1 as the lower bound
of 200 ren yixia 'fewer than 200 people", compared to 16.42% for 200 yixia
'fewer than 200'.
Incidentally, no subject gave a fractional number to both 200 ren yishang
'more than 200 people' and 200 ren yixia 'fewer than 200 people'. The
simple reason is that people exist in wholes, unless one's view of the world
permits person-partials—say a person who lives in a half-alive and half-dead
condition and who is considered to be 50% person and 50% non-person.
It can then be concluded that the significant interval difference between more
than 200 vs more than 200 people and fewer than 200 vs fewer than 200 people
in Chinese data supports the definition of a quantifier in GQT, i.e. determiner
+ noun. It is illustrated that in some cases the nature of the head noun does
influence the interpretation of an FQ, i.e. the meanings of a determiner and
a combination of the determiner + noun are not the same. That is one of
the reasons why I also define a quantifier as a combination of determiner and
noun in this thesis.
Finally, in terms of their distributions, semi-FQs can again be divided into
two subtypes: upward skewing and downward skewing.
Upward skewing: Semi-FQs of this type are exemplified by above n, more
than n, not less than n, etc.. The distribution of 200 yishang 'more than 200'
is represented graphically in Fig. 3.14 (see Appendix 2, Fig. 2.21):
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FIGURE 3.14: 200 yishang 'more than 200'
In Fig. 3.14 the distribution is indeed skewed upwards.
Downward skewing: The distributions of semi-FQs of this type, such as
fewer than n and under n, tend to skew downwards in contrast to FQs with
upward skewing distributions. The test results in Chinese for fewer than n
are given in Fig. 3.13 above, and Fig. 3.15 below reproduced from Appendix
2, Fig. 2.24.
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FIGURE 3.15: 200 ren yixia 'fewer than 200 people'
It is clearly displayed in Fig. 3.13 and Fig. 3.15 that their distributions are
skewed in the opposite direction to that of more than n.
Now, all three types of FQs have been discussed. What follows is a figure,
in which FQs are rearranged into different categories according to how their
boundaries vary.
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less than n upper limit
n-odd
lower limit
FIGURE 3.16: Three types of variance
As shown in Fig. 3.16. FQs on the top have an upper limit. For example,
more than n has a positive infinity, an open-ended upper limit. Aearly n
tends to take n, or a number similar to it. as its upper limit: any number
beyond n would not normally be considered as nearly n (see Appendix 2.
Figs. 2.9 <!c 2.21). FQs in this category differ in that some may have a lower
limit (e.g. n in more than n, see Appendix 2, Figs. 2.21 & 2.23), but some
may not (e.g. almost all). FQs in the middle are fuzzier in meaning, because
they neither have an obvious upper limit nor a lower one. They may vary
radically in both upper and lower bounds. Most FQs in the middle category
are Type I or II FQs. For example, about n has no obvious limit. Finally,
FQs on the bottom may have a lower limit. For example, fewer than n may
have negative infinity as a lower limit (see Appendix 2, Fig. 2.22), and n-odd
tends to have n as its lower limit, or a number similar to it (see Appendix 2,
Figs. 2.12, 2.13 Sz 2.14). Again, FQs in this category differ in that some may
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have an upper limit (e.g. n in fewer than n), some may not (e.g. n-odd).
Having explored FQs individually, we will next discuss some general tenden¬
cies concerning them.
3.3 The numeral and the norm
First, the numeral. Channell (19S3) states that in English approximations are
likely to occur in round numbers, such as multiples of five and ten. hundreds
or thousands. That is to say. round numbers are favoured as the numerals in
number approximations. It is also the case in Chinese, especially with bigger
numbers. For instance, we may say about 7 people, but very rarely say about
200,007 people. Moreover, Rosch (1975b) claims that multiples of ten are
most frequently used for making n or m approximations.
In Chinese data, for 2,000 ren zuoyou 'about 2,000 people", the numeral is
2,000, while it is also the mode number. Naturally, its distribution is centred
around 2,000, and its mean is pretty similar as well, 1.934. This applies to 13
out of 13 items of about n approximations tested in both the English and the
Chinese tests shown in Tables 3.12 and Table 3.13 below, reproduced from
Appendix 2, Table 2.2, Groups 4, 5 and 6 and Appendix 1, Table 1.2.
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TABLE 3.12: The number approximation test in Zhang
No Item title Mean Mode
1 200 ren zuoyou '200.48 200
'about 200 people'
2 '2,000 ren zuoyou 1,934.11 2,000
'about 2,000 people'
3 20,000 ren zuoyou 20,257.32 20,000
'about '20,000 people'
4 200 duo ren 214.17 '210
"200-odd people'
5 '2.000 duo ren 2,096.02 '2.100
"2,000-odd people"
6 '20.000 duo ren '22,482.39 roGi
"20,000-odd people'
7 jiangjin 200 ren 188.88 195
'nearly '200 people'
8 jiangjin 2,000 ren 1,869.37 1,990
'nearly 2,000 people'
9 jiangjin '20,000 ren 18,766.68 19,500
'nearly 20,000 people'
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TABLE 3.13: The number approximation test in Channell
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No Item title Mean Mode
1 about 2.00 pounds 1.97 2.00
2 about 41bs 4.08 4.00
3 about 6pm 6.00 6.00
4 about 10 pages 9.96 10.00
5 about 15 people 15,05 14/15
6 around the 20% mark 20.60 20.00
7 about 40 replies 40.13 40/41
8 about 500 pounds 508.00 500.00
9 about 14,000 pounds 14,033.65 14,000
10 around 10 million 9,942,307.00 10 million
As displayed in Table 3.12 and Table 3.13, it is appropriate to say that a
trend for about n approximations and the like is that n in about n is most
likely a norm7. This is not the case, however, for the other two types of
approximations shown in Table 3.12. For n-odd, the mean and mode number
is normally bigger than n. To take 2,000 duo ren '2,000-odd people' as an
example, its mean is 2,096, and the mode is 2,100, bigger than 2,000. Three
out of three items in Chinese data were given a bigger mean and mode number
than the corresponding n. Also, for three items of nearly n in the Chinese
data, all three of them were given a mean or mode number which was smaller
than the n.
Furthermore, we consider the issue that n is or is not included in an interval.
In the case of about n, the n is included in the interval of FQs. Consider at
least 200: it is clear that 200 should be in the interval. Another example is
more than 200: the average ratio of excluding and including 200 is 35.9 vs
64.1 (see Appendix 2, Table 2.4), i.e. a majority of the subjects thought that
the n in more than n is inclusive.
However, this does not necessarily apply to other FQs, such as nearly n and
fewer than n. For nearly n, the percentage of subjects who did not mark
7In statistics, a norm is usually measured by mean, mode, or median. In this section
we compare two of the three—mean and mode. The reason is that the information for
median is not available in ChannelFs English test.
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200 into the interval of jiangjin 200 ren 'nearly 200 people' was 72% (see
Appendix 2, Fig. 2.9). For fewer than n, the test results were marginal:
the ratio of excluding and including n was 46.2% vs 53.S% (see Appendix 2,
Table 2.5 ).
In addition, n in semi-FQs plays a more crucial role than in other types
of FQs. Our data showed that subjects did not give any number below n
for more than n and above it for fewer than n (see Table 3.9 and Table 3.11
above). However, for some other FQs. subjects often marked intervals beyond
n.
To conclude, the fact that the numerals in number approximations are not
always considered as a norm reveals that it should not be assumed that
the norm of distribution of an FQ is just the numeral. That is, there is
not necessarily an equivalence between the norm and the numeral: the two
could play different roles in the designation of an FQ's value. As a result
the numeral could be excluded from an interval, as seen in the data.. This
finding will be represented in my formal treatment of FQs where a norm
or prototype is more important than a numeral (see Chapter 6 for further
discussion).
3.4 Function of the size of numerals
The designation of an interval is also affected by the size of the numerals.
Channell's test results indicate that the length of an interval varies as a
function of the size of the numerals. For instance, 300 or so pounds (mean
length,s 77.30) was judged as designating a smaller mean length than 2.000
or so pounds (mean length, 550). Let us look at Channell's test results for
about n, n or so and n or m in Table 3.14 (see Appendix 1, Table 1.2):
sMean length means the average interval length.
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TABLE 3.14: Function of the size of a prototypical number
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No Item title Mean length
1 about 41bs .61
2 about 40 replies 5.96
3 about 500 pounds 51.92
4 about 14,000 pounds 1.067.3
5 around 10 million 1.5 million
6 a bottle or so .568
7 200 or so people 46.15
S 3,000 or so
students 538.46
9 30,000 or so
visitors 4.S46
10 3 or 4 metres 1.1
11 70 or 80 people 17.15
12 3 or 4 hundred
pounds 90.46
13 2 or 3 thousand
people 1.260.6
As shown in Table 3.14 the size of the numerals indeed affects the mean
length of FQs. It shows that as the size of the numerals increases the scores
in column three increase as well. To take the about n approximation as
an example, there is about a ten times difference in terms of the size of
the numerals between about 4 lbs and about 40 replies, and the difference
between their scores in column three is also roughly 10 times. The results
of n or so approximations are also consistent with about n approximations.
The comparison between 3,000 or so students and 30,000 or so visitors shows
that approximately 10 times is again the difference between the size of their
numerals and mean lengths. Finally, the test results of n or m approximations
also support the view that there is a direct ratio between the size and the
mean length. For instance, the difference between numerals of 3 or f metres
and 3 or f hundred pounds is about 100 times, and the difference of their
mean lengths is about 100 times as well.
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This is also applicable to the Chinese data (see Appendix 2, Table 2.2, Groups
3, 4 &: 5). In the following Table 3.15 three groups of FQs are listed, including
nearly n, n-odd and about n. In each group FQs have the same approximators
but different numerals: 200, 2,000, 20,000.
TABLE 3.15: Chinese data
Item title Range
jiangjin 200 ren 100
'nearly 200 people'
jiangjin 2,000 ren 700
'nearly 2,000 people*
jiangjin 20,000 ren 20,000
"nearly 20,000 people'
200 duo ren 125
'200-odd people'
2,000 duo ren 1,350
'2,000-odd people'
20,000 duo ren 15,000
'20,000-odd people'
200 ren zuoyou 110
'about 200 people'
2,000 ren zuoyou 1,000
'about 2,000 people'
20,000 ren zuoyou 20,500
'about 20,000 people'
The results in Table 3.15 show that the range increases as the size of the
numeral increases. For instance, nearly 20,000 people, 20,000-odd people and
about 20,000 people were judged as designating a much larger range than
nearly 200 people, 200-odd people and about 200 people. Their ranges were
given as 20,000 vs 100, 15,000 vs 125 and 20,500 vs 110. In other words, as
the size of the numeral reduces the length of the corresponding range becomes
smaller, e.g. nearly 20,000 people (range 20,000), nearly 2,000 people (range
700) and nearly 200 people (range 100).
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Finally, it is shown that whether or not a numeral is a rouncl number makes a
substantial difference to the length of interval. Channell claims that in about
n approximations, the interval designated varies significantly depending on
whether an FQ has a round number n. Moxey and Sanford (1993b: 110) also
report that round numbers admit to larger approximative boundaries than
do other numbers. It appears that an approximation with a round number
(e.g. about 20) licenses a longer interval than do other numbers (e.g. about
21). The reason for this may be that if the hearer tends to think the speaker
of about 21 is more certain about the relevant interval than the speaker of
about 20, then it would be appropriate to think of a narrower interval for
about 21 (see Section 4.1 for more discussion on this).
3.5 Function of approximators
Our data showed that the length of interval varies according to the different
added approximators. Let us consider Table 3.16, reproduced from Appendix
2, Table 2.2, Groups 3, 4 and 5.











In Table 3.16, three FQs have the same number (200), but different ranges
(i.e. the length between maximum and minimumnumbers given by subjects):
100, 125 and 110, respectively. It appears that the ranges are not the same
due to their different approximators nearly, odd and about. In other words,
it is shown here that approximators indeed change the ranges.
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Also, the different approximators can change some other scores with regard to
the designation of FQs. Consider Channell's data in Table 3.17 (see Appendix
1, Table 1.2).
TABLE 3.17: More function of approximators
Item title Mean
about 500 pounds 50S.00
500 pounds or so 560.96
In Table 3.17, the means are different, although they have the same numeral.
Item 2 has a much bigger mean score than that of item 1. That is. the mean
of 500 pounds or so spreads much further upwards than that of about 500
pounds. This is again due to their different approximators (about and or so).
It is then suspected that for a number, say 20, the range or mean would be
different when combined with different approximators, such as about 20 and
20 or so.
3.6 Consistency between the degree of fuzzi¬
ness, the size of a numeral and the length
of a range
It is observed from our data that the degree of fuzziness has a direct ratio
to the size of a numeral and the length of a range. In my Chinese test, the
degree of fuzziness was represented by standard deviation. Considering the
degree of fuzziness, the larger the standard deviation of an FQ, the fuzzier
the meaning of the FQ. For Type I FQs, we can see from my Chinese data
(see Appendix 2, Table 2.2, Group 1) that FQs denoting larger proportions
have larger variances. FQs which denote smaller proportions have smaller
variances, the point made in Section 3.2.1 above.
For FQs in Type II (see Appendix 2, Table 2.2), the test results also showed
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that there was less variance corresponding to FQs having smaller numerals
like 200 ren zuoyou 'about 200 people' than FQs having larger numerals like
20,000 ren zuoyou 'about 20,000 people'. This is illustrated in Table 3.IS,
reproduced from Appendix 2, Table 2.2, Groups 3, 4 and 5.
TABLE 3.IS: The consistency between the three kinds of results
No Item title Std. Dev. Range
1 jiangjin 200 ren
'nearly 200 people" 9.S 100
2 jiangjin 2,000 ren
"nearly 2,000 people" 115.66 700
3 jiangjin 20,000 ren
'nearly 20,000 people' 2.330.31 20,000
4 200 duo ren
'200-odd people' 14.45 125
5 2,000 duo ren
'2,000-odd people* 124.18 1,350
6 20,000 duo ren
'20,000-odd people' 2626.64 15,000
7 200 ren zuoyou
'about 200 people' 13.42 110
8 2,000 ren zuoyou
'about 2.000 people' 130.89 1,000
9 20,000 ren zuoyou
'about 20,000 people' 2541.85 20,500
As the figures in Table 3.IS show, when the size of the numerals and the
length of the ranges become larger, the degree of standard deviation also
increases. Let us compare items 7, S and 9. The size of the numeral of
item 7 is ten times smaller than item S; so is item 8 to item 9. In terms of
range, the range of 200 ren zuoyou 'about 200 people' is 110 which is again
roughly ten times smaller than 2,000 ren zuoyou 'about 2,000 people' (range
= 1,000); for 20,000 ren zuoyou 'about 20,000 people', the range is 20,500,
approximately 20 times bigger than item 8. Then, the standard deviation
for the three is 13.42, 130.89 and 2,541.85 respectively. The difference of
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the score of standard deviation between the three is again about 10 times
between items 7 and S, and about 20 times between items S and 9. So,
the trend that the degree of fuzziness has a direct ratio with the size of the
numeral and the length of range is empirically illustrated by the type of about
n, the same relationship for the other two, nearly n (items 1, 2 and 3) and
n-odd (items 4, 5 and 6) is also observed, as shown in Table 3. IS.
Finally, let us look at what Channell concludes from her English data. The
results of her informant tests show that hearers interpreted the fuzzy expres¬
sions as identifying fuzzy sets whose membership is defined by (a) the form
and content of an expression: (b) linguistic context and situation of utter¬
ance; and (c) world knowledge. Channell concludes the following, based on
the results of her elicitation test.
1. There is a set of expressions whose effect is to bring a fuzzy reading (=
an approximation) to an utterance containing a number.
2. The resulting approximations are understood as designating continuous
intervals of numbers.
3. Different approximators (e.g. about in about 20) change the interval
designated.
4. Although there is a high degree of agreement on numbers that near
the exemplar number in an interval (e.g. 20 in about 20), there is no
consensus about the extent of the interval in any given case.
5. Both the size and form of the exemplar number affect the length of the
interval.
6. Whether or not the exemplar number is a round number affects the
length of the interval (e.g. about 31 vs about 30).
7. The nature of the item being approximated (e.g. discrete vs non-
discrete) affects the length of the interval.
8. The conversational setting in which an approximation occurs affects
how it is understood.
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9. Sentences containing approximators characteristically have entailments
and implicatures. For instance, He has exactly $20 entails He has ap¬
proximately $20.
In general, ChannelFs findings are similar to what have been observed in
Chinese. It is plausible to claim that linguistic context, situation, and world
knowledge all play a role in establishing what the set consists of for FQs.
However, the claim that sentences containing approximators characteristi¬
cally have entailments and implicatures is not applicable to all FQs. For in¬
stance, He has exactly $20 may not entail He has nearly $20 (see Section 7.3
for further discussion).
3.7 Some notes on membership function
In this section, we examine the trend for all the membership functions ob¬
served from our data. Channell's original English data did not introduce
the concept of membership function. However, it is not difficult to convert
her data to the form of a membership function. Let us examine Fig. 3.17,
reproduced from Appendix 1, Fig. 1.1.
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FIGURE 3.17: About 2 pounds
In the figure, the Y-axis is the number of subjects. We may alter it into a
range [1,0], where the top (25) gets full membership 1. and the bottom gets
0. Then, if a number was given by all 25 subjects, it has a total membership
of 1: if given by fewer subjects, it has a lower grade of membership. This is
exactly how 1 calculate in my test, where membership functions were derived
by dividing a particular count by 135 (total number of the subjects in my
test), a ratio representing a particular estimate against the best estimate (see
page 0G for more explanation).
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Let us now compare Fig. 3.17 above and Fig. 3. IS below reproduced from
Appendix 2, 2.16.
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FIGURE 3.IS: 2,000 ren zuoyou 'about 2.000 people'
A general trend shown in the two figures is that membership is not simply an
all-or-nothing matter, but rather a matter of degree. For example, in 2.000
ren zuoyou 'about 2,000 people', 2,000 is more typical than 1,900 and 2,100;
and in the same way, 1,900 and 2,100 are more typical than 1,500 and 2.500,
though all numbers here have the property of 2,000 ren zuoyou 'about 2,000
people' to some extent. This trend is observed in all types of FQs in both
English and Chinese data (see Appendices for the details).
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Let us then examine closely the membership function of liany, san (gc) "2 or
3', given as in Table 3.19 and Fig. 3.19, reproduced from my Chinese data
(see Appendix 2, Fig. 2.IS).
TABLE 3.19: Liang, san (ge) '2 or 3'
Numbers(j) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
P11(7717 SQ71 (,7f)(^") 0.00 ( 0.94 0.99 0.5 0.12 0.02 0.007
number
FIGURE 3.19: Liang, san (gc) "2 or 3*
It is shown in Table 3.19 and Fig. 3.19 that if a number is fewer than 1
exclusively or greater than 7 exclusively, then it does not belong to Hang,
san (gc) "2 or 3' at all. If a number is in the interval between 1 and 7, then it
has the property of liang, san (ge) "2 or 3" to a certain degree. For instance,
the number 2 belongs to liang. san(ge) "2 or 3* to a degree of 0.94: 6 is of
liang, san (ge) '2 or 3' to a degree of 0.02; and 3 (mode number) belongs to
liang, san (ge) '2 or 3' almost totally.
A trend guides the actual numbers in Table 3.19, with the requirement that
the membership of the set increases to 0.99 and decreases from 0.99, in the
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way shown in Fig. 3.19. It rises and falls continuously as it should. For more
discussion, see Section 5.2. There is another trend that the closer a number
to a norm, the higher its membership. As Table 3.19 shows, 4 is nearer
to 3 (the norm) than 5, so 4 has a higher membership (0.5) than 5 (0.12).
However, there is a problem in claiming this trend. Empirical evidence in
Fig. 3.20 gave a counter-example, reproduced from Appendix 2, Fig. 2.9.
Count Midpoint 0n« atar indicates approximately 3.51 occurrancas
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FIGURE 3.20: Jiangjin 200 ren 'nearly 200 people'
As shown in Fig 3.20, the membership of the number 201 is 0.04, 1S4 is 0.4.
However, 201 is closer to the norm 195 than 1S4 is. This violates the claim.
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One way to solve this problem appears to be that we can add a constraint to
the claim, that the norm should be an end of scale which consists of a set of
numbers in question. Let p be a grade of membership, the function "pfx) >
p(y) iff |- — x| < \z — j/p indicates that the closer x is to z, z is a norm, the
closer p(x) is to 1; on the other hand, the further y away from z. the closer
p(y) to 0. This can be demonstrated in Fig. 3.21.
FIGURE 3.21: p(x) and p(y)
As Fig. 3.21 shows, z is a norm, and x is placed closer to r than y. notated by
~\z — x| < |r — t/|". Then. p(x) is greater than p(y). However, the function
"p(x)>p(y) iff |s—x\ <|c— y\'' works if and only if ris an end of scale where x
and y are allocated, i.e. <y\x\ z> or <z, x, y>, where ris either a minimum
or maximum. Let us examine Fig. 3.20 again. If the norm 195 is taken as an
end of scale for both sides of the interval, then the problem could be solved.
On one side of 195, the membership increases as the numbers approach 195.
On the other side, the membership decreases as the numbers move away from
195. In the case where ~ is not an end of scale we have to consider it as one
if we want to make the claim that the closer a number to a norm, the higher
its grade of membership. For example, with about n type, where the norm
may not be the end of scale. We have to group numbers involved into two:
greater than the norm and less than the norm, as shown in Fig 3.21. That
is, we have to divide the individuals on the scale into two groups: x\ y', z
and z, x, y, where z is the end of scale for both groups. Then, the function
"p(x)>p(y) iff |z — :r| <|.r — y|" would work.
Let us then explore if there are some other ways of solving the problem. For
example, let the membership function refer to the area under curve. That is,
if we talk about the percentage of curve between points, would the constraint
of an end of scale not be needed? If so, the rule would be that the higher
the percentage of curve for a point to the norm, the higher its membership.
This can be represented as in Fig. 3.22.
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FIGURE 3.22: Area under curve
As shown, although a is closer to the norm (20) in distance than b on the other
side, its membership would not be greater than b, because its percentage of
curve is lower than that of b. This solves the problem raised earlier, as shown
in Fig. 3.20. That is, if we take the percentage of curve into consideration,
although a number is closer to a norm in distance, it does not necessarily get
a higher grade of membership.
However, there would still be some problem with this solution. For example,
at point c. the percentage is 70%, higher than that of b. Then, according
to the assumption that the higher a point's percentage of curve, the higher
its membership, pc would be greater than //*,. In fact, as shown in Fig. 3.22
above, //& should be greater than pc rather than in reverse. So, the solution
is counter-intuitive and inconsistent, at least in some situations.
It appears that a valid and consistent solution to solve the problem mentioned
on page 115 above is to use the constraint that a norm should be considered
as an end of scale. Hence, in my formal semantic work below, I will use this
constraint to claim that the closer a number is to a norm, the higher its grade
of membership is (see Chapter 6 for the details).
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3.8 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter is to do some semantic analysis of FQs in both
English and Chinese, based on our empirical data. Our data here show
some semantic trends of FQs. It is observed that there are similarities and
differences between different types of FQs and between the two languages.
Common properties across English and Chinese imply that FQs are system¬
atic. It is observed (e.g. in Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6) that there is indeed
regularity in terms of semantics of FQs, which will be discussed theoretically
in Section 4.2 concerning compositionality of FQs.
It is also observed that a common feature of FQs is that, from an exem¬
plar of some kind, a set consisting of a selection of possibilities is inferred.
This verifies empirically the essence of the FST which will be discussed in
Section 5.2. It appears that the denotational meanings of FQs have indeed
imprecise boundaries, which may be represented by a membership function.
My speculation is that membership functions can provide a sound means for




Having discussed the empirical data for FQs, we will go further in this chapter
to explore FQs in terms of compositionality. Compositionality claims that the
meaning of an expression is a function of the meanings of its parts (Cann,
1993). Regarding the compositionality of FQs, I will concentrate on the
requirement of a semantic algebra (i.e. expressions that are manipulated
according to special rules of operation) which produces a homomorphism
from the semantics of one FQ to another. For instance, about 20 pounds and
about 200 people have similar semantic components. Then, if the two have
the same semantic behaviour, they are compositional.
For any adequate semantic theory compositionality is required. The reason
is simple—in order to make our language meaningful there must be some
way of associating expressions with appropriate meanings. That is, it is
plausible to expect that there is a homomorphism between the meaning of
an expression and the meanings of other expressions of the same type, as well
as the meaning of a sentence and the meanings of its component lexemes.
Otherwise, the meaning of every single expression or sentence in a language
would have to be listed, and we would not be able to determine the meanings
of sentences of any language due to the infinite sentences and the finite
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resources of the brain (Cann, 1993). Hence, meanings of expressions are
expected to be compositional1, and sentences should be defined recursively
from their components, just as they are defined recursively by syntactic rules.
For further discussion, see Partee (19S4).
All issues discussed in this chapter will involve one question: whether or
not FQs (atomic or combinative) are compositional: if so, in what way. As
an illustration, if we claim that compositionality is based on the shape of
curves that FQs generate then the claim is highly likely to be invalid. The
fact is that about 50 and about 3 may not have the same symmetrical curve,
as pointed out by Linda Moxey (personal communication). This will be
elaborated in the following sections. Then, what is compositionality based
on? How can we show FQs of a same type derive their meanings in the same
way? We will try to answer these questions by exploring the relation between
semantics and pragmatics. In other words, I will tackle the old question of
truth conditions versus "meanings" from the perspective of FQs.
4.1 Pragmatics and FQs
It is well-acknowledged that we do not interpret the meaning of FQs in a
vacuum; pragmatic factors2 play a role. Then, the question is whether or not
they affect compositionality. What follows is a discussion of the pragmatic
effects on FQs, bearing in mind the question raised here.
'There are some idiomatic phrases, such as kick the bucket, which are not compositional,
but they are extremely limited in number.
2The term pragmatic factor used here is in a broad sense. It includes not only linguistic
discourse, but also social context (world knowledge, background, experience, culture,
individual attitude, etc.).
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4.1.1 Scale effects
The interpretation of FQs is not just related to expressions themselves, it is
partially a result of the scale onto which they are mapped. As an illustration,
variance tends to increase as we move towards the centre of a scale from its
ends. For instance, on the 0-100% scale, expressions (e.g. many) towards
the middle of the scale tend to be fuzzier than those in the end (e.g. feu-).
This has to do with the scale (i.e. many has a bigger scale size), not the
expression itself, i.e. there are floor and ceiling effects3. Expressions in the
ends have less space to expand, such as about 3, so they are less fuzzy than
those that have more space to manoeuvre, such as about 30 (see Section 3.2.1
for empirical evidence on this point). This can be illustrated as in Fig. 4.1
below.
number
FIGURE 4.1: 'about -T and 'about- 20'
In the figure, we can see that about 3 does not have a symmetrical curve, as
about 20 has. This has little to do with their semantic components; they have
3A floor effect is defined here as an effect that limits the expansion of an FQ's extension
around the lower end of scale. For example, the lower bound of about 1 would not go
very far because 1 is adjacent to 0, the end of the scale. Similarly, in a scale 1-100, the
upper bound of about 99 would also not have much room to expand upwards, because
99 is next to the upper end of scale, 100. This is termed as a ceiling effect.
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exactly the same semantic structure (i.e. about n structure). What makes
a difference here is where on the scale they are located, respectively. That
is, about 3 is located down the lower end of the scale and has less room to
expand downwards. On the other hand, about 20 is not located in an end
of scale, so its curve has more freedom to move around than about 3 has
(see Section 3.2.1 for more discussion on this point). This kind of effect is
termed as a floor effect. Because of it, about 3 is suspected of not having a
symmetrical curve here.
There is empirical evidence for scale effects observed in my Chinese data.
Let us examine the Figs. 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, reproduced from Appendix 2,
Figs. IS, 19 & 20.





















FIGURE 4.2: Liang, san (ge) '2 or 3'
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FIGURE 4.4: Shi'er, san (ge) '12 or 13'
In these figures, the histogram of 12 or 13 has a more symmetrical distribu¬
tion around 12 and 13 than the other two. That is why its score of skewness
is lower. The skewness in these figures is almost certainly a floor effect—a
scale effect rather than something to do with the expressions. For 2 or 3,
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there is not much room to expand below 2, whereas there is more room in
12 or 13 than the other two.
Another example, many, may have a monotonic curve with an open-ended
upper limit. However, if we fix a scale of 1-100%, many could be different as
I had in my Chinese data (see Appendix 2, Fig. 2.3) where xuduo ren 'many
people' was given a single-peaked curve. It behaved like about n in having
a single-peaked distribution (see next section for more discussion on this).
This is because a certain scale in my test had been fixed for testing xuduo ren
"many people', the subjects were invited to designate an interval for many
out of 100. Thus, no one would be able to give positive infinity as the upper
bound of xuduo ren 'many people' under the circumstances. If the constraint
had not been provided, some subjects would have considered positive infinity
as the upper bound of xuduo ren 'many people". Moreover, it is suspected
that when given a 0-100 interval, subjects might compare many with other
FQs on the scale, like most, almost all and all. Because the quantity of many
is normally considered as less than those FQs it got a single-peaked curve,
rather than a monotonic one with 100 as the best estimate.
There may also be effects of the overall difference between top and bottom of
the scale, granularity4, etc, though these are perhaps more likely to influence
the flatness/pointedness of a curve rather than skewness. For example, about
20 and about 21 may have similar symmetrical curves, but they may differ
in terms of flatness because of the effect of granularity. It is suspected that
4In terms of granularity, Linda Moxey (personal communication) explains that all human
descriptions of quantities have vague ranges whether they contain words or numbers.
This is because our measurements are limited by the means which we have available
for measuring things like time, distance, etc. Therefore, about 10am has a series of
states of affairs which it might correctly describe, and this is also true of about 10.02am.
However, if we asked people to give a range of times which might be described by about
10am, they are likely to think in terms of the minutes around 10am, possibly even in
batches of five minutes; if we ask the same question of about 10.02am, people are more
likely to think of seconds around 10.02, or at most, minutes. This is because 10am is
a point on a coarser scale than 10.02, and subject responses are influenced by the scale
used in the question. So-called exact numerical descriptions also have different intervals
because of granularity, for example, He stayed for five minutes versus He stayed for five
and a half minutes. In the same vein as 10am vs 10.02am, the curve of the former may
be flatter than that of the latter.
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about 21 would have a more pointed curve than about 20 would have. Another
example, a few, may not be affected by scale in terms of monotonic/single-
peaked shapes as many would be, because it is less fuzzy than many (see
Section 3.2.1 for the details). However, a few could be affected by scale in
terms of symmetrical/skewing curve, as well as flatness/pointedness. It is
suspected that if the scale is narrower, then the curve may be more pointed.
Or, it may have a skewed curve when the scale is 0-4, as opposed to having a
symmetrical curve when the scale is 0-10. All these phenomena demonstrate
the importance of scale effects in interpreting FQs.
In conclusion, if we ask subjects to give numbers in response to quantity
expressions we cannot assume that the answers they give are determined
simply by the expressions themselves. There are more factors involved, such
as scale effects. Accordingly, there will be a contextual parameter built in
my formal semantics of FQs (see Chapter 6), which is meant to represent
this kind of scale effect and other kinds of contextual factors.
4.1.2 Other relevant factors
Apart from scale effects, there are more factors involved in interpreting FQs.
The item being modified
Hormann (1983) claims, based on a test of some, several and a few, that
the numbers assigned to an expression can be decided by a function of the
size of the objects and of the spatial situations surrounding the objects. For
instance, with a few, subjects gave higher numerical values for the situations
further down this list:
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A few people standing before the hut.
before the house,
before the city hall,
before the building.
That is to say that a few people was given the longest interval in the situation
of before the building and the shortest interval in the situation of before the
hut°.
In addition, Sadock (1977) states that interpretation differs from when we
are told that a man is approximately six feet tall to when we are told that a.
cockroach is approximately six feet tall because of our world knowledge about
the usual tallness of men and cockroaches. Also, Jim Hurford (personal
communication) thinks that about five may mean a range of 2 to 9 in the
sentence of I'll be there in about five minutes; but 3 to 7 in the sentence
of She has about five children. It appears that the range of about five may
vary, depending on what it modifies, minute or children. Moxey and Sanford
(1993b) point out that it is scarcely acceptable to speak of about two people,
but it is quite acceptable to talk about two volts when making a measurement
with a voltmeter, since fractions of volts are quite acceptable.
My own data also showed that the nature of items being modified affect
the way an FQ is being interpreted. It is shown in my Chinese data (see
Appendix 2, Group 7) that the noun ren 'people' has some effect on the
designation of more than n and fewer than!! n. It appears that the subjects
understood more than n and fewer than n differently depending on whether
or not it was associated with the noun. For example, responses to 200 yixia
'fewer than 200' and 200 ren yixia 'fewer than 200 people' were radically
different. A much longer interval (modal interval = -oo-200) was given to
the former; for the latter not one subject gave a negative number (modal
5Moxey and Sanford (1993b: 28) point out that such an effect could be due to the number
of people who might be expected to be standing before a hut or a city hall. Moxey et
afs data (unpublished) also showed that it is not size alone but also expectation that
influences estimates. For example, the number of people expected in front of a large
building influences estimates for many and some: the more expected, the higher the
values given. Refer to page 127 for further discussion.
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interval = 100-200). As for 200 yishang 'more than 200' and 200 ren yishang
'more than 200 people', again the modal interval for the former is 200-+oo,
and 200-300 for the latter. The key here is the noun ren 'people', i.e. with
or without it makes a great deal of difference in assigning the meaning for
more than n and fewer than n (see Section 3.2.3 for the details).
Expectation
There is a close relationship between expectation and interpretation of FQs—
empirical evidence has been given in Moxey and Sanford (1993b) (see Sec¬
tion 2.4 for the details). Let me give an example. In the sentence There are
many couples who lived together before they got married, many may mean
80% or 90% in a western culture, but perhaps at most 10% in Chinese cul¬
ture. Due to cultural differences, people from different cultures have different
expectations. For instance, in Chinese culture lovers normally do not live to¬
gether until they get married, but this is not the case in the western world.
It is suspected that Chinese people have a lower expectation about the num¬
ber of unmarried couples who live together, and therefore they would judge
many in the above sentence a lower percentage. Again, suppose that in the
sentence There are many students who have enrolled for Business Studies at
the University of Otago. where Business Studies is perceived as a favourite
subject, then many is expected to have a high value. On the other hand, in
There are many students who have enrolled for Classical Chinese Grammar
at the University of Otago, many may have a lower value, because a normal
expectation for the Classical Chinese Grammar course is lower. It could be
that many students in the case of Business Studies is 500 students, but only
2-5 for the Classical Chinese Grammar course.
There are numerous empirical data supporting the claim that the higher the
base rate is, the higher the numerical value of an quantity expression is. For
instance, Wallsten, Fillenbaum and Cox (1986) demonstrate that with re¬
spect to a high relative frequency event meteorologists judged a considerably
greater probability to an item compared to a low relative frequency event.
Pepper and Prytulak (1974) also found that frequently was considered to
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mean approximately 70% of the time when it was used to describe the fre¬
quency with which Miss Sweden was found attractive, due to a high expected
frequency. On the other hand, the term was given only approximately 20%
of the time when it was used to describe the frequency of air crashes, due to a
low expected frequency. Similarly, Smithson (1987) says that the frequency
of 15 times a year might be given a membership of 1.0 to often when the
events in question are earthquakes, but not when they are sunny days. For
an extensive discussion of these frequency expressions, see Pepper (19S1).
Apart from those factors discussed above, there are many more contextual
factors involved in interpretation of FQs. As an illustration, FQs can be
interpreted differently from one time to another. Consider the sentence Many
children were in the school playground. The proportion denoted by many
children depends very much on what time this sentence was uttered. If it
was break time, the proportion of many children would be bigger than that
of class time. Hence, the information which the sentence conveys varies
corresponding to different time spans.
Moreover, let us look at cultural factors. It is a Chinese New Year custom for
children to receive a red package with some cash in it. For Chinese, a few in
There are a few yuan6 in the red package is likely to be an even number, which
is a symbol of satisfaction, except four. Four has a pronunciation similar
to death in both Mandarin and Cantonese while the pronunciation of eight
resembles that of fa. meaning getting rich. So, when choosing such things as
telephone numbers eight is the most favourite number, while four is the least
favoured. Given all these factors, it is expected that the number denoted by
a few in the above sentence would most likely be eight. Nevertheless, this
would not have any significance to those brought up in a different cultural
environment.
The finding that FQs are interpreted differently because of pragmatic fac¬
tors is assumed to be valid for other fuzzy expressions also. One may have
to consider a few contextual factors simultaneously to interpret fuzzy ex¬
pressions adequately. For example, to work out the membership of tallness
there are several contextual factors that could be taken into account: sex,
"Yuan is a unit of Chinese dollars.
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location, occupation, etc. Generally speaking, men are taller than women;
British are taller than Japanese; and basketball players are taller than other
people. On the basis of these assumptions I present the following Table 4.1,
where membership of the set denoted by tallness is represented by the scale
of [0, 1]. The numbers given in the table are hypothetical for illustrating the
contextual effects on FQs.
TABLE 4.1: Effect of contextual factors
5T 5'3" 5 "5" 5'7" 5'9" 6'1" 6'3"
female (in Britain) (A) O.S 0.9 1 1 1 1 1
female (in Japan ) (B) 0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1
male (in Britain) (C) 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1 1 1
male (in Japan) (D) 0.3 0.6 0.9 1 1 1 1
female (B. Players) (E) 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1 1 1
male (B. Players) (F) 0 0 0.3 0.6 0.9 1 1
Note: B. Player stands for basketball players.
According to Table 4.1, for females the lower boundary for full tallness in
Britain is 5'5" onwards, whereas in Japan it is 5'3" onwards. The latter is less
than the former by 2". For males in Britain, it is 5'9" onwards which is 4"
more than for females in the same location. Moreover, the lower boundary
for full tallness of female basketball players and males in Britain is 5'9".
which is 6" more than for females in Japan. To examine a fixed height, say
5*3", A's degree is 0.9, B is 1. C is 0.3. D is 0.6, E is 0.3 and F is 0. From
Table 4.1 , tallness can be represented graphically as in Fig. 4.5.
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FIGURE 4.5: Tallnoss
The diversity of these five curves corresponds to the impact of different con¬
textual factors. In addition to the factors discussed, there may well be more
factors which need to be taken into account. The more one considers the con¬
textual factors, the more appropriate the interpretation of fuzzy expressions
becomes.
Having discussed those pragmatic factors above, it becomes certain that com-
positionalitv is not about shape of curves. Our previous discussion shows that
shapes of FQs do change from context to context, e.g. about 3 versus about
20 and more than 200 versus more than 200 people (see Section -1.1.1 for the
details). As discussed in Section 3.2.3, semantically speaking more than n or
fewer than n types could have a monotonic (or hillside-shaped) curve with
infinity as an upper/lower bound. However, pragmatically both FQs would
have a single-peaked curve, which has been empirically verified in both Chi¬
nese and English data here (see Appendix 1, Figs 1.6 k 1.7; Appendix 2, Figs
2.21-2.24). An explanation for this phenomenon would come from the dif¬
ference between semantics and pragmatics. From the point of view of truth
conditional semantics. He has more than 200 dollars is still true even though
his money is so much that it may be considered as infinity. However, from
the point of view of pragmatics, Grice's (1975) maxim of quantity requires
us to be not only truthful but maximally informative. Saying more than 200
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dollars when the actual number approaches infinity is simply not cooperative
in a pragmatic scene. That is, it is not informative and appropriate to use
it.
So, it appears that the difference between semantics and pragmatics makes us
consider FQs in different ways. Pragmatic factors are, however, suspected of
not impacting significantly on the semantic pattern FQs induce. For example,
it does not matter whether or not more than 200 has a single-peaked or
monotonic curve, i.e. the interpretation of more than 200 could be 250 in a
given context, or infinity in another; they are all sensible as far as its core
meaning is concerned (see next section for further discussion on this point).
4.2 Compositionality of FQs
At the beginning of this chapter, we discussed the definition of composition¬
ality and the need for compositionality in semantic theory. An important
question is whether or not those pragmatic factors affect compositionality.
What follows is a discussion about how compositionality works with FQs
taking pragmatic factors into account, i.e. in what way we can claim that
FQs are compositional.
4.2.1 Invariant core meaning/truth condition and vari¬
ant peripheral meaning
The concept of a core meaning is defined here as a meaning under which a set
of entities are selected as the extensional meaning of an expression. A core
meaning is similar to an intension representing common property conveyed
by an expression (see Section 7.2 for more discussion). We term it as core
meaning in the sense that it is invariant over context, more a concern for
semantics. Conversely, interpretation of an expression varies over context,
termed peripheral meaning, which is more pragmatic-oriented.
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The core meaning of an FQ is more determinate than its peripheral meaning
is. For example, about n type, its core meaning is a number approximate to
n. From this its peripheral meaning can be derived, which may vary from
context to context, from individual to individual, and from time to time.
Nevertheless, no matter what number is designated in a given context it
must be in accordance with the core meanings, otherwise it would not be
meaningful. For example, for about 20, its interval could be 18-22, 17-25,
15-22, but not 100-120. The last one is suspected not sensible, because it
does not follow the core meaning, i.e. is not an interval containing 20.
In the same vein, truth condition of propositions containing an FQ tends to
be invariant, though the interpretations of the propositions would be variable.
For example, in the sentence There are many people in my room, its truth
condition is there is a significant number of people in my room compared to
a norm, which would be constant over contexts. From context to context,
the number of people in my room may vary, but it has to be licensed by the
truth condition. That is, it could be 10, even 20, but not 1,000; because
1,000 would not conform with the truth condition, i.e. usually a room would
not accommodate up to 1,000 people.
As discussed in Section 4.1.1, scale effects influence the shape of curves, but
it is less obvious that the core meaning of an FQ, or a truth condition of
the propositions with an FQ, is affected by the scale in a significant way.
For example, it does not matter whether or not the shape for about 20 is
symmetrical, its core meaning would not change over context.
It appears that the semantic meaning of an FQ has two components: (a) a
constant component representing the core, (b) an variable component repre¬
senting the periphery, which can be defined as:
S = c + p (4.2)
Formula (4.2) shows that the semantics of an FQ (5) consists of two parts:
core (c) and periphery (p). The definition in (4.2) is a case for Mosier's
(1941) assumption of word meaning. Mosier assumes that the meaning of a
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word may be considered as containing: (a) a constant component reflecting
the overall meaning value; and (b), a variable component representing the
variation in the meaning of the word due to context, speaker, and the like.
He defines the meaning (M) of a word as:
M = x + i + c (4.3)
where x stands for the constant component over people and context, i the
variation in meaning due to the individual, and c the variation in meaning
due to the context. Mosier claims that any one of the components could be
zero for certain words, and for ambiguous words x could be multiple values.
In the case of FQs it appears that x is a single-value, but i and c could be
multiple values.
In conclusion, the claim that invariant core meaning/truth condition and
variant periphery is plausible with respect to FQs like about 20 and propo¬
sitions with an FQ. The distinction of the invariant and the variant and the
relationship between them are significant in terms of setting a norm for the
assignment of semantic values in a given situation. It is also claimed that
the interpretation of FQs, or a proposition with an FQ, must follow what the
core meaning/truth condition licenses. This lays a sound foundation for the
claim of compositionality, which will be elaborated below.
4.2.2 Motivation
From the discussion above, it is shown that specific numerical values of FQs
vary over contexts and individuals. However, this kind of variance is not
arbitrary, but is motivated.
Motivation is used here in the same sense as Lakoff (1987). He defines that
something in language is motivated when it is neither arbitrary nor pre¬
dictable. Motivated phenomena, according to him, include category exten¬
sions. polysemy, etc. Harrinton (1994) comments that in terms of polysemy,
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motivation provides a partial reason why certain senses appear, and intro¬
duces more systematicity to our understanding of polysemy than previously
assumed. However, he states that systematicity is not total: to say that a
sense extension is motivated does not mean that the appearance of a particu¬
lar sense can be predicted. There is no way to predict, a priori, that English
speakers would develop and conventionalize—for instance, the use of stand to
mean asserting one's rights, as in stand up for your rights. However, standing
up for your rights is assumed to be sensible to the English speaker by virtue
of the embodied nature of the stand concept and the linking devices (e.g.
metaphor, metonymy) used to realize specific sense extensions. Motivation
does not completely explain why a particular sense appears or is used, but
rather serves as an important source for why the sense exists. Lakoff points
out that in natural language, motivation seems to be more the norm than
the exception.
Now, let us examine FQs in particular. Although we may be certain that 200
is in the interval of about 200, it cannot be construed that the designation
of actual numbers to the expression is also determined. That is. the applica¬
tion of the actual number is not completely predictable. The implication of
motivation on FQs is, as Lakoff points out, that motivation is not the kind
of phenomenon that algorithms were designed to characterize, because with
respect to an algorithm things are either predictable (that is, computable
from an input) or they are arbitrary. For example, the actual computation
of the value of many will depend on the situation in question, and what is
the critical criterion (or criteria) under consideration. To interpret a specific
meaning for an FQ in a particular utterance is a business that interacts a
number of aspects, such as semantics, pragmatics and psychology.
Yet, it cannot be said that the application of the actual number is completely
arbitrary either. It appears that the application follows some kind of basic
membership function pattern, which has to comply with the requirement set
by its core meaning. For instance, about n type tends to generate a basic
membership function where n is a prototypical number. It would be counter¬
intuitive if, say for about 2000, the number 3,000 was given a membership of
1, but the number 2,100 was given 0.
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In conclusion, FQs are motivated in terms of the application of actual num¬
bers for a particular FQ's meaning. That is to say the assignment of specific
values to each FQ in a particular utterance is neither predictable nor arbi¬
trary. It is not predictable in the sense that the specification of an FQ's
meaning is context-driven. It is not arbitrary in the sense that the designa¬
tion of the specific values has to follow some kind of pattern. Furthermore,
the motivational characteristic implies that although fuzziness is inherent in
languages, it can be handled systematically. As a result of motivation, my
formal treatment defines that the specification of some values of FQs has to
be done empirically, i.e. they are not computable (see Chapter 6 for details).
4.2.3 Compositional FQs and propositions containing
one
Compositionality of FQs, or propositions containing one, is claimed on the
basis of constant core meaning/truth condition and motivated variance, as
demonstrated above. That is, compositionality is about the fact that an
FQ generates a number of peripheral meanings (or interpretations) which
are all derived from the same core meaning (or truth condition in terms of
a proposition with an FQ). Put another way, the core meaning of an FQ
licenses a basic membership function which may vary within the limit that
the core meaning permits. That is, we do not go beyond a certain degree
of divisibility. For example, the core meaning for 1 or 2 generates a basic
membership function, a function designates a set of appropriate numbers,
{n}, which approximate to 1 and 2. It is likely to be the case that n is 1 or
2 (or may be 3), but no less. The reason is that 0 is not 1 or 2.
It is important to note that a basic membership function is governed by the
core meaning of each type of FQ. Under this basic membership function, each
FQ can be then assigned a specific value corresponding to a given context.
For example, for about n type, its basic membership function has to follow
the core meaning, i.e. about n denotes an interval of numbers that precede or
follow n. Another example, the basic membership function for many would
have to be constrained by the core meaning a significant number compared to
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a norm. It is this kind of basic membership function that captures regularity
of the meaning of FQs and lays a foundation for a formal framework to build
on. That is the reason that the basic membership function is taken as a basis
in my formal work (see Chapter 6 for the details).
In conclusion, compositionality is sustained in that the same type of FQ has
the same way to derive a specific value corresponding to a particular context.
Although a basic membership function may change, the change is motivated
and has a limit. For example, the shape for about n may not be precisely
symmetrical but it would be odd if it had a monotonic curve.
4.3 Combinative FQs
In this section combinative FQs are in focus. We will look at their semantic
behaviours to find out whether or not combinative FQs are also composi¬
tional.
4.3.1 Concentration and dilatation
In this section Hersh and Caramazza's (1976) data in English is adopted
to illustrate the effect of approximators (see Section 1.3.2 for its definition).
Hersh and Caramazza (1976) conducted a series of experiments to explore
an application of FST to a study of the meaning of expressions, such as very
small, sort of large. The test results supported the hypothesis that natural
language concepts and operators can be described by FST.
In the test, 19 undergraduates at Johns Hopkins University served as paid
subjects. Twelve slides, each containing a black square on a white back¬
ground, were used as the stimuli. The squares measured 4, 6, 8, 10. 12.
16, 20, 24, 2S, 32, 40, and 48 in. (10.2 cm to 121.9 cm). Thirteen phrases
tested were made up by the two adjectives large and small paired with var¬
ious combinations of not and very, etc. Subjects were put in one group.
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Each received an answer sheet containing the 13 phrases in one of 10 random
orders. Below each phrase were 12 spaces. When subjects were instructed
to look at the first phrase, they were told that they would see 12 squares
in a random order, and simply to look at each square and decide whether
the phrase applied to it. If it was appropriate, enter yes in the appropriate
space; otherwise enter no. This procedure was repeated for each phrase, with
a different order of squares in each block. Although Hersh and Caramazza's
data are not for FQs per se, we may use them to examine the two types of
functions approximators have: concentration and dilatation.
Concentration: This kind of approximator, exemplified by very and ex-
trcmcly, makes the distribution of an expression converge to end of scale. It
appears that very acts as an intensifier. a point empirically verified by llersh
and Caramazza's work shown in Fig. 4.6. The curve of laryt is hillside-
shaped. Very, as an intensifier. shifts the curve to the right. making the
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FIGURE 4.6: The effect of very on large
where the Y-axis indicates the grade ofmembership, the X-axis indicates the ordinal square
size.
Supposing a square is 48 in. (i.e. at the point 12). then it is definitely large.
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That is, it has the property large to the highest degree 1. However, as shown
in Fig. 4.6, it has the property very large to a degree of 0.98. As a result, for
any number picked up from the X-axis, its membership of very large would
always be less than or equal to its membership of large.
Dilatation: Contrary to concentration the function of dilatational approxi¬
mators exemplified by somewhat, slightly and sort of. is to dilate a distribu¬
tion of FQs. This is empirically tested b}* Hersh and C'aramazza's data on
SCU&RE S'ZE
FIGURE 4.7: The effect of sort of on large
As shown in Fig. 4.7, at the square size 10. large is the degree 0.75. but sort of
large increases to 1. Look then at the square size 12: it is large to the degree
1, but 0.45 for sort of large. It appears that sort of tends to raise those values
fewer than 1 and to lower those values that close to 1. The curve of large
in Fig. 4.7 is hillside-shaped, but sort of shifts it to the left-hand side and
changes its shape to a single-peaked one. This function of sort, of is different
from the function of very, i.e. very tends to keep the same shape, as shown
in Fig. 4.6.
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Moreover, the assumption that the boundary between ,4 and not .4 is fuzzy is
empirically justified by Hersh and Caramazza's (1976) data shown in Fig. 4.S:
FIGURE 4.S: Not large and large
Fig. 4.S shows membership functions for not large and large, where the nega¬
tive phrase is plotted with the complement of the corresponding affirmative
phrase. The boundary between the two intermingles together.
The functions of very, sort of and not illustrated by the data have been
discussed. We will now look at how these functions work with FQs, both in
Chinese and English. It appears that soid of can rarely combine with FQs:
we will discuss quite instead.
4.3.2 Tebie 'very', hao 'quite' and bu/mci 'not'
Tebie 'very': Tebie 'very* in Chinese ma}* intensify the values of FQs it
modifies. For example, the value of tebie duo 'very many1 would be greater
than that of duo 'many'. Similarly, the value of tebie shao 'very few' would
be less than that of shao 'few'. This can be illustrated in Fig. 4.9.





leble duo 'very many'
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FIGURE 4.9: Tcbic 'very'
As shown, if an FQ skews downwards like shao 'few*, tcbic 'very' tends to
reduce its value. On the other hand, if an FQ skews upwards like duo 'many*,
then conversely tebic 'very' raises its value. This is also expected to be the
case in English. It is speculated that very in both Chinese and English tends
to push the numerical value of an FQ further along its original expanding
direction. In other words, tcbic 'very* intensifies towards ends of scale, the
same as very in very large shown in Fig 4.6 above.
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Hao 'quite': Quite differs between English and Chinese. In English, it
moderates towards middle of scale. This can be seen in Fig. 4.10.
FIGURE 4.10: Quite
As shown, quite a few has the same shape as a few, but not quite a lot and a
lot. In the latter, quite changes the shape of a lot's curve, as is sort of that
changes the shape of large shown in Fig. 4.7 above. In general, the function
of quite appears to push values to the centre of the scale.
However, quite in English does not have its equivalent in Chinese, i.e. hao
in Chinese does not mean exactly the same thing as quite in English'. It
can function similarly as quite in English, with ji 'a few" by moderating it
towards middle of scale. However, when hao combines with duo 'many/a lot",
it pushes the value towards end of scale, rather than middle of scale, unlike
quite in English. In the latter case, hao means very. This can be illustrated
in Fig. 4.11.
'Here is a translation problem. Between two languages, sometimes there is simply no
precise mapping between two words.
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FIGURE 1.11: lino 'gtiilc'
As shown in Fig. 4.11. there is some difference between hao in Chinese and
quite in English. The common thing between them is that they both just
moderate, unlike not which can do more than that.
Bu/mei 'not': In Chinese, both bu and mci are negative words, the latter
tending to be used for the past tense. Bu/mci "not* displays a crucial dif¬
ference to tcbie 'very" and hao 'quite", in that it not only pushes the values
to the opposite direction, but goes to the other side of the middle-point. It
does not just moderate, which can be illustrated in Fig. 4.12.





FIGURE 4.12: Du/mci 'not'
Not reduces the value of many in not many. In addition, can we say not many
= a few, or not a few = many! In fact, due to fuzzy semantic boundaries,
one can hardly be certain about this. Apart from the fact that the two pairs
cannot be measured in a mathematical sense, even in a linguistic sense, it is
not certain that the two expressions in each pair mean the same.
Here are some examples of the Type II FQs' combination. ChannelFs (19S3:
So) data showed that combinations like around four or five regions and about
sevenish or a bit later are acceptable. However, expressions like approx¬
imately some arc not acceptable. It seems that about and approximately
require a numerical kind to combine with, and the resulting meaning is even
fuzzier. The efTect of adding an approximator to a numeral is to give it
a fuzzy reading. What happens if we add more is that the reading would
become even fuzzier. Let us examine the following sentences:
a. She is ten.
b. She is about ten.
c. She is about ten or a bit younger than that.
(1.4)
Chapter f. Pragmatics, compositionality and FQs 144
The sentences from (a) to (c) seem to allow a progressively greater interval.
In other words, the meaning of (c) is fuzzier than (b); and (b) is fuzzier than
(a).
Combination occurs mainly among FQs in Type I. Type II FQs do not com¬
bine as often as other types do. As an illustration, in English not does not
combine with about 200 in the same way as with Types I and III. One would
not start a sentence with not about 200, i.e. we normally would not say Not
about 200 students went to the party. This is also the case in Chinese, we
may say Meiyou henduo ren lai 'Not many people came\ but would not say
Meiyou erbairen zuoyou lai 'Not about 200 people came'. The reason pre¬
sumably is that FQs in Type II have their own approximators, such as about
in about 200. In this case, it sounds somewhat redundant to add another
approximator. It sounds odd to say, for example, *very about 20Cf.
Having discussed combinative FQs, a crucial question is whether or not com¬
binative FQs are compositional. The answer is positive. For example, the
way very combines with other FQs tends to be intensifying towards ends of
scale. On the contrary, quite moderates towards middle of scale in English.
In Chinese, hao 'quite' can be an intensifier (e.g. in hao duo 'quite a lot') or
a modifier (e.g. in hao ji (ge) 'quite a few'). The function of not is expected
to push in the opposite direction, and possibly goes to the other side of the
mid-point. So, the semantic pattern of the same type of combinative FQs
in a language, such as hen x 'very x' in Chinese, can be predicated, i.e. /ten
'very' has the same intensifying function over context. Thus, it is speculated
that combinative FQs are compositional.
It is important to note that Moxey and Sanford (1993b) found that in a
between-subject test9 few and very few were not differentiated in numbers.
Hence, they ax-gue plausibly that we should examine the difference between
few and very few in terms of strength of claim instead. This does not under¬
mine the claim of compositionality. The point is that when few and very few
8It is also syntactically ill-formed, because about 200 is not a typical gradable adjective.
9In a between-subject test, a subject is exposed to just one stimulus. On the contrary,
in a within-subject design, a subject is exposed to more than one stimulus.
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are different numerically, very behaves as an intensifier on the scale of numer¬
ical values it modifies. Even when the two FQs are not different numerically.
very still behaves as an intensifier, but this time on the strength of claim
instead. The consistency here is vital in terms of compositionality, because
very would have the same intensifying function in all situations regardless of
what kind of scale (numerical or non-numerical) it intensifies.
Finally, a formal representation of compositionality can be represented as in
(4.5) below,
*n||(c) = H/IKIki||(c)..... ||xn(c)||) (4.5)
which means that the function /has the same effect, subject to some modifi¬
cation depending on context denoted by (c). For instance, very is a function
on the interval denoted by many such that the interval is shortened between
the lowest truth value and 1. Also, about n tends to have a basic membership
function constrained by a number approximate to n. These can be represented
as: 11about n||(c) = ||a&ot£f||(||n||(c)) and ||very FQ||(c) = ||very|!(j|FQj|(c)).
The important point in (4.5) is that in the case of FQs context factors have
a certain effect, but it is definable and functional. The formula in (4.5) can
be a representation for all compositional FQs, atomic or combinative. In the
same vein, ( 4.5) can also represent compositionality of propositions contain¬
ing an FQ, i.e. ||/(<pi,.... dn||(c) = ||/||(||di||(c),..., ||o„(c)|j), where 6 stands
for a proposition containing an FQ.
4.4 Conclusion
What has been attempted here is to develop a compositional theory from
the perspective of FQs. It claims that compositionality is valid because of
FQs' constant core meanings, or truth condition for propositions with an
FQ, and motivated peripheral meanings. While acknowledging context plays
a role in obtaining peripheral meanings, it is argued that from the point of
view of semantics, formal semantics in particular, context is not significant
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in the way that it does not affect compositionality or truth conditionally, i.e.
they have no significant impact on general semantic patterns of FQs. The
fact that the general patterns remain the same over context and individu¬
als implies that the heterogeneity is functional. Pragmatic factors do affect
the interpretation of FQs, but do not go beyond a certain degree of divis¬
ibility. In this way we could build a compositional theory whereby certain
basic membership functions of FQs are subject to modification depending on
context, and the modification has to be constrained by the core meaning of
an FQ or the truth condition of a proposition containing one. This would
explain why such functions are variable without denying compositionality or
truth conditionally.
Compositionality of FQs, together with motivation, enables a provision of
formal treatment of FQs in my work to be carried out. Also, in my formal
semantic framework below, I will employ the concept of membership function
as a means to tackle FQs.
5
Formal semantics of FQs (I)
Having discussed relevant semantic characteristics of FQs, an attempt is
made in this chapter, as well as in the following chapters, to provide a formal
treatment for FQs in which those semantic characteristics explored above
will be formally addressed.
We have speculated in the previous chapters that the semantics of FQs can
be represented by membership functions based on a compositional theory.
What will be shown below is how basic membership functions of FQs can be
formally defined, how they vary over types of FQs, how the pragmatic factors
can be taken into account, above all how our formal semantics of FQs works.
We will first discuss applications of FST and GQT to FQs in this chapter.
Then, a formal semantic framework of FQs will be developed in the next two
chapters.
5.1 Generalized Quantifier Theory
In this section we will discuss GQT with FQs in focus. Two issues are
explored here: in what way FQs are similar to generalised quantifiers, and
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whether or not GQT can treat FQs adequately.
For decades the two logical quantifiers, V and 3, have been in a dominant
position, regardless how atypical they are in representing the quantifiers in
natural languages. In the late 1950s, Mostowski (1957) originated the notion
of a generalized quantifier, which had little influence until Montague's (1974)
work. In truth-conditional semantics, Montague's work—"The proper treat¬
ment of quantification in ordinary English"(PTQ)—has in a classical way
contributed much to our understanding of the formal treatment of the quan¬
tifiers, such as all, some and any. Montague shows that natural language
can be elegantly formalized, including natural language quantifiers.
Based on Montague's theory and influenced mathematically by Mostowski,
Barwise and Cooper (1981) have devised GQT, which is frequently quoted
in papers concerning generalized quantifiers, exemplified by most, and many.
Ever since then there has been rapid development on generalized quantifiers,
such as Westerstahl's (19S9) work. From a slightly different perspective
Iveenan and Stavi (1986) among others, explore determiners, mainly in terms
of their semantic properties. In logic, van Benthem (19S4) proposes a logic
with a provision for natural language quantification.
5.1.1 Semantic universals
A quantifier is interpreted as a set of sets, thus called a generalized quantifier.
It should be noted that a quantifier in GQT is a combination of a determiner
and a noun (e.g. more than 200 + people) , and properties of quantifiers
may not apply to a determiner alone. This differs from standard practice in
traditional logic, where quantifiers are associated only with determiners.
A generalized quantifier is defined as follows (van Benthem, 1982: 61).
By a generalized quantifier, we mean a functor D assigning, to
each set £, a binary relation DeAB between subsets A.B of E. (5.1)
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Research on generalized quantifiers has explored a number of semantic prop¬
erties. Here, we will discuss four of the fundamental semantic universals
with respect to FQs: conservativity, extension (constancy), quantity, and
variation, based on Cann (1993) and Partee, Meulen and Wall (1990). The
original proposal given in Barwise and Cooper (1981) on these universals
has been revised extensively. The version discussed below is relatively less
controversial.
Ul: Conservativity
A quantifier is conservative, if it is a function which assigns a set of subsets of
E with the property B, B C A. This can be defined in (5.2), and exemplified
in (5.3).
IL4, B C E, then DeAB «-+ DeA(A D B). (5.2)
a. Several students left iff several students are students who left.
b. About 200 students left iff about 200 students are students who left.
(5.3)
Conservativity: Every natural language quantifier is conservative. (5.4)
The definition in (5.2) requires that the extension of the VP denoted by B is
contained in the set of sets denoted by D(A). That is, in (5.3a), if leave'is in
the set of several'(student'), then several'(student') contains the intersection
of the extension of student' and leave'. The same analysis applies to (5.3b).
It is assumed in (5.4) that for any quantifier, if it is a natural language quan¬
tifier, then it is conservative. Take Many students left as an example; it is
analytically equivalent to Many students are students who left. It might be
felt that this universal is too obvious to be significant, but as pointed out
by Cann (1993) it captures the fact that the denotation of natural language
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quantifiers is not logically necessary. Also, conservativity rules out many log¬
ically possible quantifiers, and ensures that the interpretation of a quantifier
containing a common noun is not affected by those sets of entities not in the
extension of the common noun (see Cann (1993: 192-193) for examples).
Conservativity claims that for the interpretation of an FQ, only part of E
is relevant. For instance, for the interpretation of a proposition About 200
students left, all we need to know is whether there is a subset of E in which
there are about 200 students who left. In this case, sets like apples and
earthquakes in E are not our interest.
U2: Extension (Constancy)
A quantifier is extensional or constant if the extensions in a domain do not
affect the interpretation of the quantifier. For instance, if the proposition
Every student left is true, then it is still true if we add more earthquakes
or apples to the domain of that model, or take away some from it. This is
represented in (5.5).
What this universal says is that if we want to interpret a quantified propo¬
sition formed with a NP + VP, then anything else that does not belong to
the extensions of the common noun or the VP can be ignored. For instance,
if we want to check the truth value of A few students left, the size of other
sets in the domain is irrelevant, say the set of apples. The truth value is
only dependent on the number of students who left, but not on the number
of apples.
If Conservativity and Extension are the case, then the two amount to another
condition: Strong Conservativity. This can be defined in (5.6).
IL4, B C E C E' then DeAB <-»• De'AB. (5.5)
If A,B C E then DeAB DaA(A fi B). (5.6)
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Strong Conservativity says that the size of the domain is irrelevant in inter¬
preting a quantifier, and only A (common noun) and B (VP) are relevant.
This is built up on the assumption that both Conservativity and Extension
are the case.
U3: Quantity
Quantity claims that the interpretation of a quantifier is only determined by
the number of elements in the relevant sets, and the nature of these elements
is not relevant. This can be represented as in (5.7).
If F is a bijection from Mi to M2 , then De^AB <-* De2F{A)F(B). (5.7)
Quantity requires sameness of interpretation up to isomorphic models. This
condition appears workable with FQs. For instance, About 20 students left is
true if and only if we know how many students left. The matter of who they
actually axe is not relevant, since the truth value of the proposition expressed
by the proposition is not affected by the fact that John is chosen, rather than
Jim, as one of the students in the set who left.
U4: Variation
Variation claims that when more entities are added to a domain in a given
model, there can be some set in the domain which is not generated by a
quantifier. This is defined in (5.8).
For each domain E there is a domain E'such that E C E', ,
A, B, and C C E', such that De'AB and ~ De-AC. ' '
It is shown that set C does not associate at all with set A by D. What
this condition tells us is that quantifiers in natural language must comply
with the requirement that a quantifier does not generate any sets arbitrarily.
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That is, the Principle of Compositionality has to be followed in generating
the meaning of a quantifier (see Section 4.2 for further discussion).
The four universals, Conservativity, Extension, Quantity, and Variation, de¬
fine a generalised quantifier. It appears that one of the four constraints is
particularly robust and valid: Conservativity (Cann, 1993). Our discussion
above, where FQs are used as examples, shows that FQs fit all the four
universals.
5.1.2 Monotonicity
Monotonicity is one of the central issues in GQT, and it presupposes all
the four universals discussed in the last section. Monotonicity characterises
the properties of different subsets generated by quantifiers. For instance,
if Every student left is true in some model, then every'(student') (leave') is
true whether or not more people who left are added to the model. The
proposition is still true if we take away one of the students, or even a subset
of the students. However, the truth value will be affected if we add more
students to the model, should this be the case that some students added are
not in the set of leaveWhat will be demonstrated below is how monotonicity
works with FQs.
In general, a quantifier in the formula D(N)(VP) is monotone increasing if
the adding of more entities to the N or VP has no effect on the truth value
of the formula. On the other hand, a quantifier is monotone decreasing if
subtraction of entities from either of the two sets does not affect the truth
value of the formula. The property of monotonicity is formally defined in
Barwise and Cooper (19S1: 1S4-1S5) as,
A quantifier Q is monotone increasing (mon f) if X € Q and X
CYCE implies Y € Q (i.e. for any set X £ Q, Q also contains
all the supersets of X).
(5.9)
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A quantifier Q is monotone decreasing (mon J.) if A" G Q and Y
CXCE implies Y € Q (i.e. for any set X € Q, Q also contains (5.10)
all the subsets of A").
The definitions show how truth values are affected by an increase or a de¬
crease of the number of entities in the extension of an expression. To test an
XP for monotonicity, let VPi and VP2 be two verb-phrases that the exten¬
sion of VPi is a subset of the extension of VP2. We aim to ascertain if the
assumption in (5.11) is logically valid:
a. If NPV*Pi, then NPV"P2. (NP is mon f) . ,
b. If NPVT2, then NPVPi. (NP is mon J.) ( '
Example 1: (5.11a) is valid, where VPi is are men, and VP2 is are human.
[ all students j
If { most students } are men,
[ about 200 students J
(5.12)
f all students 1
then { most students } are human.
[ about 200 students J
Notice that the reverse implication does not hold, since there could be a
person who is human but not a man. The validity of these implications
follows from the fact that these NP's are monf. To exhibit monj NP's, we
examine (5.13).
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\ no students ]
If { few students } is/are human,
[ neither student J
\ no students ]
then { few students } is/are a man/men.
[ neither student J
(5.13)
In this example, VP2 swaps place with VP\, compared to propositions con¬
taining mon| NPs in (5.12).
In (5.12), it is shown that an NP is monj\ if NPVPi, then NPVP2, where
VPi is a subset of VP2. For instance, if About 200 students are men. then
About 200 students are human. On the other hand, in (5.13) an NP\s monf,
if NPVP2, then NPVP\. For instance, if Few students are human, then Few
students are men.
Furthermore, monotonicity can be examined in two types: subject monotone
and predicate monotone, as in Cann (1993: 193-194). A quantifier is sub¬
ject monotone if the truth value of a quantified formula is unaffected by an
increase or decrease in its common noun extension. A predicate monotone
quantifier is defined in that the truth value of a quantified formula is un¬
affected by an increase or decrease in its VP extension. Strictly speaking,
the definitions given in (5.9) and (5.10) above are for predicate monotone
quantifiers only.
Formula (5.14) below gives definitions of the four properties, (5.15) gives
inference patterns validated by the definitions in (5.14). Then the validity
and invalidity of (5.14) are illustrated in (5.16), (5.17) and (5.18) by examples
from all three types of FQs.
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a. A quantifier D(N) is subject monotone increasing
iff D{NJVP -» D{N2)V?, where Afi C N2.
b. A quantifier D(N) is subject monotone decreasing
iff D(Ni)VP -» D(N2)VP, where iV2 C Aq.
c. A quantifier D(N) is predicate monotone increasing
iff D(N)VPi D(N)VP2, where C VP2.
d. A quantifier D(N) is predicate monotone decreasing
iff D(N)V7>, -> D(N)VP2, where VP2 C VPj.
a. q(\ A VOM ^(x)(v)
^(X)(V) <f>(X A ^)(s?)
C- <?(.\ )(<r,A *P)^4>{X)(P)
d- <i>(x){p) -* <k{x){<p A 1>)
a. If several Chinese students left, then several students left.
b. * If several students left, then several Chinese students left.
c. If several students left early, then several students left.
d. * If several students left, then several students left early.
a. If about 200 Chinese students left, then about 200 students left.
b. *If about 200 students left, then about 200 Chinese students left.
c. If about 200 students left early, then about 200 students left.
d. *If about 200 students left, then about 200 students left early.
(5.17)
a. *If fewer than 200 Chinese students left, then fewer than 200 students left.
b. If fewer than 200 students left, then fewer than 200 Chinese students left.
c. *If fewer than 200 students left early, then fewer than 200 students left.
d. If fewer than 200 students left, then fewer than 200 students left early.
(5.18)
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Let me explain the inference patterns in (5.15), taking (a) as an example. If
we match it with the proposition If several Chinese students left, then sev¬
eral students left in (5.16a), then it would be like this: <f>(several)(x(students)
Axf(Chinese))(ip)(left) —»• (j>(several)(x)(students) (<p)(left). Next, we consider
(5.15d) and the proposition If fewer than 200 students left, then fewer than
200 students left early in (5.1Sd). That is, <j>(fewer than 200)(\)(students)(~p)
(left) —> d(fewer than 200)(\)(students)(y>(left) Ath(early)). The same prin¬
ciple applies to the rest of inference patterns given in (5.15).
/
In (5.16), (5.17) and (5.IS), those propositions that do not hav:e certain prop¬
erties are indicated by an asterisk. Each illustration contains four proposition
correlating to the four properties in (5.14). For instance, in (5.16) and (5.17).
several and about propositions are both subject and predicate increasing and
neither is monotone decreasing. However, in (5.18) propositions with fewer
than are monotone decreasing for both subject and predicate, and has no
monotone increasing property at all.
FQs may be sorted corresponding to different inference patterns to which
they give rise. Some Type I FQs are displayed in Table 5.1 below, where
they are examined in terms of the four properties, defined in (5.14) above.
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TABLE 5.1: Four properties of FQs in Type I
FQs subject subject predicate predicate
monotone monotone monotone monotone
increasing decreasing increasing decreasing
very many ? No Yes No
a lot ? No Yes No
many ? No Yes No
quite a lot ? No Yes No
quite a few ? No Yes No
a few Yes No Yes No
several Yes No Yes No
not many No ? No Yes
few No ? No Yes
very few No •? No Yes
It is shown in Table 5.1 that for the two FQs in the middle, a few and several,
their properties are relatively easy to identify. However, for other FQs it is
less obvious whether or not they possess certain properties. This goes back
to the claim that FQs which may be used to denote an interval rather than
proportion are less fuzzy (see Section 3.2.1 for more discussion). ,4 few and
several can be used in this way (i.e. they may denote a meaning that is less
proportional), therefore they are less uncertain. For instance, we tend to
interpret several as a number, say six, rather than 5%. On the other hand,
with other FQs in Type I, a percentage is often used. Take many as an
example; it is unclear whether or not it is subject monotone increasing in the
proposition like If many Chinese students left, then many students left. The
reason is that many Chinese students left does not necessarily entail Many
students left1. There may be a situation in which many in the first clause
is counted as a small proportion of students in the second clause, i.e. the
number of Chinese students who left is proportionally greater than that of
other students of non-Chinese nationality. But it does not guarantee that
1 If the extensions of common nouns (Chinese students vs students) are equivalent, then
the proposition is monotone increasing. The problem is that we normally do not know
whether or not they are (see Section 7.3 for further discussion on this).
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the number of students who left was more than that of students who did not
leave. Those FQs with a question mark in Table 5.1 are semantically more
complex than FQs without.
It shows that all FQs listed above a few and several, i.e. very many, a lot,
many, quite a lot and quite a few, are predicate monotone increasing only,
less obvious in terms of subject monotone increasing, and have no monotone
decreasing property of any sort. They are all positive FQs. A few and several
are positive as well, but it is clear that they are both subject and predicate
monotone increasing. Below a few and several are negative FQs; they are
only a few, not many, few, and very few, all predicate monotone decreasing.
Again, it is not clear if they are subject monotone decreasing.
A preliminary conclusion may be drawn here. In tex-ms of FQs in Type I,
all the positive FQs are monotone increasing, and all the negative FQs are
monotone decreasing. Let us check this with FQs in Types II and III in
Table 5.2 below.
TABLE 5.2: Four properties of FQs in Types II and III
FQs subject subject predicate predicate
monotone monotone monotone monotone
increasing decreasing increasing decreasing
about n Yes No Yes No
n-odd Yes No Yes No
n or so Yes No Yes No
nearly n Yes No Yes No
more than n Yes No Yes No
at least n Yes No Yes No
fewer than n No Yes No Yes
at most n No Yes No Yes
Similar to Table 5.1, Table 5.2 shows the four properties of FQs in Types
II and III. It verifies the conclusion that all positive FQs are monotone in¬
creasing, and all the negative FQs are monotone decreasing. Compared with
Table 5.1, FQs in Table 5.2 are simpler in terms of identification of the four
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properties. As opposed to more than n and at least n, fewer than n and at
most n are negative and monotone decreasing in both subject and predicate.
It appears that all FQs in Type II, plus two positive FQs in Type III, are
monotone increasing in both subject and predicate. Interestingly, although
distributional shapes of the four FQs in Type II, about n, n or so, n-odd and
nearly n, are different as illustrated in Chapter 3 by our empirical data in
Chinese and English, they behave similarly in terms of monotonicity. This
implies that different shapes of FQs do not affect their unity in terms of
the inferential pattern, as they do not affect compositionality of FQs (see
Section 4.2 for the details).
Quantifiers analysed so far are all FQs, and there might be some interesting
difference between FQs and non-FQs. Thus, three typical non-FQs are tested
with the four properties in Table 5.3.
TABLE 5.3: Four properties of non-FQs
FQs subject subject predicate predicate
monotone monotone monotone monotone
increasing decreasing increasing decreasing
every No Yes Yes No
a Yes No Yes No
no No Yes No Yes
As shown, one exception to the claim made with FQs above is that although
every is positive, it is subject monotone decreasing. However, the claim that
all positive quantifiers are monotone increasing is still valid as far as FQs are
concerned.
Comparing Table 5.3 with Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, there are three interest¬
ing points. Firstly, non-FQs all have two properties of the four, but some
FQs have only one (e.g. all type I FQs, except a few and several, shown in
Table 5.1). This might be due to the uncertainty of FQs' meanings. Sec¬
ondly, every has two opposite properties: subject decreasing and predicate
increasing. It thus seems inaccurate if we simply say that every is mono¬
tone increasing and a specification of predicate monotone increasing is more
Chapter 5. Formal semantics of FQs (I) 160
appropriate. In terms of FQs having two opposite properties, this hardly
happens, i.e. an FQ normally would be either monotone increasing or mono¬
tone decreasing, but not both. Again, this might be due to their imprecise
semantics, i.e. they are not universal quantifiers like every. Thirdly, most
Type I FQs do not have the property of subject monotonicity except a few
and several, but it is not the case for other types of FQs and non-FQs. As
far as FQs in Type I are concerned predicate monotonicity is a more relevant
property and subject monotonicity is less interesting.
Monotonicity reveals the kind of inference licensed by quantifiers, illustrated
in (5.19). If (a) is true, due to the property of a few (monf) (d) follows from
(b); whereas the property of few (monj.) does not imply that (e) follows from
(c).
a. All politicians are polite.
b. A few men are politicians.
c. Few men are politicians. (5-19)
d. A few men are polite.
e. Few men are polite.
Some non-FQs, like exactly 20, are not monotone quantifiers. In English, all
phrases in the form of exactly n are assumed to be non-monotone. However.
Barwise and Cooper (1981) claim that quantifiers like exactly 20 can be ex¬
pressed as a conjunction of expressions which are monotone. For instance.
exactly 20 could be considered as a conjunction of not more than 20 and not
less than 20. This suggests that any quantifiers might be considered mono¬
tone, because a quantifier, like exactly 20. can be expressed as a conjunction
of other quantifiers.
There is some uncertainty about whether an FQ is monotone increasing or
monotone decreasing. For instance, Moxey and Sanford (1993b: 73) think
that a few is monotone increasing. But, Barwise and Cooper (19S1) are less
sure about it and think that FQs like a few have two readings: some but
not many and at least a few. If the former is the case, then a few is not
monotone; if the latter is the case, then it is monf. This also applies to
several. It appears to me that a few is monotone increasing, e.g. If a few
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students are men, then a few students are human, no matter which of the
two readings is the case. This kind of disagreement shows that the monotone
types of inferences are not analytical, since our intuitions play an important
part in it (see Section 7.3 for further discussion on this).
Monotonicity gives rise to a number of semantic universals. As an illustration
compound FQs formed, for example by and, permit only those FQs with the
same monotone direction. For instance,
a. Many students and several lecturers left.
b. *Many students and few lecturers left.
(o.20)
c. Few students and fewer than 3 lecturers left.
d. *Few students and at least 3 lecturers left.
In (5.20), (a) has two conjoined FQs, many students and several lecturers.
of which both are monotone increasing. However, (b) sounds odd. because
few is monotone decreasing. The same applies to (c), where both FQs are
monotone decreasing, and (d), where the requirement of the same monotone
direction is not fulfilled.
The constraint can be formulated as in (5.21) (Barwise Cooper, 1981),
Co-ordination constraint: A compound FQ formed by conjunction and
or disjunction or must contain'FQs with the same monotone direction.
(5.21)
According to (5.21), any combination containing a decreasing quantifier and
an increasing one is excluded on a semantic ground. This constraint is ex¬
pected to be valid for all compound FQs with and/or. The validity can be
tested by checking through FQs in Table 5.1. For instance, the combination
of very many and a few (e.g. Very many students and a few lecturers left)
and not many or only a few (e.g. Not many students or only a few lectur¬
ers left) are fine, because the two FQs combined are monotone in the same
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direction. If this requirement is not fulfilled, then two FQs are not likely to
be conjoined. For instance, the combinations of very many and few and not
many or a lot sound odd. So. in Type I FQs the constraint in (5.21) indeed
works. Type II FQs in Table 5.2 are simpler, because they are all in the
same monotone direction. With Type III FQs in Table 5.2, the constraint
works as well as it does with FQs in Type I. Finally, both conjunction and
disjunction preserve monotonicity. For instance, the compound FQ, many
students and a few lecturers, must also be monotone increasing. The same
argument applies to disjunction of FQs.
How well the constraint works with a compound FQ formed by FQs from
different types has still to be questioned, however. It seems that the com¬
bination of about n and few (e.g. About 5 students and few lecturers left) is
workable as is that of fewer than n and a few (e.g. Fewer than 20 students
and a few lecturers left). But, this validity is against the constraint set in
(5.21), since the two FQs in both combinations are monotonely opposite.
Barwise and Cooper (1981: 217) claim that this kind of variation is difficult
to explain. Thus, it appears that the constraint in (5.21) applies only to the
FQs of the same type.
5.1.3 Comments on GQT
GQT is certainly better compared with the first-order predicate calculus
which can only deal with few atypical quantifiers like all and some. As
Barwise and Cooper (1981) point out, there are two respects in which the
standard first-order logic is inadequate in dealing with the quantified propo¬
sitions. First, natural language quantifiers are too complex to be symbolized
by either V or 3. For instance, the meaning of many students cannot be
represented by 3 in a satisfactory way. Secondly, there is a big gap between
the syntactic structure of quantified propositions in predicate calculus and
that in natural language. As an illustration, for Many students left, it fits
neither —» for V, nor fl for 3. On the other hand, GQT permits a logical
syntax to relate more closely to a natural language syntax. With GQT the
serious limitation of first-order logic can be overcome by a higher-order con¬
cept denoted by a generalised quantifier. Also, it can treat a wider range of
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natural language quantifiers.
Van Benthem (1982: 61) comments:'"Generalized quantifiers' discover a whole
fine-structure of Montague Grammar, so to speak. ... most conspicuously,
general conjectures have been formulated about the occurrence of, or con¬
nections between, certain types of determiner in all human languages. This
development of 'semantic universals' not only enriches the Montagovian fund
of semantic themes, it also provides a promising rapprochement between ear¬
lier 'fragmentary' approaches in formal semantics and more common 'global'
linguistic habits of semantic description." I subscribe to the point made
bv van Benthem that Barwise and Cooper's interest is located at the level
of "meaning postulates", in between global "categorical fit" and elaborate
lexical details.
Moxey and Sanford (1993b:107) also comment on Barwise and Cooper's work:
"...they concentrate upon specifying how natural language expres¬
sions fit into the Generalized Quantifier Theory, which is about
the kinds of inferences licensed by expressions, rather than be¬
ing about the (numerical) values that may be associated with
expressions. If a particular natural language expression (quanti¬
fier) denotes a state of affairs that corresponds to some category
within the theory, then it is possible to say what inferences it
licenses: That is, what necessarily true things follow if the quan¬
tified assertion is true."
Barwise and Cooper's approach is indeed a promising one in analyzing the
properties like semantic universals and monotonicity. However, it has its lim¬
itation. Although the semantic universals tackle the semantics of generalized
quantifiers with some success, it assumes a bivalent theory of truth. That is,
a proposition is either true or false. It is then difficult for GQT to capture
the degree of truth represented by propositions containing an FQ.
Any propositions which contain an FQ have a degree of truth, such as the
proposition Many people are girls. GQT has no provision for the degree of
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truth. In order to deal with fuzziness, GQT confines that any interpretations
of generalized quantifiers should be done in a fixed context. The problem
with FQs is that even within a fixed context their interpretations may still
be fuzzy.
In conclusion, GQT is not totally incompatible with FST approach, particu¬
larly the idea of a set of subsets, but it needs to be determined how fuzziness,
e.g. degree of truth, can fit in GQT (see Section 7.1 for further discussion
on this). This is where FST comes in, which is the issue discussed next.
5.2 Fuzzy Set Theory
For the past two decades, GQT has been studied extensively in linguistics,
but FST (Zadeh, 1965, 1971-73, 19S3) is limited in its influence, although it
is well-established in many other fields. Ever since the 1960s, the emergence
of FST has provoked new insights into our study of fuzzy phenomena. FST
has extended theories developed on the basis of Zadeh's original ideas; it
also has many versions. I intend to introduce Zadeh's basic ideas and normal
version, and importantly, show how they work with FQs linguistically.
5.2.1 The definition
FST is a fuzzy set-based theory with the basic idea that, instead of either
being in a set or not, an individual is in the set to a certain degree, say some
number between zero (non-membership) and one (full membership), notated
as [0, l]2. This is called a membership (characteristic) function.
FST can deal with a proposition with fuzzy characteristics. With respect to
a fuzzy predicate, FST is concerned with the degree of satisfaction of gradual
properties expressed by the fuzzy predicate, such as about 20 and red, graded
2Smithson (1987: 300) proposes that the value may also take on other kinds, such as
linguistic values.
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on the scale [0, 1]. For instance, the proposition Mary is about 20 years old
might be neither totally true, nor totally false, but true to a degree notated
by some number between 0 and 1.
Formally, a fuzzy set is defined as follows (Zadeh, 1965, 1975):
In a universe of discourse E = {i, ...}, a fuzzy set A, A € E. can be
characterized in terms of a set of ordered pairs {x, /^(a:)}, where /m(x)
is understood to be the degree of membership of x in A. Pa{x) is usually
taken to have values in the interval [0, 1].
(5.22)
An element of the fuzzy set A can, in this way, be designated by the ordered
pair:
< x,PA{Z) > (5.23)
When A in (5.23) is a non-fuzzy set, its membership function can take on
only 1 and 0 corresponding to whether x does or does not belong to A,
respectively. So, FST is a generalization of the conventional two-valued set
theory (see Section 8.2.1 for an elaboration on this). Smithson (1987: 9)
comments that the definition of a fuzzy set has some intuitive appeal since
ordinary common sense presents us with sets which fit this description. For
instance, for about 200, 215 might be given a membership, say 0.8.
Applying the definition in (5.22) to the semantics of FQs, a FQ, like 2 or
3, may be considered as a fuzzy set to which individuals belong to a cer¬
tain degree. 2 or 3 can be represented in terms of its membership function
Pi or 3(2)- Instead of taking just two values, 1 or 0, pi or 3(1) can take values
in the interval [0, 1], each representing a degree of membership. Note that
the nearer the value of p.2 OT 3(2:) to 1, the higher the grade of membership
of t, this has been the case in my Chinese data (see Section 3.7 for more
discussion).
Chapter 5. Formal semantics of FQs (I) 166
A hypothetical membership function of 2 or 3 is given here as in Table 5.4.
and graphically represented in Fig. 5.1.
TABLE 5.4: 2 or 3
Numbers(j) 0 1 2 3 4 5
/'2 or 3 (■r) 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 0
number
FIGURE 5.1: f or 3
It is shown in Table 5.4 and Fig. 5.1 that if a number is fewer than 0 inclu¬
sively or greater than 5 inclusively, then it does not belong to 2 or 3 at all. If
a number is in the interval between 1 and 4, then it has t he property of 2 or 3
to a certain degree. For instance, the number 2 belongs to 2 or 3 to a degree
of 1. as does 3; 4 is of 2 or 3 to a degree of 0.5. This membership function
indicates the meaning of 2 or 3 in this particular model. It appears that the
application of the actual numbers for an FQ is not predictable, rather it is
pragmatically determined. However, the application is not arbitrary either.
This is because FQs are compositional and motivated, as argued earlier (see
Chapter 4 for the details).
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5.2.2 Fuzzy set operation
To define a fuzzy set is to specify its membership function. To specify the
complement of a fuzzy set or the union/intersection of two fuzzy sets we
have to specify how the membership function of the complement, union or
intersection is related to the membership function of the fuzzy set(s) from
which it is derived. The following definitions are proposed by Zadeh (1965).
These definitions represent the relationship of fuzzy sets to their union, in¬
tersection, complement and subset. To see how they work, let us examine
а. Union: Pa u b = niax(/i,4.pe)
б. Intersection: Pa n b — "dn(/f.4,pb)
c. Complement: /t.4< = 1 — Pa
(I. Subset: A C B iff p,\(r) < Pb{s)-
(5.24)
for all j- € A*.
Fig. 5.2. about 2 or 3
1 1 1 1 1 1 U-
0 1 2 3 4 5
number
FIGURE 5.2: 2 or 3 and about 2 or 3
Let A = 2 or 3 and B = about 2 or 3. If P2 or 3(*) = 0.6, pabout 2 or 3(*) = 0.S,
then the union for them is O.S, and the intersection is 0.6. The complement
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for p2 or 3(2:) is 0.4, for pabout 2 or 3(2) is 0.2. Given a number in Fig. 5.2,
its grade of membership of 2 or 3 is expected to be less than or equal to its
grade of membership of about 2 or 3. For instance, the number 4 has the
property of 2 or 3 to the degree 0.5, whereas it has the property of about 2
or 3 to the degree 0.7. Also, given the number 3, the membership of both is
1. The trend here is that the membership of about 2 or 3 for a number in
the interval will always be greater than or equal to the membership of 2 or
3 for the number.
It is evident that the formula of (5.24d) is valid. However, it appears that
while all other operations of fuzzy sets in (5.24) can have a grade of mem¬
bership, (5.24d) cannot, which takes only 0 and 1. It would be consistent if
it can also take on intermediate values. There are several ways by which this
can be done:
(a) Lukasiewicz (described in McCawley 1981: 366):
\A C B\ = 1 iff < |£|
= \B\ iff Ml > |5| 1 j
(b) Ronnie Cann (personal communication):
\A C B| =1 iff M| < \B\
= \A\-\B\ iff M| > 1*1
(c) McCawley (1981: 480):
M C B\ =1 iff Ml < \B\
= 1 - Ml + \B\ iff |A| > \B\
(5.26)
(5.27)
Or. (5.27) could be represented as in (5.2S):
M C B\ = min( 1, 1 - Ml + \B\) (5.28)
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since |.4| < |i?| is equivalent to "1 - |A| + \B\ > 1".
To explain how the formulas work, let us reuse Fig. 5.2 above, but this time
we examine the degree that |about 2 or 3|(A) entails |2 or 3|(B), rather than
the other way round as in (5.24d). In Fig. 5.2, to take the number 4, |A| =
0.7, and \B\ = 0.5. Then, \A C B\ — 0.5 according to (5.25), 0.2 according
to (5.26), and 0.8 according to (5.27).
To make sense of these results, we need to discuss the rationales behind
the three formulas. In (5.25), the formula represents the intersection of the
membership values of .4 and B. Formulas (5.26) and (5.27) represent the
difference between the values of A and B. Note that (5.26) and (5.27) describe
the difference in a reverse way. In terms of (5.26), the more trivial the
difference between |A| and |i?|, shown by the value |A — B|, the higher the
degree of |A| C |f?|. On the other hand, for (5.27), the bigger the value of
(1 — |A| + |jB|), the higher the degree of |A| C |J5|. The values from (5.26)
and (5.27) are complementary to each other (e.g. 0.2 + 0.8 =1). The three
formulas in (5.25), (5.26) and (5.27) all provide a way of representing a degree
of set inclusion, making the formulas in (5.24) more consistent. It appears
to me that (5.25) is more straightforward than the other two, although all
of them can offer a degree of membership. For example, In Fig. 5.2, let |.4|
= 0.7, and \B\ = 0.5. As shown, from 0 to 0.5, both A and B are true, the
minimum of the two values or the intersection of the two sets.
5.2.3 Fuzzy proposition operation
The treatment for fuzzy set operations is also applicable to propositions
containing a fuzzy set. In terms of the prepositional logic, FST is a gener¬
alization of standard prepositional logic in that it makes a move from two
truth values false and true to degrees of truth notated in [0, 1]. If we take two
fuzzy propositions P and Q, and let "A", "V" and be connectives,
then valuations for the connectives are defined as follows, quoted from Zadeh
(1965, 1971):
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«. \-P\ = 1 -\P\
b. \P A <5| = min(|/>|, |Q|)
c. \P V Q\ = max(|n \Q\)
<1. \P - Q\ = 1 iff |R| < \Q\
Note that when |P| and |Q| are both 1 or 0, or one is 1, the other is 0, we
would get the classical truth value. That is, if one puts binary values into
(5.29), one gets binary values back.
To see how (5.29) works, let us examine Fig. 5.3.
Ther are about 2 or 3 apples
number
FIGURE 5.3: Two propositions with 2 or 3 and about 2 or 3
Let P = There are 2 or 3 apples, and Q — There are about 2 or 3 apples.
To take the number -1 in Fig. 5.3 as an example, |P| = 0.5, and |Q| = 0.7.
Then, the proposition There are not 2 or 3 apples is true to the degree 0.5,
and There are not about 2 or 3 apples is true to the degree 0.3. As a result.
There are 2 or 3 apples and there are about 2 or 3 apples is true to the
degree 0.5—the minimum of 0.5 and 0.7; whereas There are 2 or 3 apples or
there are about 2 or 3 apples is true to the degree 0.7—the maximum of 0.5
and 0.7.
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In terms of entailment3, the formula is \P —*■ 31 = 1 iff |P| < |Q|. Thus, here
JP —Q| = 1, since |P| < |Q|, i.e. 0.5 < 0.7. That is, if there are 2 or 3
apples, then there are about 2 or 3 apples. From the trend shown in Fig. 5.2
above, the grade of membership of 2 or 3 for a given number is always less
than or equal to its grade of membership of about 2 or 3. We can thus derive
that the truth value of a proposition containing the former would be always
equal to or less than that of a proposition containing the latter as shown in
Fig. 5.3.
It is again worth noting that other formulas in (5.29) all represent a degree
of truth, except (5.29d). This invokes the same question discussed about
(5.24d) above, i.e. we need a formula to offer a degree of truth for —Godel
(described in Rescher 1969: 44) proposed,
|P->31 = l iff |^| < |3I ,,,m
= 131 iff|P| > 131 ('^U)
The formula is similar to (5.25) above. This time let |P| = There are about
2 or 3 apples, and 131 = There are 2 or 3 apples. Take the number 4, as
shown in Fig. 5.3, |P| = 0.7 and |3| = 0.5. Then |P —* Q\ — 0.5, which is
the same result from A, i.e. to take the minimum value of the two values,
when |P| > |3|- According to (5.30), the greater the value of Q, the greater
the value of an entailment. This can be illustrated in Fig. 5.3, where the
bigger |31 is> the more true the entailment.
5.2.4 FST and prototype theory
FST rejects a number of well-known standard theories, such as The Principle
of Bivalence and The Law of Excluded Middle, which have attempted to fit
the real world to an all-or-none assumption, giving no place and provision
for fuzziness.
3Here, the notion of entailment is used in a straightforward logical sense.
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Prototype theory developed by Rosch (1973, 1975) has some bearing on FST
in that they both have a provision for fuzziness in natural languages. Pro¬
totype theory is meant to represent the fuzziness by virtue of defining the
relation between a prototype for a fuzzy set and the rest of the elements in
the set. A prototype4 is, as defined in Smithson (1987: 301), an exemplary
member of a set which may be virtual or imagined. The standard notion
of a prototype, as stated in Smithson (1987: 58), claims two points: (1) the
prototype itself is a member of the category which it represents; (2) the more
dissimilar a given item is from a prototype, the lower that item's membership
value in the corresponding category.
On this theory, Lvons(1986: 71) says:
"Generally speaking, we operate with what have come to be called
proto-types, or stereotypes; and usually what we want to refer to
conforms to the proto-type. For example, the proto-type for 'dog'
might be rather like the Longman definition, ...:'a common four-
legged flesh-eating animal, especially any of the many varieties
used by man as a companion or for hunting, working, guarding,
etc.'. I have now quoted the definition in full; and it will be
observed that the additional part of the definition, running from
'especially' to 'etc.', indicates that there are several varieties of
dogs and that some of these fall within the focal extension of 'dog'
(that is, they are more typical sub-classes of the class than other,
non-focal, varieties are). As for the varieties, we could all name
a few, and dog-fanciers a lot more: spaniels, terriers, poodles etc.
When we say that someone knows the meaning of "dog', we imply
that he has just this kind of knowledge."
Coleman and Kay (19S1) assert that an individual is assigned a degree of
membership according to how similar it is to a prototype. For instance,
4The prototype is termed differently. For instance, it is called an exemplar in Channell
(1983). She terms 500 an exemplar in about 500 pounds. The prototype is called
paradigm in Sainsbury (1991).
Chapter 5. Foi~mal semantics of FQs (I) 173
when we try to judge the applicability of an FQ about 200, and if the proto¬
type is the number 200, then we are able to judge individuals through their
similarities to the prototypical number 200. The similarities here come in
degrees, and the truth value for a proposition containing a fuzzy expression
appears to be a matter of degree as well.
However, Chierchiaand McConnell-Ginet (1990: 390) say that not all impre¬
cise concepts are graded in terms of similarity to a prototype. For example:
They believe that there is no plausible prototype associated with tall even
with recourse to context. The truth value for the propositions in (5.31)
does not depend on how closely Eloise and Peggy resemble the prototype.
Suppose that a prototypical tall American woman is 5'9", Eloise is 6'2" tall
and Peggy is 5'5" tall, then Peggy's height differs by only 4" from that
of the prototype, but Eloise's height differs by 5". Then, it appears that
Peggy is more similar in height to the prototype than Eloise is, and what
follows is that Peggy is more typical in tallness than Eloise. This result is
obviously counter-intuitive. In fact, (a) is absolutely true, but (b) is, at best,
nearly true. Based on this instance, Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet claim
that prototypes are not always relevant when we are dealing with semantic
imprecision.
There are two ways by which we can say that prototype theory can actually
deal with the case in (5.31). Firstly, allow the prototype to have more than
one entity. For instance, a range of heights [5'9", 6'2"...] could all be proto¬
types. Since Eloise is 6'2" tall, which is in the set of prototypes already, so
there is no question that Eloise is tall. On the other hand, Peggy is only 5*5"
tall, which differs from the prototype by 4". The upshot then is that Peggy
is less similar in height to the prototype than Eloise, because Eloise's height
is a prototype itself. So, Peggy is less typical in tallness than Eloise, and we
can solve the problem by getting the intuitive result that (a) is truer than (b)
in (5.31). The claim that the prototype could be a set of entities is verified
empirically in my Chinese data, e.g. 200 ren zuoyou 'about 200 people' was
а. Eloise is tall.
б. Peggy is tall. (5.31)
(
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given a set of numbers from 195 to 205 as its prototypes (see Appendix 2,
Fig. 2.15). Zadeh (1982: 293) also claims that the prototype could be a set
of more than one single object. He goes further to say that the prototype
could be an infinite collection of objects, which is mathematically plausible.
The second way is to put a constraint on the claim that the closer a given
item to a prototype, the higher the item's membership value. The constraint
is that where compared items are placed, a prototype must be an end of
scale. With this constraint, the claim works universally (see Section 3.7 for
more discussion). In (5.31) the prototype does not act as an end of the
scale, where Eloise and Peggy are compared. Consequently, the claim that
the prototype theory does not work in this case is invalid, as far as the
constraint is concerned. That is, in the example given, the scale would be
[5'5" (Peggy) ... 5'9" (prototype) ... 6'2" (Eloise)], where the prototype is
not the end of the scale.
It is suspected that people do not make judgments about tallness in general.
If we ask "How tall is tall?", people would feel hard to answer this question.
We may have to be more specific, asking questions like "How tall is tall for
a ten year old girl?". Tallness is a relative concept, it varies from context
to context. In a given context, A who is 4'8" may be said relatively tall
if the only compared person is B who is 4'5". Also, if we compare two
children of three years old, a prototype for them would be much shorter than
a prototype for adults. A tall person, a tall building, and a tall tree require
different prototypes. Therefore, a prototype or typical value appropriate in
a given context cannot be the basis of judgments about tallness in general.
Of course, in the case of FQs this claim may or may not be the case. It may
be the case for many, but not for about n type where n tends to be regarded
as a prototypical number or at least very similar to it.
To conclude: the two theories, FST and the prototype theory both provide an
account for fuzziness. They are compatible in that both reveal the property
of degree by looking into the relation between a prototype and the rest of
the related individuals in the model. They both claim that the closer an
individual to a prototype, the higher the membership it has of the set. The
prototype in a fuzzy set acts as a norm and influences the membership of
the related individuals in the set. Although FST and prototype theory are
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not mutually exclusive they employ different methods to represent fuzziness.
FST accounts for fuzziness by using intermediate values in [1, 0], which
are not part of the means used in prototype theory. FST focuses on the
continuous nature of membership, prototype theory on representativeness,
as commented by Fuhrmann (19S8: 195).
In my work, FST is adapted to explore FQs, membership function in par¬
ticular. The reason I use membership function is that it is more suitable to
represent the meaning of FQs (see next chapter for a detailed demonstration).
5.2.5 Fuzzy grammar
There is a wide range of application of FST in linguistics and a brief discus¬
sion of fuzzy grammar is given here. Through the following discussion, it will
become evident that FST applies equally well to grammar as to semantics.
Fuzzy grammar has been advocated since the early 1970s (see Matthews
19S1: Ch. 1, & Newmeyer 1986: Ch. 5 for more discussion). FST makes
grammars capable of generating sentences with a degree of grammatical ap¬
propriateness. Fuzzy grammar is based on the assumption that grammar
is a non-discrete phenomenon, rather than discrete. For example, Comrie
(1989) discusses the issues of fuzzy degree of subjecthood, nouniness and ad-
jectiveness. More recently, Meyer (1992) treats the category of apposition as
gradient, because of borderline cases between apposition, complementation
and coordination.
The most well-known work on the fuzziness in grammar is Ross's (1973)
paper. He discusses category squishes and claims that there is a grey area
about the noun phrase. Ross considers the notion of squish as an important
part of his notion of non-discrete grammar. He states that a lexical item
could be placed somewhere on a continuum with verb and noun as the two
extremes, and that this kind of continuity also applies to other grammatical
categories. As an illustration, Ross provides a hierarchy of noun-phrasiness
as in Fig. 5.4:
Chapter 5. Formal semantics of FQs (I) 176
more noun-phrase-like
<
''Harpo'' > ''headway'' > ''there'' > ''tabs''
FIGURE 5.4: Ross: nouniness
The "'greater than" sign here is to be interpreted as an implication. For any
two items, A and B. if B "passes" some test, then A will also pass it. In
other words, the items under discussion are pseudo-NPs: they are a subset
of typical NPs like Haiyo in Fig. 5.4. This point is compatible with the FST
in that a fuzzy expression defines a set of entities with a degree of mem¬
bership. Ross suggests that the core/patch approach proposed by Morgan
(1972) is promising in dealing with syntactical fuzziness. It is suggested that
instead of discrete categories we talk about degrees of nouniness and verbi-
ness. Hence, in this theory grammatical categories and rules are considered
as having fuzzy boundaries. Hooper (1994) also points out that in dealing
with descriptions of the nominalisation types, it is clear that at certain points
they form continua rather than discrete categories. Her data from Tokelauan
empirically undermines the notion of strict categoriality.
Lakoff (1973b) subscribes to Ross's claim, suggesting that speakers do not
always make clear or uniform judgments about whether a sentence is well-
formed or clear in meaning. Almost every syntactic or semantic phenomenon
has a shadowy area in which speakers become unclear with respect to judg¬
ments about meaning and well-formedness. He points out that Ross has
made the following claims in the absence of a theory of fuzzy grammar. No
current theory of grammar can even begin to accommodate the facts that
Ross has observed.
1. Rules of grammar do not simply apply or fail to apply; but rather apply
to a degree.
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2. Grammatical elements are not simply members or nonmembers of gram¬
matical categories; rather they are members to a degree.
3. Grammatical constructions are not simply islands or nonislands; rather
they may be islands to a degree.
4. Grammatical constructions are not simply environments or nonenvi-
ronments for rules; rather they may be environments to a degree.
5. Grammatical phenomena form hierarchies which are largely constant
from speaker to speaker, and in many cases, from language to language.
6. Different speakers (and different languages) will have different accept¬
ability thresholds along these hierarchies.
In the framework of cognitive grammar developed by Langacker (1987, 1991)
and Lakoff (1987), the notion of prototype categories is assumed, producing
degrees of grammatical categoriality like nouniness. In addition, Hopper
and Thompson (19S5) criticize the absoluteness of the categories and claim
the fuzziness of the categories by suggesting that grammatical categories are
derived from the needs of discourse rather than being ontologically given.
As far as application of FST is concerned, Labov's (1978) work seems to
be representative. His work applies the theory to explore non-discrete cat¬
egorical boundaries. Like his fellow Berkeleyans G. Lakoff and L. Zadeh,
David Palmer (Linguist-list, Vol-5-190) has been working with a computa¬
tional model of fuzziness as it applies to corpus analysis, specifically with
fuzzy part-of-speech categories. He treats a word's POS (part-of-speech) as
a series of probabilities based on its occurrence in a corpus of different POS
categories. Using degrees of nouniness and verbiness facilitates corpus anal¬
ysis by not requiring a discrete POS categorization. He claims that he has
obtained encouraging results by applying this approach to sentence boundary
disambiguation.
Although syntactic fuzziness is not of concern here, our discussion in the
section shows that fuzziness is widely spread, and is indeed a characteristic
of natural language. More importantly, it demonstrates that FST works
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well to represent fuzziness in grammar. Apart from the application to the
semantics of FQs, FST is indeed proved capable of dealing with fuzziness in
other linguistic fields.
5.2.6 Development of FST
FST is a favourite with some linguists and logicians for dealing with the se¬
mantics of fuzzy expressions in an approximate fashion. Some work has been
done by Lakoff (1973a). He proposes a treatment of semantic imprecision by
applying FST linguistically. He stresses that one obviously cannot specify
the points on a number continuum at which any particular approximation
ceases to be true. Putnam (1975) says that if one really wanted to formalize
fuzzy expressions, it would be necessary to employ fuzzy sets or something
similar, rather than sets in the classical sense. McCawley (1981) discusses
extensively the application of FST in linguistics, using some numerical values
in the interval [1, 0] to describe membership of a fuzzy expression.
Sadock (1977) proposes a way to deal with a proposition containing a fuzzi-
fier like approximately, by ignoring the degree of truth generated by approx¬
imately. Take approximately 200 as an example. According to Sadock, all
the numbers in the assumed applicable domain, say from 150 to 250, would
receive the same true value 1, whether a prototype or not. As far as he is
concerned, things like the acceptability of an approximation are a matter of
pragmatics. It seems to me that Sadock's account does not represent natural
language, such as the degree of truth for a fuzzy proposition. For instance,
the number 195 is certainly a better example of approximately 200 than 150.
Any adequate semantic theory must take this fact into account. Channell
(1983: 205) points out another limitation of Sadock's account. It cannot
deal in an acceptable manner with logical operations like entailment. For
instance, it appears that There are exactly 200 people entails There are ap¬
proximately 200 people. However, because Sadock does not assume that the
truth value assignment to the latter proposition could be a matter of degree,
there is no point in talking about entailment between the two propositions,
i.e they are logically equivalent. This is counter-intuitive.
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FST is not only influential in theories but its application is also widely im¬
plemented. Why is FST useful in practice? Generally speaking, because of
ubiquitous fuzziness, to design a complex system like a control system flex¬
ibility is greatly demanded. FST can represent things in degree, providing
a treatment to deal with fuzziness, and consequently producing the much
needed flexibility. It is proven in practice that the system using FST can
indeed operate in a much more efficient way. Let me give a few examples
here. According to Bartjan Wattel's (19th Jan. 1994 on fuzzy-mail network)
e-mail report, the first application of FST was done by Dr Mamdani of the
University of London, who in 1974 designed an experimental fuzzy control
for a steam engine. In 19S7, a subway system which was controlled by FST
started operating in Sendai, Japan. The FST in this subway system made
the journey more comfortable with smooth braking and acceleration. In
19S9 Omron Corp. demonstrated fuzzy workstations at the Business Show
in Ilarumi. Japan. This workstation was simply a RISC-based computer
equipped with a fuzzy inference board. The fuzzy inference board was used
to store and retrieve fuzzy information and to make fuzzy inference. Re¬
cently, Sony introduced the Sony Palmtop, which uses an FST decision tree
algorithm to perform handwritten (using a computer lightpen) Kanji char¬
acter recognition. For instance, if one writes 250, the Sony Palmtop can
distinguish the number 5 from the letter S.
Since 1965, many researchers have been applying FST to their fields, like
Artificial Intelligence-Robotics (Goguen 1975, Uragami et al 1976), Image
Processing (Chang 1971, Jain k Nagel 1977), Speech Recognition (Coppo &
Saitta 1976. Pal k Majumder 197S), Biological and Medical Science (Lee k
Lee 1974, Butnariu 1977), Applied Operation Research (Jones 1974, Dubois
1978), Economics and Geography (Gottinger 1973, Taranu 1977), Sociology
(Zadeh 1973b, Dimitrov 1977), Psychology (Oden k Anderson 1974, Kochen
1975), Linguistics (Lakoff 1973a, Joyce 1976), Semiotics (Nowakowska 1976,
Vaina 1978), Damage Assessment of Structure (Blockley 1975, Blockley 1978),
Analysis of Scientific Literature (Allen 1973, Jones 1976). So, it appears that
FST is worthwhile exploring both in theory and in practice.
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5.2.7 Some questions about FST
The most frequently asked question about FST is the use of precise num¬
bers. As an illustration, if we define about 20 by the membership function in
Table 5.5 below,
TABLE 5.5: about 20
Numbers(x) 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
P-2ors{x) 0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3 0
then the question is why 16 receives 0.3, but not 0.4 or 0.2. In fact, this
kind of argument misses the point of FST, since the precise numbers here
are hypothetical and for illustration only. The determination of membership
function to a specific term has to be treated as an empirical matter, which
may vary from individual to individual and from context to context. It is
neither a major concern for FST nor for my work here. What I am interested
in is the structure of the membership function, and how it varies from one
type of FQ to another. Whether 16 receives 0.3 or 0.4 is not a real issue
here, provided that about 20 generates a set of numbers that conforms to the
core meaning for about n, that is a number approximate to n. To be more
specific, it does not really matter whether 16 receives 0.3 or 0.4, as long as
the values do not go beyond a certain threshold. For example, 200 would not
be an appropriate member for about 20. The real problem would be that in
a given context one gave 16 a membership of 0.4, but 0 for 19; or 21 for 0,
but 24 for 1, because the pattern of basic membership function for about n
would seem to be violated.
Another concern is about Zadeh's (1972,. 1973a) hypotheses on language
operators. For instance, Zadeh assumes that the function of very is a power
function, i.e. |very P| = \P\2. However, in Hersh and Caramazza's (1976)
data (see Section 4.3) this was not the case. The subjects gave 0.75 as
the grade of membership of the square size S of large; 0.12 of very large.
According to Zadeh's power function, however, the value of very large should
be |0.75|2, i.e. 0.56 rather than 0.12.
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It is also argued by Budescu and Wallsten (1990) that those mathematically
prescribed operations in FST, shown in (-5.24), should not be applied indis¬
criminately in natural language because they are empirically unsupported.
For instance, their data showed that and judgments were best fitted by some
sort of an average of the two stimulus terms, rather than a minimum oper¬
ation. Oden (1977a) also claims on empirical grounds that the truthfulness
of a conjunction of fuzzy statements is judged to be equal to the product of
the truthfulness of its component statements. The falsity of a disjunction
of fuzzy statements is judged to be equal to the product of the falsity of its
statements. It is believed that these rules provide a better account of the
data than rules based on the minimum and maximum truthfulness of the
component statements as proposed in FST (see (5.29) above).
However, it appears that even if one were to do empirical studies of standard
linguistic judgments, I suspect that there would be variability, as there is with
grammaticality judgment. But from a theoretical point of view the empirical
variance may be explained by things outside the theory, such as pragmatic
factors. The use of empirical data allows the basis of a theory to be laid,
but does not provide an absolute testing ground for it. The point is that we
should not take the actual value of power function seriously; what should be
taken seriously is the relation between A* and very X denoted by the function.
The power function is meant to convey the idea that the function of very is to
intensify the value of the item being modified. The actual exponential could
be adjusted according to a given context. For example, it could be 3 in one
situation, or 1/2 in another. This goes back to the issue of compositionality
of FQs (see Section 4.2 for the details). That is, certain basic membership
functions may be subject to modification depending on context, but the
core meanings keep constant and the variance is motivated, which make the
semantics of FQs operative, functional, and more importantly, sensible.
The conclusion is that the precise numbers adopted in FST should not be
taken seriously. The real power of FST is that it generates, through the
notion of membership function and degree of truth, semantic and inference
patterns of fuzzy expressions that capture human and linguistic behaviours.
In particular, its basic idea gives rise to new insights in the study of FQs, and
it provides a means for dealing with fuzziness. What makes FST so striking
is its non-standard treatment of fuzzy sets—an individual may be in a set to
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a certain degree and so a proposition containing a fuzzy term may be true
to an extent.
Finally, there is a question about whether or not FST can be limited to
a relatively small finite number of values. I agree generally with Lakoff's
(1973a: 492-493) idea that the fuzzy logic function is continuous in principle.
However, because of our limited perceptual capacity in a given model the
function shall be considered to locate, in an approximate manner, a finite set.
This becomes a significant point when we come to distinguish a paradoxical
case from a fuzzy case.
It has been proposed that the question of fuzziness can be considered in the
form of the paradoxes of sorites (e.g. heap) and falakros (e.g. a bald man).
such as in Hersh and Caramazza (1976). For example, the criterion for the
concept of a bald man is not sharp enough to enable us to decide whether a
man is bald or not. That is, if a man has 10,000 hairs he is not bald, then if
he loses one hair (10,000-1 = 9,999) he is still not considered to be bald. If
we let this repeat 9,999 times then he would have no hair at all, but still not
be bald.
In fact, the similarity between a classical paradox like a bald man and fuzzi¬
ness is that both raise difficulties for the Law of the Excluded Middle, because
in both cases there is no clear-cut boundary to be drawn. However, it seems
to me that the two phenomena are not the same. Consider the example of
a bald man again. The situation where a man is still not bald even though
he has no hair at all would not be the case in terms of fuzziness, because
the concept shall only be fuzzy to an extent. There is a threshold beyond
which the concept would not be fuzzy at all. That is, there is a tolerance
rule in defining a fuzzy term which sets the threshold for the fuzzy term.
For instance, if a man has no hair at all he is definitely bald, which is not
fuzzy at all. The claim that the variance of fuzzy terms does not go beyond
certain divisibility is a condition for compositionality of FQs (see Chapter 4
for the details). Thus, it is argued that the FST is capable of making a finite
set concerning a particular context which draws a line between paradox and
fuzziness.
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5.3 Conclusion
In this chapter we have discussed the application of GQT and FST to FQs.
It appears that FQs are similar to general quantifiers in terms of semantic
patterns and structural relations. In particular, the idea that a quantifier
is a set of subsets is applicable for FQs, which will be incorporated into my
formal treatment of FQs in the following chapters. However, GQT cannot be
employed here as my approach since it assumes the theory of bivalent truth,
hence lacks an explicit provision for fuzziness that FQs convey.
FST is chosen as my approach for its provision of fuzziness—membership
function and degree of truth. It is argued that precise numbers used in FST
is not a real problem. The adoption of numbers, as far as a formal semantics
is concerned, has significance only with respect to semantic patterns, i.e. the
number is not significant via the number itself, but in terms of the way it is
ordered.
Since it appears that any fixed values in functions or operations of FST
cause suspicion on empirical grounds, what could be done perhaps is to leave
specific values to be determined in a given context, i.e. do not use precise
numbers to define a general operation, which will be the case in my formal
framework (see Chapter 6 for the details).
6
Formal semantics of FQs (II)
As mentioned earlier, the problem with the conventional approach is that it
leaves FQs, such as about n, as an unanalysed primitive and does little to
capture the meaning of it. As Klein (1980) points out, the treatment utilizes
a semantic metalanguage in which FQs occur. This kind of treatment is not
particularly informative or useful. For decades fuzziness has been a neglected
area in linguistics, partly because of its complexity and inconvenience for
classical, all-or-none, approaches. In this chapter, a framework for formal
semantics of FQs will be discussed. Models here aim to capture intuitions
about the properties and relations of FQs. The ultimate goal is to provide a
rigorous and intuitive formal semantics for FQs.
Let us reconsider the three types of FQs that are being dealt with in this
thesis. The three are listed in Table 6.1, reproduced from page 21.
TABLE 6.1: Types
Type I: few, a few, many, a lot
Type II: about n, n or m, n-ish, nearly n, n or so, n-odd
Type III (semi-FQs): fewer than n, more than n, at least n.
184
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The three types will be dealt with in turn. It should be noted that FQs in
Type III differ from expressions like more N than M which is a two-place
determiner. Type III FQs in my terms are all one-place determiners.
Furthermore, in the case of FQs, a determiner consists of two subclasses:
atomic determiner and compound determiner. The structure of FQs is rep¬




/ \ (e-g- ''students'')
Atomic Compound
(e.g. ''many") / \
predeterminer numeral
(e.g. "about") (e.g. "200")
FIGURE 6.1: The Structure of an FQ
In Fig. 6.1, we can see that an FQ with a compound determiner has more a
complex structure than an FQ with an atomic determiner.
The symbols of Lfq (formal language of FQs) used here are:
1. constants: a, b, c,...
2. variables: x, y, z,...
3. set expressions: A, B, C,...
4. predicates: X, Y, Z,...
5. formulas:
6. operators: c, €, =, n, u, ...
7. some of the following non-logical determiners: many, about n,
more than n,...
Next, we need to have syntactic formation rules to define a translation for
FQs and specify the procedure for translating fuzzy quantifications. Then,
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we need to have interpretation rules to provide a formal semantic treatment
for FQs and propositions containing them.
6.1 Syntactic formation rules
We define four kinds of expressions of Lfq- set expressions, determiners,
FQs. and formulas.
G1. A, B, or C is a set expression.
G'2. If (f> is a formula, and x is a variable then Ax[(f)\ is
a set expression.
G'i. If D is primitive, then D is an atomic determiner (AD).
If D = predeterminer + numeral, then D is a compound
determiner (CD).
G4. If D is a determiner (AD or CD) and A is a set expression,
then D(A) is an FQ.
G-5. If R is an n-ary relation symbol and ii, ...,in are constants or
variables, then R(ii,..., in) is a formula. Similarly, if B is a
set expression and i is a variable or constant then B(i) is a formula.
G6. If FQ is a fuzzy quantifier and C is a set expression, then
FQ(C) is a formula.
G7. If and are formulas, then q> fl <p, <j) U ->4>l~>p,
and 4> —» <p are all formulas.
(6.2)
We provide seven syntactic formation rules in (6.2). Set expressions are
formed by Gl and G2. Determiners are formed by G3: ADs correspond
to determiners in Type I FQs (e.g. many)-, and CDs are the determiners
in Types II and III (e.g. about(20), moreJ,han(20)). G4 forms an FQ, i.e.
given a set expression A and a determiner D, we write an FQ, D(A). Finally,
formulas are built up by G5-G7, where G7 are combinations of quantified
propositions with FQs.
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6.2 Semantic rules
Having specified syntactic formation rules for Lfq, here are semantic rules.
A model can be built that represents precisely what events, properties and
relations make up the situation being modelled, i.e. a description of the deno¬
tations of all the basic expressions in an object language. The next step is to
set up the rules for interpreting expressions in the object language. In doing
this, one must consider any arbitrary model that specifies how the denota¬
tions of composite expressions are constructed from those of their component
parts, using recursive definitions. This indicates that compositionality of FQs
is presupposed here.
A model for Lfq provides a means for determining the meaning of expressions
in Lfq■ It assigns interpretations to set expressions, which are some subsets
of E, the universe of discourse. The recursive clauses below state formally
the truth conditions of formulas in Lfq by defining what must be the case for
a formula with a particular structure to be true in any model, i.e. a formula
4> is true in a model Miff 1^1^ = 1, false iff \<j>\M — 0. Otherwise, <? is true to
a degree iff \(f>\M € [0,1] exclusive. A distinctive feature of formal semantics
of FQs is that the truth values are in degree, i.e. a formula formed with an
FQ can be true to a degree, a value in [1,0], rather than just 1 or 0.
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Given a model, M = < F, \ | >, then,
51. For any constant a, a £ E; For any variable i. g{i) £ E.
52. For any set expressions or predicates, A, X, |A|, |A"| C E.
53. If R is an n-ary relation symbol, then \R\ C E\ x ... x En.
54. |F| assigns to A a set of sets FQ, such that
X C FQ «-» {A n A*) C FQ.
55. If R is an n-ary relation symbol, then ..., in)| is 1,
iff < |i11,..., |f„| > € |F| completely.
Otherwise, |R(z'i,..., in)| £ [1, 0] excluding 1.
Also, if A is a set expression, then |A(i)| = 1, iff |z| £ \A\ = 1
Otherwise, |A(i)| £ [1,0] excluding 1.
56. If D is an atomic determiner and A a set, then |F(.4)| = |D|(|.4|)
mboxand \(PreD(Num))(A)\ = (|.PreJD|(|Afum|))(|A|), where PreD
stands for a predeterminer, and Num stands for a numeral.
57. If FQ is a fuzzy quantifier, X is a predicate, then |FQ(A")I = 1,
iff X £ |FQ| completely. Otherwise, |FQ(A")| € [1,0] excluding 1.
58. If <j> is a formula, then |->^| = 1, iff \(f\ = 0.
Otherwise,!-><f>\ £ [1, 0] excluding 1.
59. If <f> and p are formulas, then \<f> A y?| = 1, iff \6\ = 1 and \<p\ = 1.
Otherwise, |^A^>| £ [1, 0] excluding 1.
510. If 6 and (p are formulas, then \cp V ip\ = 0, iff 1^1 = 0 and |y?| = 0.
Otherwise, |© V p\ £ [1,0] excluding 0.
511. If (j) and <p are formulas, then \<p —>■ p\= 0, iff \<p\ = 1 and \<p\ = 0.
Otherwise, \<j> —>• <p\ £ [1, 0] excluding 1.
(6.3)
S4 states that all FQs are conservative. That is, for any FQs, |Z)|(A) is a
set of sets with the property that X £ \D\(A) iff (A" fl .4) € \D\(A) (see
page 149 for more discussion of this point). From S9 to Sll we deal with the
interpretation of complex formulas. Apart from the classical truth conditions
for those connectives we introduce a degree of truth. With intermediate truth
values in the treatment we do not need to draw any arbitrary distinction
between 1 and 0, and can capture the fuzziness in the form of true to a
degree.
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To see ail application of the formal rules set above, let us look at examples
in Fig. 6.2 and Fig. 6.3. These illustrate how the translation procedure for
Lfq works.
a. About 200 students left.
b. translation and interpretation
S, about_200'(student')(leave')
/ \
NP, about_200'(student') Pred, leave'
/ \
CD, about_200' N, student'
/ \
Predet, about' numeral, 200'
FIGURE 6.2: Illustration I
Fig. (6.2) is an analysis tree for the sentence About 200 students left. The
tree can be looked at as a top-down, or bottom-up tree. As an illustration,
for the top-down analysis the sentence consists of two main elements: an NP
(about.200'(student)) and a predicate (leave'). Next, one level lower, NP
has two elements: a complex determiner (about-200) and a noun (student).
Finally, the complex determiner consists of two elements: a predeterminer
(about) and a numeral (200). The procedure of the bottom-up analysis is
the same, except in a different order.
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a. Many students and a few lecturers left.
b. translation and interpretation
S, (many'(student') & a_few'(student'))(leave;)
/










D, a_few' N, student'
FIGURE 6.3: Illustration II
Again, the analysis tree illustrated in (6.3) for the sentence Many students
and a few lecturers left is similar to the one in (6.2) above, except that this one
has a more complex NP. The NP is a conjunction of two NPs: many"(student)
and a.few '(studentT). On the second level there are an NP and a predicate,
on the third level two NPs. Finally, a determiner and a noun are derived
from each of the two NPs.
What follow are formal models of FQs using the rules given. Membership
functions of FQs are our focus here.
6.3 Fuzzy quantifier
As defined in Section 5.2, membership function is specified by a mapping from
a domain to a set in question. By an FQ, we mean a functor D assigning, to
a domain E, a fuzzy binary relation DeAB between subsets A, B of E in a
given context. This can be illustrated in Fig. 6.4:
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FIGURE 6.4: About 200 people
In Fig. 6.4, the boundary of intersection set 5 of A and B is fuzzy. This
represents the result of the fuzzy binary relation between A and B, which is
ascribed by FQs' fuzzy denotation, like that of about 200 people. This can
be defined formally in (6.4) below.
Definition: Let E be a non-empty domain: S, .4. B C E. S = .4 fl B: .r. y. :
€ S. Let C be a set of contexts, c 6 C\ Let [0. m. 1] be a set of membership
values, where 1 corresponds to a total membership. 0 corresponds to a non-
membership. and m corresponds to an intermediate value between 1 and 0.
Then, an FQ is a function from S in E and Conto [0. m. 1], which can be
defined as below: For all r. y. z £ S and all c € C.
FQ((E,S)c)(x) =1 iff x € A',
= m iff x € M,
Px > py iff |~ - ^1 < I- - y|» - € N (6.4)
= 0 otherwise,
%(na) *Vo{nb).
In (6.4), A'stands for a norm, a central tendency, which could be a number or
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a set of numbers. It is a prototype for a membership function. For instance,
for about n type, n may be a prototypical number. If a: € N, then fix = 1,
where px stands for the membership of x. All members in the set of N receive
the same membership—a total membership of 1.
The intermediate value m is determined by whether x is in the area of M.
an area between a threshold t and a norm. The threshold t sets a limit: any
element outside t is no longer in the interval denoted by an FQ. For instance,
we may set the t. as 5th percentile in a given context—anything which falls
out the 5th percentile will receive a membership of 0. This says that an
entity is eligible for consideration if and only if it is within / which can be
graphically represented in Fig. 6.5 below: the numbers are hypothetical.
From Fig. 6.5 we can see that if x is in the central area dashed (N). then
ftx = 1. If x is in the non-central area (M), 0 < px < 1. If x is outside the
threshold t, then p.x = 0. The function "/'(x)> fi(y) iff |~ — x| < |c — ijj, z
€ A"' says that the closer x to z, the closer px to 1; on the other hand, the
further y away from z, the closer to 0. It must be emphasized again that
a norm here must be an end of scale otherwise the function would not work
universally, which has been explained in Section 3.7 above.
0.0 t • - i - - » i - - i ■ • \
1 50 1 70 1 90 2 1 0 230 250
t number 1
FIGURE 6.5: About 200 people
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The function "%(na) ★ %(nb)",. where * stands for operations like
or says that the percentage of curve above or below a norm indicates
dilferent types of FQs. For example, for about n type, the percentage of
curve above a norm .(%(na)) tends to be equal, or similar, to the percentage
of curve below the norm (%(nb)); for n-odd type, %(na) > %(nb); for nearly
n type, %(na) < %(nb).
In summary, (6.4) defines that the nearer a number to Ar, the higher the grade
of membership it gets. In (6.4), AT, M, and the threshold t, are all variables.
Any specification of their values, i.e. the actual values of a membership
function for a particular FQ. has to be determined empirically.
As an illustration, from Fig. 6.5 we can see that if a number is fewer than 150
exclusively or greater than 250 exclusively, then it does not belong to about
200 people at all. If a number is in the interval between 150 and 250, then it
has the property of the FQ to a certain degree. For instance, the number 210
belongs to the FQ to the degree 0.8; 180 is 0.4; and 200 (the norm) belongs
to about 200 people totally. The shape of the curve is symmetrical, so that
%(na) = %(nb). Moreover, if x = 190, y = 180, then px = 0.S and py = 0.4,
because 190 is closer to the norm (200) than 180. This relation is defined
in (6.4) as \px\ > |/iy| iff |- — x| < |c — y|, i.e 0.8 > 0.4. as |200 — 190| <
1200 - 1S0|.
Then, the FQ in Fig 6.5 can be interpreted as,
a5outJ200((£', 5)c)(x) =1 iff x € 195 — 205,
= to iff x € 150-194 or 206-250.
%(na) = %(nb).
0-x > Hy iff |200 — x| < [200 — t/|, (6.5)
= 0 otherwise,
Moreover, the definition in (6.4) is assumed to be applicable to other types
of FQs (e.g. n-odd and nearly n) and semi-FQs (e.g. more than n and fewer
than n). In terms of nearly n and fewer than n, n may not be a norm, and
even not in the interval denoted by the FQ. On the other hand, for more
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than n and over n, n may not be excluded. For n-odd, n is more certainly
in the interval. For FQs in Type I, such as many and a few, the norm for
a membership function is less obvious than FQs in other types. For those
FQs which may have a monotonic curve, such as almost all and very few, the
norm would be end of scale. For example, all would be a norm for almost all,
and zero would be a norm for very few. Finally, for those FQs which may
have a bimodal curve, such as 10 or 20, the same principle of membership
function still applies. What differs is that they may have two norms, i.e. a
membership function with two peaks (see Fig. 3.S above).
More provision for formal representation of FQs may be attempted, e.g. a
modal interval of FQs. Take about 200 people, about 2,000 people and about
20.000 people as examples. Supposing, as my Chinese data showed (see
Appendix 2, Figs. 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17), their modal intervals are 190-210.
1,900-2,100, and 19,000-21,000, respectively. Then, a formula for about n can
be given as follows:
hiodCabout n •
1'mm — ft (ft X 5%)
Vmax = ft + (ft X 5%) (6.6)
where n denotes the numeral, Vmin stands for the minimum value of the
modal interval, and Fmax is the maximum value of the modal interval.
From (6.6), we can get that modal intervals of about 200 people, about 2,000
people and about 20,000 people Are: 190 (200-200x5%)-210 (200+200x5%);
1,900 (2,000-2,000x5%)-2,100 (2,000+2,000x5%) and 19,000 (20,000-20,000x5%)-
21,000 (20,000+20,000x5%), respectively. Certainly, we could calculate a
modal interval for any about n approximations by using the formula in (6.6).
Take about 10 as an example. Vmin = 10-10x 5% = 9.5; Vmax — 10+10x 5%
= 10.5, i.e. the modal interval of about 10 is 9.5-10.5.
It appears that the percentage in (6.6) may vary from context to context1, i.e.
1Specifications of a membership function can be influenced by contextual factors, such as
scale effects (see Section 4.1.1 for further discussion of this point). A formal provision
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we might need a "rounding function" which has certain fineness or coarseness
built in. For example, about 10 people may mean 8-12, rather than 9.5-10.5,
as predicted by (6.6). So, (6.6) can be modified as:
Modeabout n ■ (n ± 11 X f(p)%) (6.7)
where n is a norm, / is rounding function depending on context and p is a
base determined empirically. For example, let n be the numeral in about n\




= 9—11 — < n — n x (2 x 5)%. n + n x (2 x 5)% >
i.e. < n — ii x 10%, n + n x 10% >
= 17—23 = < n — n x (3 x 5)%. b|bx(3x 5)% >
i.e. < n — n x 15%, n -f n x 15% >
= 80 — 120 = < n — n x (4 x 5)%, n + n x (4 x 5)% >
i.e. < n — n x 20%, n + n x 20% > .
(6.S)
In (6.8), everything else keeps consistent, except /. This/represents variance
due to different contexts or models. For example, for about 10 it is 2; for
about 20 it is 3 and 4 for about 100. So that one works out a proportion of a
norm and scales the minimal and maximal appropriately.
As demonstrated above, the formula in (6.8) works for FQs like about n; it
is also applicable to more complex FQs. Take many people as an example.
It is well-known that many is not necessarily above 50% (see page 75 for
illustrations). Supposing that n is 70%, p is 14%, we might have:
for this kind of scale effect on membership function is proposed in Sadock (1977) (see
his paper for the details).
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manyl = 60% — 80% =< n — n x (1 x 14)%, n -f n x (1 x 14)% >
many2 = 10% — 20% =< n — n x (6.15 x 14)%, n + n x (—5.15 x 14)% >
(6.9)
where standard half-rounding, to one decimal place, has been applied. In
(6.9), using function / many is assigned to have two different interpretations:
60%-80% or 10%-20%. As shown, the function / could be a natural number
(e.g. 1), a fraction (e.g. 6.15) or even a negative number (e.g. -5.15). Bo¬
using /. the modal interval may vary from one model to another. Similarly,
we may apply (6.9) to other types of FQs.
6.4 Fuzzy quantification
Fuzzy quantification is formed by a proposition containing an FQ. Instead of
asking about the grade of membership of an FQ we ask about the truth of a
proposition that asserts the grade of membership. The general rule is, if x is
a member of A* only to a certain degree, then the proposition x is X should
be true only to that degree, rather than being absolutely true or false. A
formal definition of fuzzy quantification is given in (6.10):
Suppose there is a non-empty domain E. An FQ is involved in the interpreta¬
tion of an FQ (fuzzy quantification) in E. The FQ is a function from subsets
.4 . X, P of E and a set of contexts C onto a set of truth values [0, m, 1],
where 1 corresponds to absolutely true; 0 absolutely false: m corresponds to
some intermediate truth values between 1 and 0. For all A. X. P C E, c €
c;
FQ((;4,A')c) = 1 iff A fl X — Pc,
= m iff A fl X — Pp, (6.10)
= 0 otherwise.
where Pc is a central area of an intersection of A and X. Pp is a peripheral
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area of the intersection of A and A*, which is a complement area of Pc. The
formula (6.10) can be graphically represented in Fig. 6.6:
FIGURE 6.6: Fuzzy quantification
As shown in Fig. 6.6. the intersection of the two subsets A and A' is the set P.
P in turn consists of two subsets: Pc and Pp. Now, consider the proposition
About 200 people arc girls, based on the membership function of about 200
people in Fig. 6.5 above. It can be interpreted by:
about 200((A,A» = 1 iff |A n X|= 195-205,
= m iff |A n X|= 150-204 or 206-250, (6.11)
= 0 otherwise.
in which the value of .4 will be fixed as
{x |People(x)},
while that of A" will be
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{y |Girls(y)}.
What (6.11) means is that this proposition will be absolutely true, if the set of
people who are girls has exactly 195-205 members; true to an extent if it has
members which fall into 150-194 or 206-250; and false otherwise. The truth
value should be 1 at 195-205 and gradually decreases from 195 downwards
and 205 upwards. The statement approaches truth as the numbers move
up to the norm, and approaches falsity as the numbers move away from the
norm.
There is a regularity here about the semantics of fuzzy quantification. On
the one hand, numbers increase from 150 to 250 continuously, and on the
other hand, truth values decrease from 1 both upwards and downwards. The
trend of the movements for both numbers and truth values makes the whole
fuzzy quantification sensible.
Furthermore, we discuss the question of whether A and X in (6.6) are ordered.
This question is related to the issue of sortal quantification raised by Altham
and Tennant (1975). They claim that frequently the range of quantification
is restricted, in which quantifiers are sortal. A proposition About Xs are Ys
is one in which the quantifier is not sortal, because it is similar to About Is
are Xs. In contrast, Many Xs are Ys involves a sortal quantifier, because it
is not equivalent to Many Ys are Xs. In Many Xs are Ys, the quantifier's
range is restricted to the set of Xs. Thus, the set of Xs determines a norm.
Consequently, since the set of Xs may not be the same cardinal number as
the set of Ys, then the norm determined by one may be different from that
determined by the other. The non-equivalence of the two sortally quantified
propositions is a consequence of this fact. Let us consider the following
examples:
d.
a. About 20 men are lawyers.
b. About 20 lawyers are men.
c. Many lawyers are men.
Many men are lawyers.
(6.12)
It appears that (a) and (b) are truth-conditionally equivalent, but not (c)
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and (d). The proposition (c) may be true, but (d) may not. There are far
more men than male lawyers—the norm for many men is correspondingly
larger than that for many lawyers.
How can this be represented in the treatment of fuzzy quantification then?
The formula in (6.6) deals well with FQs in Types II and III, because FQs of
these types are non-sortal. However, with respect to the fact that some FQs
in Type I, such as many, are sortal, we need to find some way to solve the
problem. One solution is to assume that the norm of A" and Kin (6.10) would
be the same. Suppose n is the norm for many men, and m for many lawyers,
then (c) and (d) in (6.12) would both be true if m = n. However, this is not
likely to be the case, because the size of many lawyers would be smaller than
the size of many men. Then, another solution is to put a constraint over the
formula in (6.10), as shown in (6.13):
FQ(< A,X > c) = 1 iff A D A* = Pc,
= m iff AO X = Pp, (6.13)
= 0 otherwise.
where the pair of < A, X> is ordered, representing sortal quantifications;
that is, A determines the norm, not A'. Supposing A is lawyers and A" is men.
Then, that Many lawyers are men is true does not necessarily entail that
Many men are lawyers. The norm determined by A would in this case be
much smaller than that of A'.
In conclusion, fuzzy quantifications containing FQs in Types II and III are
not sortal, whereas those containing some FQs in Type I, such as many, are
sortal and may be treated with the extra constraint as shown in (6.13). Put
another way, syntactic disposition such as word order does not affect the
interpretation of non-sortal fuzzy quantifications, but it has impact on those
sortal fuzzy quantifications.
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6.5 Compound proposition
A formal treatment of compound propositions containing FQs needs to cap¬
ture the fact that the truth values for a compound proposition should have a
degree of truth, since the constituents from which they are derived have the
same feature.
Let P be assigned a numerical value |P|, called the degree of truth of P. such
that 0 < |P| < 1. Let "A", "V" and >" be connectives. Valuations
for the connectives are defined as follows.
«• h-PI = f\P\
b. IPAQI = f(\P\AQ\)
c. \P V Q\ = f(\P\,\Q\) (6.14)
d. \P -* Q\ = 1 iff |/>| < |<?|
= \Q\ iff l-^l > \Q\
Let us compare (6.14) with operations proposed in Zadeh (1965, 1971), re¬
produced from (5.29) above,
= 1 - \P\
= min(|P|, |Q|)
= max(|P|, \Q\)
= 1 ^ 1^1 < IQI
There are two differences between my treatment and Zadeh's. One is that I
do not use specific function in (a), (b) and (c). The reason is that they may
not be empirically appropriate (see Section 5.2.7 for the details). Instead, I
use a general function / to indicate that these operations generate some kind
of function between those components, and any specific functions have to be
be determined empirically.
The other difference concerns entailment. I promote the idea that entail¬
ment can be in degree, but this is not the case in Zadeh's model. In my
a. hP\
b. |P A Q\
c. |P V Q\
d. 1P - Q1
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treatment, an intermediate value can be given, as shown in (6.14d). This
makes the treatment more consistent and adequate. For further discussion,
see Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3.
6.6 Conclusion
It is shown that FQs can be treated in formal semantics. The formulas here
convey the claims made previously, that an FQ can be interpreted as a fuzzy
operator, and a norm functions as a prototype and other numbers in the set
are ordered depending on how closely they approximate to a given norm.
My formal treatment of FQs is based on the conclusion drawn previously that
FQs are compositional and motivated. On the one hand, compositionality
of FQs guarantees that the semantic structure of the same type of FQs is
preserved. In defining compositionality membership function is deployed.
That is, functions of approximators, such as about, or so and very, give a
mechanism by which the same type of approximator operates in the same
way towards expressions being modified.
On the other hand, the characteristic of motivation for assignment of specific
values requires that some values of my formal treatment have to be deter¬
mined empirically, i.e. they are not computable. In my treatment contextual
factors are taken into account, due to the fact that the meaning of an FQ
may vary from context to context.
Hence, my formal treatment is made unique by the two characteristics—
compositionality and motivation—of FQs. It is different from a conventional
approach (e.g. algorithmic approach which only permits a phenomenon either
predictable or arbitrary) in that the treatment here is partially determined
empirically. That is, in the treatment the general semantic pattern of an
FQ is predictable, i.e. any basic membership functions for a certain type of
FQ is functional, although it may be moderated by context, as shown for
example in (6.4) and (6.7) above. However, the specifications have to be
done empirically.
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Standard FST (Zadeh, 1965) has been developed here to deal with the formal
semantics of FQs. My treatment differs from Zadeh's in several aspects.
Apart from the two mentioned on page 200, in my formal framework the
membership function takes account of new information, such as the constraint
that a norm has to be taken as an end of scale. Otherwise, it would not
necessarily work if we want to claim that the closer a number to a norm the
greater its membership. Also, we look at percentage of curve to examine
types of FQs, i.e. whether or not they are symmetrical (see Section 6.3 for
the details).
7
Formal semantics of FQs (III)
This chapter continues our discussion of the formal semantics of FQs. We
will show how the notion of membership function of FST can be introduced
into GQT. Then, the issues of intensional models and entailment with FQs
will be tackled.
7.1 GQT models incorporating with member¬
ship function
As shown in Chapter 5, the pattern of FQs is similar to generalised quantifiers
for the most part. As far as the semantics is concerned, GQT would be able
to deal with fuzziness adequately, if it does not assume the bivalent theory.
In the following models it is attempted to alter GQT theory to take account
of new information—membership function.
Generally, generalised quantifiers can be modelled as sets containing entities
or functions over entities. Let us examine:
203
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a. Several students left.
b. Many students left.
c. About 200 students left.
d. 200-odd students left. (7.1)
e. Nearly 200 students left.
/. More than 200 students left.
g. Fewer than 200 students left.
Sentences in (7.1) can be semantically analysed in terms of set theory. As
an illustration, an NP like several students denotes a set of sets of entities.
Then, (7.1a) can be translated as several'(student )(leave ). The semantics of
generalised quantifiers can be directly defined by the model theory, without
the use of variables and value assignments. That is, a generalised quantifier
is considered as a function which assigns to each A of E a set of subsets of
E. As an illustration, the definition of some is given in (7.2).
some is the function which assigns to each ACE, the set of sets -.
such that {X C E\X (14/0}. ('"L)
It follows then that a proposition whose subject NP formed with some is
true if the VP of the proposition denotes a set that is in the set denoted by
the subject. That is, the proposition conveyed by Some student left is true
iff (leave') H (student') ^ 0. In what follows, we will show how membership
function works with such GQT models.
7.1.1 Type III FQs (semi-FQs)
The interpretation of Type III FQs can be done in terms of the cardinality of
a set. This means that we are able to interpret Type III FQs by looking at
the number of elements they contain. A proposition expressed by a sentence
like At least 200 students left may be interpreted as in (7.3).
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atJeast2200'' (student'') (leave'') = 1 iff | leave' fl student'| = 200. .
Otherwise, atJeast2200'(student')(leave') € [1,0] exclusive of 1.
Formula (7.3) says that At least 200 students left is true just in the case
where the intersection of the extension of student with that of leave has 200
members, i.e. the set of students who left has a cardinality that is equal to
2001. Otherwise, the truth value would be true to a degree. For instance,
250 may be true to a degree of 0.8.
If the set actually has 195 students who left, then At least 200 students left
may also be true, say, to the degree 0.1. Of course, one might say that
in a strict mathematical sense, if there are 195 students who left, then the
proposition would be totally false. However, it seems that if we are talking
about ordinary language, then a degree of truth might be more intuitive,
In the same vein, Channell(1994) states that the interval for not less than n
could go below n. For example, the cost of repair was not less than 60 pounds;
she does not think it would be odd if the cost turned out as something like
58 pounds. In other words, the use of a fuzzy term fuzzifies the number.
What I am interested in is if the value could go below n, how would this affect
the semantic pattern generated by at least n. not less than n and the like? It
appears that this does not significantly affect the basic membership function
these FQs license. It is just a matter of whether an interval could or could
not take a number below n. As stated in Section 4.2, in my system the basic
membership function may be moderated over context, so the possibility of
having some numbers below the n is not rejected. In fact, in my data, similar
phenomena occurred, such as jiangjin 200 ren 'nearly 200 people', jiangjin
2,000 ren 'nearly 2,000 people', jiangjin 20,000 ren 'nearly 20,000 people',
where subjects gave an interval beyond the n (see Appendix 2, Figs. 2.9,
2.10 and 2.11).
On the other hand, for 200 yishang 'more than 200' and 200 ren yishang
1 Here, we hypothetically take 200 as a norm, though it may vary. This will be the case
throughout this section, i.e. any specific value occurred in the models is my best guess,
but it may be subject to change from individual to individual.
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'more than 200 people', no subject in the Chinese test gave an interval which
was fewer than n (see Section 3.2.3 for the details). The trend in my test
was that n in more than n was the limit, i.e. its basic membership function
varies with this limit in the particular context.
Similarly, for At most 200 students left, the formula would be the same to
that of At least 200 students left in (7.3), except that |leave' fi student'j <
200. Also, other Type III FQs like (f) and (g) in (7.1) can be interpreted as
in (7.4).
a. more_than_200'(student')(leave') = 1 iff |leave' fl student') = 201
Otherwise, more_than_200'(student')(leave') G [1,0] exclusive of 1.
b. fewer_than_200'(student')(leave') = 1 iff |leave'fl student'| = 199.
Otherwise, fewer_than_200'(student')(leave') G [1,0] exclusive of 1.
(7.4)
As shown in above models, degree of truth play a role in representing fuzzi-
ness. By doing this GQT framework can provide more intuitive semantic
interpretations for expressions like FQs.
7.1.2 Type I FQs
If we try to interpret a sentence like Several students left in (7.1a), it will not
be so straightforward. For several students, its norm is less obvious than a
norm for at least 200 students is. So, apart from appealing to membership
function, we need to take pragmatic factors into consideration, i.e. several
may be interpreted with respect to some pragmatically determined values
(Cann, 1993). Let v represent this kind of value, several can be interpreted
as in (7.5a):
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a. several'(student') = {X C E\\X fl student'| = v}.
b. Let v = 5, then several'(student')(leave') = 1 iff |leave' . .
H student'| = 5. Otherwise, several'(student')(leave') ^ '
G [1,0] exclusive of 1.
What (7.5) says is that if in a given model several requires a norm of 5
entities denoted by the common noun (i.e. students), and those entities have
the property denoted by the verb phrase (i.e. left), then the sentence in
(7.1a) has the interpretation in (7.5).
In the same vein, we may interpret propositions involving many, few, and
a lot as all needing some reference determined contextually, and a degree of
truth. In addition, v can be an interval or a proportion. The interpretation
of many is more complex, as illustrated in (7.6).
a. many''Ml(studenV)(leave') = |student'fl leave'| > v • |£"[. . .
b. many,M2(studenf)(leave'') = |student' D leave'| > v • |i4|.
For (a), suppose there are two subsets in E, the set of students and the set
of lecturers, whose properties are denoted by the predicate left. ManyMl
interprets Many students left by comparing the set of students to the set of
lecturers. If the set of students who left is larger than the set of lecturers who
left, then manyMl is true. In (b), the interpretation has little to do with the
set of lecturers, but is determined by comparing the set of students who left
and the set of students who did not, i.e. the set of lecturers is not relevant.
ManyM2 is true if the set of students who left is larger than its complement
set.
Suppose the value v for many in a given context is 60%. Then, (7.1b) has
the interpretation in (7.7).
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a. many\studenf) = {X C E\\X fl student'| > v • |student'|}.
b. Let v = 60%, and |student| = 200, then, many'(student') (leave1) = 1
if |leave' fl student'| = 120.
Otherwise, manv'(student')(leave') € [1,0] exclusive of 1.
(7.7)
7.1.3 Type II FQs
A more complex situation arises if we look at sentences like (7.1c), (7.Id),
and (7.1e). For instance, if we try to interpret about 200 students three steps
are needed, rather than two steps for FQs like several students. That is, about
takes on two arguments, translated as (about(200))(student), while several
in several(student) takes only one. This can be graphically represented in
Fig. 7.1,
I I I I I I I I I I
I I >1 I I I >1 I >1 I
I I I I I I I I I I
Several students about 200 students
FIGURE 7.1: Several students and about 200 students
The figure (7.1) can be symbolised in (7.8):
(about)nNP (7-8)
It says that about applies to n (a numeral) to form a determiner, then about n
applies to a common noun to form an NP. That is, the interpretation of an NP
with about is likely to take two mappings to complete, which has more steps
than FQs like several students. This is also the case for Type III FQs, such
as more than 200 students. Furthermore, about in About 20 students danced
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decomposes at least three sets: dancers who were not students, students who
did not dance, and students who danced. In a way, about, along with other
determiners like many, behaves like a set filter to select those individuals who
are qualified to be in the relevant set.
In terms of the interpretation of (7.1c), it appears that in a number contin¬
uum our judgments become increasingly positive as the number of students
who left moves towards (from either side) 200. That is, about denotes a
membership function of 200 ± v. The sentence About 200 students left can
be interpreted as in (7.9).
a. about_200'(student'') = {X C E\\X f)student'| = v±200}.
b. Let v = 2% then, about_200'(student')(leave') .
= 1 iff |leave' O student'| £ [196,..., 204].
Otherwise, about_200'(student')(leave') € [1,0] exclusive of 1.
What (7.9a) shows is that about 200 students is interpreted as a set whose
members are approximate to 200. Note that this time, v is a proportion.
The formula in (7.9b) defines About 200 students left as totallytrue if the'
intersection of student 'and leave' belongs to the interval. Otherwise, a degree
of truth should be the case.
The sentence in (7.1e) may be interpreted as in (7.10),
a. nearlyJ200\studenf) = {X C E\\X fl student'| = v}.
b. Let v = [196-199], nearly_200'(student')(leave') = 1 iff
|leave' fl student'] € [196 199].
Otherwise, nearly_200'(student')(leave') € [1,0] exclusive of 1.
(7.10)
Conversely, the sentence in (7.Id) may be interpreted as in (7.11).
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a. 200-odd\studenV) = {X C E\|X fl student'| = v}.
b. Let v = [200-204], 200_odd'(student') (leave') = 1
iff |leave' ft student'| € [200-204].
Otherwise, 200_odd'(student')(leave') € [1,0] exclusive of 1.
In (7.10) and (7.11), v is an interval. The interpretations in (7.10) and (7.11)
differ only in that the distribution of the former expands from n downwards,
whereas for the latter it is upwards from n.
A general formula for interpretation of FQs and a proposition formed with
an FQ is given in (7.12),
a. D(CN) = {X C £||A' n CN\ * v}.
b. D(CN)(VP) = 1 iff |VP fi CNj = x. (7.12)
Otherwise, D(CN)(VP) € [1,0] exclusive of 1.
where ★ stands for an operation such as =, <, >; the values of v and x are
pragmatically determined, and they could be a natural number, a percentage,
or an interval.
In conclusion, the models derived from GQT can be integrated with the
notion of membership function, and the integration works well with FQs.
Importantly, these models capture our intuitions about what these FQs mean
in natural language by using a membership function.
7.2 An intensional treatment
In my work, FQs are explored in terms of their denotations. Denotation
here is defined as consisting of intension and extension, which are intended
to refer to things in the world (Cann, 1993: 267-268). The latter is the
entity or function that an expression refers to in a model. The former is
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more abstract, and it is this common thing that causes each of the elements
in the reference of an expression to be identified as such. For instance,
the extension of many people is the set of people which is considered to be
a significant number compared to a norm. Its intension is the property of
being a significant number compared to a norm, the significance of the set of
entities abstracted away from the individuals themselves.
The purpose of making a distinction between extensional and intensional
denotations is to allow a distinction to be made between referentially trans¬
parent and referentially opaque contexts. In the latter case straightforward
determination of an extension may fail. In the case of FQs there may not
be a transparent reference between an FQ and entities it denotes. As in
the illustration—Many students went to the party—a precise extension of
many students is not accessible, i.e. we do not know precisely how many is
many. Thus, any claim of a fixed extension has to be a result of some kind
of idealization.
On the one hand, the intension is known to us, i.e. they are objective in a
way that agreement is possible. Intension of FQs is relatively consistent over
individuals and contexts. For instance, the intension of many is a significant
number compared to a norm; although the norm has to be set pragmatically,
the abstract property indicated by the intension remains constant. However,
extensions determined by the same intension are subjective in that extensions
of FQs vary from individual to individual. For instance, we may agree on
that many means a significant number, an intension. But, it is possible for us
to come up with different interpretations of it. What is the norm? It could
be three when I talk about the Chinese students of English each year at the
University of Otago. However, it may change to millions when I talk about
the Chinese population of China. So, a norm differs depending on contexts.
A norm which is suitable in one context may not be in another. We can
raise or lower the norm to serve our purpose, as we wish. In fact, extensional
meaning is hardly fixed, even in a fixed context. This is because there is
great diversity among people, namely individuality of language users plays
a crucial role in determination of the extension of FQs (see Section 1.4 for
further discussion on the causal factors of fuzziness). The fact that FQs has
an invariable intension, but variable extension, can be represented as follows:
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I =*> {Ei, ...,En}, where € [1,0]. (7.13)
Formula (7.13) says that the intension of an FQ generates a set of extensions
with respect to different contexts or individuals. More importantly, those
extensions belong to the FQ to an extent, notated in [1,0]. As an illustration,
about 20 students can be defined as in (7.14):
n ~ 20 =>■ {..., 0.5i7,0. (is, 0.9ig, I20,0.92i. 0.122,0.523, •••} (' ■ 14)
where the intension a number that approximates to 20 produces a set of
numbers (notated by subscripts) in which each individual belongs to the FQ
to a degree.
It is attempted in this section to look at the relation between intension and
extension, to show how the contextually determined manipulation of ex¬
tensions could be handled in a formal theory by examining some intensional
models. Intensional models normally contain times, possible worlds and other
things (e.g. places), along with entities. Let intensional models here allow
extensions to vary along times (f), contexts (c) and individuals(i). That
is, extensions are defined by an index consisting of time, context and indi¬
vidual. If one of the parameters changes, the extension may also change.
Hence, [^]the truth values of a proposition with an FQ at the index
< t.c. i > with respect to model Mand variable assignment g. may differ from
[o] v/'5'<a'ca',a to [4>Here are formulations of intensional models:
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11. If x is a constant or variable, then [a:]= g(a).
12. If x =R[tu ...,<»), then = 1 iff < [i >
G [i?]^5'*'0'1. Otherwise, [x]A/,a,t,c'' G [1,0] exclusive of 1.
13. If <p = ->9?, then [<p]A/'a'',c'' = 1 if [(V)]^.*.^ = 0.
Otherwise, [<^]M'a,t'c'' G [1,0] exclusive 1.
Similarly, for other connectives (V, A,—<->).
14. If FQ is a quantifier and X is a predicate,
then [FQiX)]"'3'1^ = 1, iff [FQ]^^ 3 [A']jV/,s,t-c-'.
Otherwise, [F(5(X")]A/,a,i'c'' G [1,0] exclusive of 1.
(7.15)
According to the rules set in (7.15), an intensional model can be formally
defined as follows. For all t G T (a set of times), c G C (a set of contexts), i
G / (a set of individuals),
[^.u.i€[l,0]. (7.16)
In this model, time, context and individual form an index. Also, a degree
of truth is introduced which is meant to represent fuzziness. Let us now see
how this model works. For instance, Many students went to the party may
be interpreted by Mary as, say 100 students, but by John as 150 students,
although both may agree that the truth condition of the sentence is a signifi¬
cant number compared to a norm. As far as the truth value of the proposition
is concerned, 100 and 150 are both true to a certain degree.
Another example, There are a few lazy students; suppose in 1993 a few was
actually three, while in 1994 it was five. The extension of a few might differ
over years, but the very same intension can be consistently applicable to
determine either three or five belongs to a few, if an accessibility, iRj, can
be established between the intension and an extension appropriate in a given
year. Otherwise, if say in 1995, the number of lazy students increased to 20,
then we may feel that 20 belongs to a few to a degree, where the accessibility
would only be partially established.
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Membership function or truth value represent the degree of accessibility from
one time to another, one context to another, and one individual to another.
As an illustration, for ca € C, such that ca may be accessible to cb to an
extent. Take nearly n as an example. We may interpret it as in a particular
context there is a possible interpretation similar to the actual interpretation
in which n is true. Also, about 200 students may be said as in a particular
context there is a possible interpretation approximate to the actual interpre¬
tation in which 200 students is true.
The formal semantics of FQs is an extremely complex matter, for it raises a
number of issues that question our conventional ideas. One is that intension
determines a unique extension for any formulas. In fact, it is evident that
the relation between intension and extension is not necessarily determinate,
i.e. the function of intension is fuzzy in the sense that it may not specify a
unique extension2. Also, any parameters which affect the interpretation may
be added into the index defined in (7.16). For example, we may represent
the difference between at least 20 students and at most 20 students in terms
of attitude of the speaker. The former indicates a positive attitude and a
negative attitude is implied by the latter. This can be represented as:
[<j]A/,j,<,c,i,o g (i?o], where a denotes the speaker's attitude by uttering
a sentence.
(7.17)
Within an opaque context, two propositions formed with FQs may have same
truth values, but different intensions. On the other hand, it is also possible
that one proposition is assigned different truth values corresponding to a
different context, i.e. the same intension does not license the same extension
or the same truth value. This feature can be formally represented as:
2However, if it is with respect to a context and an individual, then the relation between
intension and extension may be determinate. It is just that here we have gone beyond
Montague's (1975) defining intensionality, and so it is no longer true that extensions are
unique with respect to < w, i >. However, that is true of all standard models where an
index does not specify all possible parameters.
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\<j)\ — \ip\ int[(f>] = int[ip\ (7.18)
It says that the same truth value does not guarantee the same intension, and
vice versa.
It is noted that in a sentence like Many students went to the party, although
a precise extension of many students is not accessible, there is still existen¬
tial entailment here (Some students went to the party). The point is that
in opaque contexts the substitution of equivalents fails, i.e. the NP many
students may not be totally extensional, but the common noun may be (see
Section 7.3.4 for further discussion of this point).
It must be noted that FQs are not intensional. Expressions like unicorn
in English and fenghuang 'phoenix' in Chinese are intensional, since they
have no extension at all, at most some kind of imaginary extension. On the
contrary, FQs like many students can have real extensions, although their
extensions could be indeterminate. Of course, FQs differ from expressions
like all students and 25 students in the way that the former have no precise
extension as the latter would have.
Lakoff (1973a) states that one can get a fuzzy modal logic by adding operators
and "O" and giving the following valuations.
|DP|u.' = mm{|P|u/}for all w' such that Rww' .
|OP|u> = max{\P|u/}for all w' such that Rvvvv'
where R is the alternativeness relation over possible worlds.
Note that the value of "DP" will be equal to some a, such that 0 < a
< 1, just in case the value of the P never falls below a in any alternative
world. If "DP" is interpreted as meaning that P is a necessary truth, then
in fuzzy modal logic we will have degrees of necessary truth, since |dP| may
fall between zero and one. This raises the question of whether there are such
things as propositions which are necessarily true to a degree. The one type of
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possible example is an arithmetic statement that contains an approximation.
Consider the following sentence,
Approximately half of the prime numbers are of the form of 4N + 1.
(7.20)
Is (7.20) true? We would say it has a high degree of necessary truth, rather
than say it is absolutely true.
It is shown in this section that FQs can be treated in an intensional model,
where degree of truth is introduced. Intensional models make it definable in a
formal theory—the modification of pragmatic factors on a basic membership
function of FQs. This enhances the claim that a formal semantics of FQs is
feasible.
7.3 Entailment with FQs
Conventional entailment with logical quantifiers is relatively straightforward:
If all students went to the lecture, then some student went to the lecture.
Here all entails some, but the reverse is not valid. However, a proposition
containing an FQ is more complex to talk about entailment. In this section,
we will explore entailment patterns that are not normally considered, and
attempt to provide accounts for these patterns.
7.3.1 Degree of entailment
A general characteristic of the entailment with FQs is a degree of entailment.
For instance, About 20 students are ginger-haired may entail 23 students are
ginger-haired to a degree of 0.9, rather than absolutely entailed or absolutely
not entailed.
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Applying FST to entailment, Lakoff (1973a) suggests: suppose +" were to
take on intermediate values, then one would like to generalize the notion of
entailment to the notion of entailment to a degree a (written h a), with the
following holding:
He points out in such a system we will want to talk about concepts such as
"degree of validity" and "degree of theoremhood", which are natural con¬
comitants of the notion "degree of necessary truth". It can be demonstrated
by the following examples.
We know that not all birds fly, but we might well want to say that once
an individual has a certain degree of bird-likeness, say 0.9, then we could
possibly assume that it flies. We might then want to say that (a) entails (b)
to degree 0.9.
Also, Lakoff points out that modus ponens in FST is not only a valid form
of inference, but it can be generalized so that it preserves a degree of truth.
This can be represented in (7.23):
PhaQ iff haP^Q (7.21)
a. a: is a bird.





What (7.23) means is that if P is true at least to degree a, P —* Q is true;
then Q is true at least to degree a. That is, P entails Q to degree a iff \P
—> <5| never falls below a in any valuation.
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In addition, monotonicity of FQs indicates some significant inferential pat¬
terns of FQs (see Section 5.1.2 for the details). What follows is a discussion
of basic patterns of fuzzy entailment.
7.3.2 Entailment pattern with FQs in Type I
In terms of fuzzy entailment with FQs in Type I, one may assume that <all.
almost all, most, many, some, few> is ordered, provided that the quantifier
on the right-hand denotes a smaller proportion than the left-hand one. A
general idea is if many denotes x amount, few denotes y amount, the x entails
y, i.e. if 10 then 2. The negative aspect is quite a separate issue. We may
not say not many entails not few, because the two might be equivalent, or
the entailment might be in reverse.
In terms of very, a proposition with very tends to entail the one without. For
example, Very few students are ginger-haired entails few students are ginger-
haired. Also, Very many students are ginger-haired entails Many students
are ginger-haired. As for quite, the entailment would be different between
Chinese and English (see Section 4.3.2 for the details). In English, Quite a
few students are ginger-haired entails A few students are ginger-haired. On
the contrary, A lot of students are ginger-haired entails Quite a lot of students
are ginger-haired. However, in Chinese any propositions with quite entails
the one without, much like very entailment.
Moreover, because many does not necessarily imply more than half (see
page 75 for examples), therefore it is shown in (7.24) that (a) and (b) are
fine, but not (c). The failure of (c) is due to the fact that many does not
necessarily imply more than half.
a. most'(student') = {X C A\\X 0 student^ > \studenf f) (A — X)\}.
h. more_than_half'(student') = {X C A||A" D studenV| > |studenV 0 (A — X
c. *many'(student') = {XC A\\X 0 studenV| > |student' fl (A — X')|}.
(7.24)
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It seems that the first two in (7.24) are truth-conditionally equivalent, but
there is no such equivalent for (c).3
7.3.3 Entailment pattern with FQs in Types II and III
With FQs in Types II and III it is generally assumed, such as in Lakoff
(1973a), that a proposition containing a non-FQ entails its equivalent con¬
taining an FQ. For example, Sam is exactly six feet tall entails Sam is ap¬
proximately six feet tall. This can be formally represented as follows:
If P contains a non-FQ and Q contains an FQ, then P —* Q. (7.25)
However, a condition for the validity of this formula is that the numeral n in
for example about n, n-odd and more than n, must be included in the interval
of FQs that contain it, as illustrated in Fig. 7.2. Otherwise, the formula
would be invalid.
3Ho\vever, in terms of paraphrase between (a) and (b), we might feel that the sentence
Most students left implies a greater proportion of students left than students who did not.
Then, Most studen ts left and More than half of students left are not semantically equiva¬
lent. Suppose there were 1,000 students, and 550 of them left. Truth-conditionally, both
(a) and (b) could convey this information, but pragmatically (b) is more appropriate
than (a). Here, it is a matter of cooperative principles (Grice, 1975), i.e. choosing more
than half is determined in terms of appropriateness in a pragmatic sense rather than
truth-conditions, as pointed out by Cann (1993). That is, if we know that there are 550
out of 1,000 students who left, we may prefer to use more than half rather than most.
Chapter 7. Formal semantics of FQs (III) 220
where P = "About 20 students arc ginger-haired"; Q — "Exactly 20 students arc ginger-
haired"; R = "Nearly 20 students arc ginger-haired".
It is shown in Fig. 7.2 that at the point of 20 the truth value of P equals
that of Q. then the latter entails the former. However. Q does not entail
R. So, the entailment in (7.25) may not be valid with FQs like marly n or
fewer than where n is not in the interval denoted by the FQ. That is. the
entailment would not work well with an FQ exclusive of n as its member.
The entailment for n or m type is more complex. It is suspected that n or m
may be a bimodal FQ. If so. we may say that 20 students are ginger-haired
and 30 students are ginger-haired both entail 20 or 30 students arc ginger-
haired. But, a number in between, say 25 students are ginger-haired may
entail 20 or 30 students are ginger-haired to a certain degree, rather than
absolutely (see Fig. 3.8 for an illustration).
As for FQs in Type III, apart from what has been said above, it appears that
if we take FQs in Type III as generating a monotonic membership function,
then all the numbers in the interval would be semantically equivalent. For
example, suppose more than 20 students means an interval from 20 to a
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positive infinity, then all members in the interval receive total membership
1. Thus, there is no entailment involved here, only equivalence. The same
applies to fewer than n and other FQs in Type III. However, if we take FQs
in Type III as having a single-peaked curve, then they should behave as other
types of FQs, as discussed above.
7.3.4 Deductive or intuitive
The propositions involving FQs behave like modal statements in the way that
they may be not logically true. Let us consider,
a. In a warm spring, flowers may bloom.
b. John must be happy. (7.26)
c. Many students are happy.
In (a), the proposition expressed by the sentence is true if and only if some
world is consistent with the knowledge of a warm spring, flowers and bloom,
and whether flowers do bloom in a warm spring. The truth of (a) is associated
with worlds consistent with general knowledge. On the other hand, the
proposition conveyed by (b) is interpreted as true with all worlds that an
individual, speaker or hearer, knows. It may not be logically true in every
world, because John cannot be happy every single minute of his entire life.
However, it may be interpreted as a true proposition according to what the
speaker knows, e.g. that John is indeed happy, because he has just married
Mary with whom he is deeply in love. Finally, the truth of the proposition
expressed by (c) can be determined if we know that in a given context there
is a set of students who are happy, and its size is larger than a normal
expectation that we would have. The three examples are similar in the sense
that they are not deductive entailments. However, (c) differs from (a) and
(b) in that (c) does not need to be true in some/all accessible worlds, only in
this one. That is, (c) is true iff the cardinality of the set of happy students
in this world is greater than a norm.
Then, let us look at the inference pattern in (7.27), quoted from Cann (1993:
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263).
a. The Morning Star is the Planet Venus.
b. The Evening Star is the Morning Star.
c. Therefore, the Evening Star is the Planet Venus.
(7.27)
It is the rule called Leibniz's Law or the Law of Substitution that guarantees
the validity of the inference in (7.27). The rule asserts that the truth value of
a formula can be maintained, if the expressions substituted are extensionally
equivalent to one another. In (7.27), since all three terms, the Morning Star,
the Evening Star and the Planet Venus, denote the same entity, they are
substitutable for each other according to the Law of Substitution. A formal
definition of the law is given in (7.28),
which says that if two entities m and n are extensionally equivalent, then
the truth value of a formula if is equivalent to the formula formed from if
by substituting an instance of n for every instance of m (see Cann (1993:
263) for more discussion). However, the Law of Substitution may collapse in
inferences involving FQs. For instance,
Since the two expressions in (7.29), many students and many New Zealanders
may not be extensionally equivalent, the inference in (7.29) is not necessarily
valid. However, if the set of New Zealanders (common noun) and the set
of students (common noun) are identical, then the inference goes through.
It appears that FQs are extensional to the extent that one can substitute
extensionally identical common nouns and maintain the truth. The problem
(m = n) —» [if t/>n/ra] (7.28)
a. Many students are New Zealanders.
b. Many New Zealanders are friendly.
c. Therefore, many students are friendly.
(7.29)
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is normally we do not know whether or not the two sets are extensionally
equivalent, i.e. it is not simply a matter of syntax.
The claim that FQs are extensional to a certain degree is related to a question
that whether or not the axiom of extensionality works with FQs. The axiom
asserts: where 5 and S' are any sets, S is identical with 5' iff for any object
x, x belongs to S iff x belongs to 5'. Tye (1990) has some doubt about the
axiom, and says:"The statement schema—call it lA'—that x belongs to 5
if, and only if, x belongs to S' has assignments under which it is not true,
since there are objects that are borderline members of S and 5'. However,
A is not false under these assignments. Rather, by the truth-table for *-»,
it is neither true nor false. So, the universally quantified statement (x).4x is
neither true nor false. So, the statement, 5 = 5' (x)Ax, has an indefinite
right hand side in the above case. So, the Axiom of Extensionality comes
out as indefinite under the proposed semantics."
However, if the set of, for example, students is the same as the set of, for
example, ginger-haired people, then if Many students are happy is true then
so is Many ginger-haired people are happy. So, the axiom of extensionality
holds for FQs. This is expected to be valid for all FQs. What is significant
is that FQs are (or may be) epistemically inconsistent, i.e. their precise
interpretation is tied to the speaker and also controlled by the context4.
Moreover, with logical quantifiers which are independent of context a syllo¬
gism such as "All Xs are Ys and all Ys are Zs, therefore all Xs are Zs" is
deductively valid. If we use a deductive syllogism with FQs which are de¬
pendent of context, it would not work, as shown in (7.29) above, or it would
work only if a certain condition is fulfilled, such as if common nouns involved
are extensionally equivalent. The problem with the syllogistic reasoning of
nonlogically quantified propositions is that truth conditions are satisfied with
respect to the situation in question. FQs do not allow conventional syllogism,
i.e. reasonings with FQs are non-deductive. For more discussion, see Altham
(1971), Johnson-Laird (1983) and Moxey and Sanford (1993b)5.
4This is probably also true for all or most expressions in the language.
5Moxey and Sanford (1993b: 112) suggest that FQs and the like allow simple heuristic
procedures. For instance, should one make an inquiry about the failure rate for a course
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In conclusion, it appears that logical reasoning has limited application in the
entailment of FQs, and that an intuitive reasoning is more commonplace.
7.4 Conclusion
The introduction of FST into GQT models shows that the membership func¬
tion provides a more intuitive treatment. The intensional treatment here
shows that the extension of FQs is not part of objective meaning, and is not
accessible to language users in general. It is possible that even a fixed con¬
text would not determine the truth value for a proposition with an FQ. On
the other hand intension is, relatively speaking, more public and objective.
The relation between intension and extension of FQs is not determinate. It
is demonstrated in Section 7.2 that the relation between intension and ex¬
tension, contextual factors, and individual differences can be represented by
intensional models involving a membership function. Finally, the investiga¬
tion on fuzzy entailment deepens our understanding of inferential patterns
of FQs.
In general, the work of formal semantics of FQs discussed in the last three
chapters is significant in the sense that it enables us to identify and explain
linguistic phenomena associated with FQs in a formal system.
and be told that Many students failed, one may think that the chance of failure is great.
If the quantifier is few instead, then the chance of success is great. This kind of reasoning
is to derive a conclusion with respect to available possibilities.
8
Implications and Conclusions
Quantifiers play an important role in linguistics. From the above discussion,
it appears that semantic imprecision of FQs does exist and can be represented
by a degree of membership. It is suggested that fuzziness is an inherent
property of language, and consequently any adequate linguistic theories must
account for it.
An important conclusion from my work is that FQs are compositional and
motivated. This is also expected to be applicable, in principle, to other kinds
of semantic imprecision. In this thesis we have dealt exclusively with FQs
that are countable. It is expected that the same argument would apply to
other similar expressions, like FQs that are not countable, probability and
frequency items. Some parallels are obvious, e.g. many vs much, occasionally
vs a few, rarely vs few, often vs many. This is an interesting area for further
investigation.
As stated in the introduction, FQs are explored here in terms of denotation
and membership function, i.e. a fuzzy semantic approach is used. It is
semantic patterns of FQs we aim for, rather than try to solve the fuzziness
itself, which is something we can hardly achieve. In other words, what is
being focused on here is not the fine-grained scaling, but overall semantic
trends. The membership function represents semantic patterns of FQs, and
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indicates the ways in which FQs are interpreted. The semantic patterns
explored give rise to ways in which we can predict the semantic tendency of
FQs.
The formal models given in this thesis provide a mechanism for how a mem¬
bership function can be defined with respect to FQs, using FST. The formal
semantics of FQs is represented here by a degree of membership and a degree
of truth, particularly by dealing with inference where truth is fewer than 1
and greater than 0. A distinctive characteristic of fuzzy quantification is that
the number of elements in a domain which must satisfy a predicate is not
precisely given by an FQ and so a proposition containing one may be more
or less true depending on how closely the elements approximate to a given
norm.
This chapter concludes our semantically oriented discussion of FQs. In this
final chapter, I will discuss some interdisciplinary implications in areas that
are relevant to my work, since it is shown that the matter of the semantics
of FQs does not stand alone, but interfaces with other fields. Finally, I will
draw up some general conclusions.
8.1 Semantic implications
It is claimed in my work that an expression can be considered as a fuzzy
set with uncertain meaning boundary. An entity as a meaning component of
an expression might belong to that expression to a degree. What does this
indicate in semantics then?
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8.1.1 The properties of compositionality and motiva¬
tion
As discussed in Chapter 4, compositionality says that the meaning of an
expression is a function of the meaning of its parts. Whether or not a se¬
mantic theory is adequate depends on its ability to sustain compositionality.
The importance of the Principle of Compositionality is that the information
contained in an expression is not lost during its interpretation, and informa¬
tion not connected with the subparts of the expression does not arbitrarily
contribute to the meaning of that expression. A fundamental assumption in
semantics is that if compositionality is out, then so is the provision of any
sensible semantic theory (see Section 4.2 for further discussion of this point).
My work on FQs here supports the assumption. The important thing is how
we come to the conclusion, taking the fuzziness of FQs into consideration.
The argument is that an FQ, its core meaning in particular, licenses the same
way by which its basic membership function is derived. Also, FQs are moti¬
vated. That is, even if one cannot maintain that once a membership function
is defined for an FQ then it is always applicable, one should and must be
able to say that given a basic membership function it will vary only with
certain limits defined by context. For example, about n is normally expected
to have a bell-shaped curve. Over context, it may get thinner or have the
ends cut off or skewed a bit, but about n can never be interpreted as having
a monotonic curve.
Compositionality of FQs provides a mechanism by which a certain type of ap¬
proximator has the same impact towards expressions being modified. There¬
fore, FQs are not idiomatic. An idiom has at least two characteristics (Chan-
nell 1983: 176): its meaning is not accessible from the sum of its parts and
there is some degree of constraint on replaceability of items within it. FQs
do not actually have the two characteristics. For instance, in about 20 and
about 200, about is accessible as an approximator to bring the same semantic
pattern (i.e. approximate to n) to both FQs. That is, it functions towards
20 and 200 in the same way. Also, about in about n is replaceable by approx¬
imately or around, i.e. they differ little semantically. So, in the light of the
two factors aforementioned, FQs do not fit in the category of idiom. They
are compositional.
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Consequently, it is shown that although no sharp line is found in the meaning
boundaries of FQs and . most likely in fuzzy expressions of any kind, the
heterogeneity is systematic and definable. To take the core/peripheral system
as an example, the core in my definition lays a standard for the interpretation
of FQs, a peripheral member which can be selected by how closely they
conform to the core. The importance of the core is to make a paradigm
for peripheral members. The functional heterogeneity is also shown by the
membership function. The membership function should not be regarded as a
tool just for designing a precise interval of an FQ using exact numbers, which
is too simplistic (see Section 5.2.7 for more discussion). As for the significance
of the membership function, Newstead (1988: 66) states:"The complexity of
quantifiers can perhaps be captured by assuming that they can be represented
as fuzzy sets which can vary along an analogue scale. To illustrate this, in the
absence of context, often might have a membership function corresponding
to a normal curve with a mean of 65% and a standard deviation of ±10%.
The effect of context would be to alter the mean value, but the membership
function itselfmight be relatively unchanged." The conclusion from my work
supports Newstead's claim in principle (see Chapter 4).
8.1.2 Internal structure
Following the claim of compositionality on FQs, there is also an implication
on the internal structure in FQs. The significance of the study of FQs is
not only the issue of degree of truth itself, but also the issue of internal
structure. There are two structural characteristics of FQs: prototj'picality
and membership function.
In terms of prototypicality of FQs, a set of ordering numbers are selected
depending on how close each number in the set approximates to a norm—a
prototype. This can be captured by the membership function. For instance,
suppose a norm for about 20 is the number 20, then we may assume that
19 belongs to about 20 more than 15. That is, the membership of 19 would
be higher than that of 15. The same principle is suspected to work for
any other type of semantic imprecision. An immediate example that comes
to mind is Channell's work in 1983. She gives an explicit analysis of fuzzy
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conceptual categories, like fruit and something like that and car or something,
apart from the analysis of number approximations. She claims empirically
that the same general principle of manipulation is at work in both cases.
Heider's (1971) work on the processing and formation of natural categories
also provides empirical evidence to show ranking of members based on their
distances from a prototype.
This kind of internal structure of fuzzy expressions also reveals inferential
behaviours by which people perceive a fuzzy expression: placing potential
members according to their similarities to a prototype or best example. In
other words, degree of membership is determined by degree of similarity to
a norm. The point is that it is a mistake to regard natural language as
something that is extremely incoherent and arbitrary, impossible to treat
systematically.
8.1.3 Semantics and pragmatics
A study of the meaning of FQs would be more adequate if we explore both
semantic and pragmatic factors. Since my work here is primarily semantics,
so the issue of how exactly contexts affect the interpretation of FQs is left to
pragmatics to solve.
From the discussion of FQs in this thesis (e.g. Chapter 4), it appears that
contextual factors play a crucial role in interpreting FQs. This indicates
that semantics and pragmatics are intermingled, and probably the study of
semantics should not be totally independent from that of pragmatics.
However, we cannot say that pragmatics controls over semantics, and prag¬
matics theory can solve fuzziness alone. As claimed in Chapter 4, pragmatic
factors only function effectively on the interpretation of FQs, but have no
significant impact on general semantic pattern of FQs, core meaning/truth
condition in particular. That is to say a semantic pattern for a certain type of
FQs would remain the same with or without the consideration of pragmatic
factors. The fact that the general patterns maintain the same over contexts
and individuals is because.the heterogeneity of FQs is functional, as argued
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in the previous two sections.
8.2 Formal semantic and logic implications
There are two aspects in terms of formal semantics and logic that we will
discuss in this section.
8.2.1 A generalization of conventional formal theories
As mentioned earlier, fuzziness is not well-represented in conventional formal
semantics. For decades, we have contented ourselves with meaning glosses
which are, as Labov (1973) says, labels but not descriptions. The reason is
probably the problematic nature of fuzziness and the fact that the conven¬
tional theory cannot cope with fuzziness. However, if we want to represent
our languages appropriately, precision is certainly not the only phenomenon
which should be studied. Imprecision also plays a key role. The two interact
with one another, and it is a challenge for us to work out how to define fuzzi¬
ness in a formal framework. The formal treatment of FQs given in this thesis
raises a number of difficulties for the bivalent truth-conditional semantics
and logic1. The conventional true-or-false approach has an inability to cope
with the'complex and subjective phenomena exemplified by FQs.
Let us consider the proposition Some students are girls. A conventional
model of this proposition would require a representation of a logical quanti¬
fier. For instance, that at least one student is a girl is a logical necessity in
this model, and the logical possibility is that there are students who are not
girls and girls who are not students. However, what I deal with in this thesis
is the concept of a natural language quantifier, i.e. some in Some students
are girls is considered as a non-logical quantifier, the same as many and about
'The Principle of Bivalence says that any statement is either true or false, and the
Principle of Biexclusion says no statement can have more than one semantic value of
either true or false.
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200. Its meaning is something like several or a few, which is a more natural
interpretation than at least-one, because in day-to-day communication we
would interpret some students as something similar to several rather than at
least one.
We need much more information to describe a model which represents non-
logical quantifiers. That is, fuzzy semantics reveals more than what the
conventional semantics can offer. Fuzzy semantics defines expressions like
some a membership function, which represents its characteristic in natural
language. In fuzzy semantics, the degree of truth approach does a better job
in describing gradations. Instead of saying anything is either true or false, it
can say to what degree the statement is true. In addition, fuzzy semantics can
also capture a changing linguistic reality affected by time or spatial factors:
or tell how far it has changed in degrees. Apart from dealing with a fuzzy
set, membership function can represent a non-fuzzy set, i.e. it would give 1
or 0 to a non-fuzzy set, if that is the case. Therefore, it is reasonable to say
that FST is a generalization of conventional formal theories.
It is concluded in my work that semantic imprecision can be manipulated
more naturally, and defined more precisely in the framework of FST. As
Smithson (19S7: 1) comments:"Like many intuitively appealing concepts,
the idea of a fuzzy set is simple. In classical set theory, an element either
belongs inside a set or it does not. In fuzzy set theory, on the other hand,
an element may belong partially to a set. Fuzzy sets have gradations of set
membership and blurred boundaries, and so they resemble at first glance
the kinds of categories ordinary people use in natural thought or commu¬
nication." McCawley (1981: 380) also comments that in FST truth values
between 0 and 1 have been proposed as an appropriate device for dealing
with inexact concepts. With intermediate values one is not forced to draw
an arbitrary distinction between members and non-members of a fuzzy set.
Moreover, in terms of FST in the practical sense, areas in which FST can suc¬
cessfully be applied include fund management systems, robots, sorting ma¬
chines, helicopter control (unmanned), nuclear power plants, pattern recogni¬
tion, operation research, document retrieval systems and expert systems. It
appears that problems like processing imprecise information (Negoita, 19S4),
and approximate reasoning (Zadeh, 19S4) can be solved most effectively by
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using FST. The usefulness and significance of fuzzy models in both consumer
products (e.g. washing machines and air conditioners) and industrial systems
are due to the fact that the employment of FST makes the systems have high
MIQ (Machine Intelligence Quotient). This leads to a rapid growth in the
number and variety of applications of the FST (Smithson 1987). For in¬
stance, computers tend to have extremely rigid systems, which makes them
much less flexible than a human brain and severely limits their ability in an
uncertain situation. Machines need to be told how to mimic human infer¬
ential behaviour. Fuzziness is an inherent characteristic of human thinking
and language, and so naturally machines have to know how ,to deal with
fuzziness. In the case of fuzzy information, computers need to be given some
kind of formal mechanism to process fuzzy input. FST improves the ability
of computers by employing techniques like membership function to deal with
fuzziness2.
It is finally realized that much, perhaps most, languages are not precisely
presented. There is little evidence to show that we can tackle fuzziness within
the framework of classical approaches. Our discussion here has shown that
one need not throw up one's hands in despair when faced by the problem of
fuzziness. Fuzziness can be explored seriously within the framework of FST
in a satisfactory manner. Newstead (1988: 63-64) says: "The conclusion that
quantifiers are best regarded as fuzzy concepts seems inescapable. Attempts
to determine the meaning of a quantifier have been noticeably unsuccessful in
all areas of research. Clearly quantifiers have a range of meanings and there
are no clear-cut boundaries between one term and another; it is difficult to
see how this could be captured other than by notions such as derived from
fuzzy set theory."
In general, by adopting FST in semantics, it is feasible to measure fuzziness
in terms of degree of membership and truth. By this kind of quantitative
measurement, we can define various different types of FQs. The significance
of this is to provide a mechanism to show the regularities of the semantics of
20f course, FST is not the only way; approaches like connectionist (Dolan, 1989; Sharkey,
1990) can also be used to deal with fuzziness. Also, FST can be developed to take
account of new information. For example, in my work the notion of percentage of curve
is introduced when talking about membership function; an intermediate value is also
given for fuzzy entailment (see Chapter 6 for the details).
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FQs and their compositional functions on the items with which they interact.
8.2.2 Core meaning, truth condition and inference pat¬
tern
In my formal treatment of FQs, models are built with a degree of truth.
These capture natural language properties and shorten the gap between the
formal framework and natural languages. As shown, a precise numerical
value of any FQ is context-specific. However, the core meaning of FQs is
not, which can determine the relation between an FQ and the entities that
it can be used to refer to.
Similarly, although we may not know a proposition is actually true or false,
we do know the truth condition that must be obtained for it to be true. This
idea forms the basis of truth-conditional semantics, and it assumes that the
core of a proposition is its truth condition. That is, to know the core of a
proposition is to understand the truth conditions under which it could be
true. For instance, Many people went to the party has a truth'condition,
a significant number of people who went to the party, which can be figured
out without necessarily requiring the truth of the proposition to be known
or knowable in any particular situation, although the interpretation of a
significant number of people depends upon things like our normal expectation
of it with respect to the situation in question.
Furthermore, core meaning determines truth condition or inference pattern.
That is, if we know the core meaning of an FQ, then the truth condition
of a proposition with this FQ and its inference pattern are expected to be
predictable. For example, from the core meaning of about 20 students, we
can predict that the truth condition for About 20 students went to the party,
is a number of students that approximate to 20. Accordingly, its inference
pattern is 20 students went to the party entails About 20 students went to the
party. Also, the inference is monotone increasing, both subject and predicate
(see Section 5.1.2 for the details). The same principle may apply to all FQs.
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A predictable relation between core meaning/truth condition and inference
pattern makes the formal semantics of fuzzy expressions sensible. Other¬
wise, it may be difficult to establish any feasible formal models for fuzzy
expressions.
8.3 General linguistic implications
It appears that language is fuzzy in the sense that almost all linguistic
terms have "hazy" denotations, such as tallness and redness (see LakofF
(19S7), Comrie (19S9), Givon (19S4, 1990), Langacker (1987, 1991) and Tay¬
lor (1989)). That is, if one comes to think about expressions in our language,
most expressions have a fuzzy boundary, even some seemingly clear ones like
a dead person. It is less clear whether a person is dead or not in the situation
where a person has been in coma (i.e. brain dead) for a long long time.
However, as Martin Haspelmath (Linguist List: Vol-5-190) points out, the
issue of fuzziness has not been addressed by the dominating paradigm in
linguistics, the Chomskyan school. He says: "They assume without argument
that categories are clear-cut, and that gradience has no place in linguistics
theory. Due to the enormous prestige of Chomsky and numerical weight,
they can get away with that although there is overwhelming evidence for
fuzziness, but of course, fuzziness is hard to deal with if you think of human
language as being like a programming language. Connectionist thought is
only gradually beginning to have impact in theoretical linguistics."
8.3.1 Inherent property of language
As Burns (1991: 4) comments, Frege (1970) regards the existence of fuzziness
in language as a defect, on the ground that a concept that is not sharply
defined is a wrongly termed concept. Let us examine the two reasons Frege
gives. One is that fuzzy expressions lack meaning. It seems to me that
fuzzy expressions do have meaning, although they are fuzzy. Fuzzy meaning
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shall be considered as part of meaning, because they are used in natural
languages and serve the communicative purpose just as well as other kinds
of expressions.
The other reason Frege gives is that the laws of logic fail when applied to those
fuzzy concepts. Take the Law of Excluded Middle as an example—it cannot
represent the working of a fuzzy concept. It again appears to be inadequate
to say that if fuzzy language cannot be dealt with in existing theoretical
frameworks, then it must be excluded. It seems to me that we should consider
the matter in reverse. If our theoretical framework cannot handle the fuzzy
language, then we ought to do something about the framework. In fact, my
work shows that the Law of Excluded Middle should be rejected because it
fails to provide a satisfactory treatment for those fuzzy concepts which exist
pervasively.
Thus, fuzzy language should not be considered as a defect. It appears ev¬
ident, at least in the English and Chinese data that we have here, that in
natural language the existence of fuzziness is inherent rather than accidental.
It appears that context does not resolve fuzziness, i.e. fuzziness cannot be
removed by context—at least we can say this in a theoretic sense3. Con¬
text can make disambiguation take place, but it cannot make defuzzification
happen. This is due to the very fact that fuzziness is inherent in natural
language. We cannot change it at all. More importantly, there is no need to
do so.
8.3.2 Not necessarily categorical
Fuzziness is a challenge to the theory of language. Behind most, if not all,
theories of linguistic structure there is a common set of assumptions about
the nature of structural units which can be called categorical view. Under
traditional categorical view, as Labov (1973) outlines, the categorization is
3However, Linda Moxey (personal communication) states that if we want to claim on
empirical grounds that context does not resolve fuzziness, we have to have a way by
which we can extract context—which is impossible. There is no such thing as no context,
and we cannot control all aspects of context.
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such a fundamental and obvious part of linguistic activity that the properties
of categories are normally assumed rather than studied. One of the assump¬
tions is that of the feature of discrete—which assumes that categories are
separated from each other by clear-cut discontinuities of form or function.
However, in many areas of linguistics, it is problematic to implement this
view, because of fuzziness. The uncertainty of FQs, for instance, undermines
the application of the categorical theory and creates the limitation of the
categorizing process.
We tend to make linguistic categories more rigid and absolute than they
really are. This is in fact not compatible with natural language. My study
of FQs here has to systematically reject the traditional categorical view, to
explore the fuzziness. Chomsky (1957) suggests that any unclear case in
grammar can be settled by "letting the grammar decide". However, Ross
(1973) raises a very serious question by examining the fake NP squish—the
category of NP is not precisely defined at all. He points out that if we insist
that the grammar is based on clear cases, then this may have the effect of
making such delicate phenomena invisible to our scrutiny. In other words, the
research strategy of dealing with the clear cases only, although heuristically
valuable in the initial stages of studying a language, cannot be viewed as
being a theoretically neutral strategy. For in effect, such a strategy makes
an empirical claim that such incremental or delicate processes do not exist.
However, it is evident that they do exist, therefore they shall be treated as
being of central importance in linguistic studies. Lakoff (1973b) points out
that a comprehensive study of fuzziness is much needed. We should examine
our languages and the world in a different way, as opposed to the conventional
way that everything should be represented precisely.
Labov (1973: 347) points out correctly: "If we are to take seriously the cate¬
gorical property of language, we must pass beyond the categorical view which
takes it as given, and study the process of categorization itself by focusing
on such discontinuities directly. By avoiding the categorical view, or some
equally rigid principle of distribution, we are free to study the real properties
of such boundaries, and deduce the higher level properties which govern the
use of language."
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8.4 Psychological implications
It is shown in my work that the meanings of FQs vary over individuals, and a
specific value for an FQ in a particular utterance is a business that interacts
a number of fields, such as semantics, pragmatics, psychology, like a matter
of problem solving.
FST provides a way of representing fuzziness in psychology, as it does for
the semantics of FQs in my work. Smithson (19S7: 75-76) comments that
discussions on FST have contributed greatly to a general realization of fuzzy
phenomena. The proper study of fuzzy phenomena has long been hindered
by the lack of a workable vocabulary and conceptual framework, but the
situation is changing partly because of the stimulus provided by FST. These
changes represent rather more than the mere "suburbanization" of the knowl¬
edge domain. They are part of a widespread trend involving fundamental
shifts in how people perceive and manage certitude, doubt, and risk. He lists
the following points which imply the significance of FST in social sciences,
including psychology:
1. The gradient thesis: People's natural categories behave like fuzzy sets.
2. Many concepts in the human sciences are unavoidably fuzzy, since they
are graded.
3. The ways in which people manipulate and structure their categories
correspond to the rules in FST.
Smithson (1987: 75-76) says:"In the human sciences we certainly need the
flexibility to adapt and modify fuzzy set theories according to either substan¬
tive findings or our own conceptual requirements. Cognitive psychology and
psycholinguistics could both contribute immensely to this portion of the di¬
alogue ... For researchers in many fields where human thought and language
are modeled only heuristically or indirectly, fuzzy set theory undoubtedly
provides a more coherent language in which to operationalize a number of
concepts. Many observers have said that the true test of fuzzy set theory lies
Chapter 8. Implications and Conclusions 238
in its application to the solution of problems that conventional frameworks
cannot handle.11
The semantic and inference patterns discussed in this work give an indication
of how people perceive and process FQs. In particular, it is shown that the
meaning of an FQ is interpreted by some general rules, such as the processing
of an element by relating it to a prototype appropriate to a particular FQ.
This kind of pattern is also proved to be applicable to other fuzzy categories,
such as bird in Rosch (1973). Similarly, Harrinton (1994) claims empirically
that people act more quickly to a prototype than to a peripheral member.
A general implication is that the approximative inference seems not unusual
in everyday reasoning, and it plays an important part in the study of every¬
day reasoning. This phenomenon shall not be overlooked in cognitive and
psychological studies.
It is also claimed in my work that the application of the actual numbers
for an FQ's specific meaning is motivated—neither arbitrary nor predictable
(see Section 4.2). Similarly, as Lakoff (1987: 346) points out, in the hu¬
man conceptual system motivation is also an important phenomenon. He
claims: "The reason is this: it is easier to learn something that is motivated
than something that is arbitrary. It is also easier to remember and use mo¬
tivated knowledge than arbitrary knowledge." A conclusion given by Lakoff
(1987: 538) is that motivation is a global property of a conceptual system.
Harrinton (1994) comments: "Motivation was proposed in Lakoff (1987) as a
cognitive structuring principle manifested in a range of lexicosemantic struc¬
tures, particularly in polysemy (i.e. where multiple senses are linked within
an individual lexical item). Although polysemy is a pervasive fact of natural
language, a tenable cognitive account of the phenomenon has proved elusive.
Thus, Lakoff's proposal has important implications for our understanding of
the mental lexicon." Harrinton conducted three tests which were intended to
prove the assumption that motivation plays a central role in the ontology and
organization of sense relations and it is directly reflected in processing; also,
it is assumed that motivated structures are learned faster and recalled better
than non-motivated structures. He tested the assumption by examining per¬
formance on learning and recall tasks involving motivated and non-motivated
polysemy senses. It was reported that the results were generally consistent
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with the motivation construct, and responses on the motivated items tended
to be faster and more accurate.
Also, Lakoff (1987: 9) suggests a shift from classical categories to prototype-
based categories. It is a change that implies other changes: changes in the
concepts of truth, knowledge, meaning, rationality. He lists some familiar
ideas along the line of the classical categories, which will have to be left
behind:
1. The mind is separate from, and independent of, the body.
2. Emotion has no conceptual content.
3. Reason is transcendental, in that it transcends—goes beyond—the way
human beings, or any other kinds of beings, happen to think. Mathe¬
matics is a form of transcendental reason.
4. There is a correct, God's eye view of the world—a single correct way
of understanding what is and is not true.
5. All people think using the same conceptual system.
Oden (1977a) believes that his work provides a beginning for the develop¬
ment of a model of what he calls fuzzy psycho-logic. He thinks that the
standard logic does not characterize much of our subjective experience and
knowledge. He states that humans are competent at processing fuzzy in¬
formation, which has a very important implication for the nature of nearly
all semantic information processing. Oden (1977b) discusses how degree-of-
class-membership information in semantic memory may be used to determine
the degree to which various interpretations of sentences are perceived to be
sensible. Also, the preference of which interpretation of an ambiguous sen¬
tence may be determined by this sensible information. A theory of fuzzy
semantic information processing is involved in a better understanding of the
nature of the basic cognitive processes used in dealing with fuzzy informa¬
tion, which constitutes the primary goal of the fuzzy psycho-logic proposed
by Oden.
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Finally, Moxey and Sanford's (1993b) work shows great potential to explore
natural language quantifiers psychologically. The significance of Moxey and
Sanford's work is to explore natural language quantifiers from non-numerical
perspectives. As an illustration, a theory of attentional focus4 on natural
language quantifiers is developed in their work, which gives new insights in
the study of natural language quantifiers. The general idea is that different
natural language quantifiers manipulate different inferential patterns, and
pick up different subsets, illustrated in (S.l).
a. Few people went to the meeting. They went to the party instead.
b. A few people went to meeting. They enjoyed it.
(S.l)
Few can be thought of as putting emphasis on what they term a compset.
which is the set of people who did not go to the meeting; whereas a few puts
focus on what they term a refset, the set of people who did go. The focus
theory is not only relevant to Type I FQs in my terms, but also applicable
to FQs of Types II and III. For instance:
a. At least 20 people went to the meeting. They felt that it was
an important meeting.
b. At most 20 people went to the meeting. They felt that it was not
an important meeting.
(S.2)
In (a), at least n generates a refset, while in (b) at most focuses a compset.
It is commonly stated that natural language quantifiers serve to identify nu¬
merical values. For instance, few identifies a smaller proportion than many.
4Moxey and Sanford (1993b: 57) define attention as:"one subset can be given priority
in processing over others, and this subset will form the basis for inference that will be
drawn."
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However, a problem is that quantifiers may serve to identify similar propor¬
tions (e.g. a few and not many), yet produce somewhat different represen¬
tations when they are used. Moxey and Sanford's work shows empirically
that these expressions serve to put focus into different subsets of the super¬
set upon which they operate. In their work, natural language quantifiers are
treated as having a major function in manipulating attentions and patterns
of inference. They are mental operators, and exert an influence on the pat¬
terns of inference which follow utterances containing such operators; that is,
they are controllers of what is attended to.
Moreover, Moxey and Sanford integrate psychology with linguistics and logic,
to capture far-reaching properties of quantifiers. Moxey and Sanford's ap¬
proach is plausible in that it opens up a wide range of topics for the study
of natural language quantifiers, such as natural language quantifiers manip¬
ulate attentions, inference patterns and provide complex information regard¬
ing the speaker's expectations (see Section 2.4 for more details). Their work
also has some bearing on technology, like expert systems and AI. Any formal¬
ism for representing or interpreting natural language quantifiers, especially in
decision-making technology, would be more adequate if taking non-numerical
meaning into account, such as attentional focus.
It appears that a potential area for exploring natural language quantifiers
is psychology of language. This kind of study may explore properties that
linguistics would not normally cover. Certainly, an integration of linguistics
and psychology is predicted to make the study of natural language quantifiers
more significant.
8.5 Conclusions
The study of FQs in this thesis explores the question of how the semantic
theory could be improved. It also raises a serious question challenging the
assumption that languages should always be precise. The most important
conclusion is that fuzziness is an inherent characteristic of language, rather
some feature of performance or context-dependent result. That is to say
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that "unfortunately" there is no invariable and idealized natural language
in the world. Fuzziness appears to be an extremely pervasive phenomenon,
invading almost every area of linguistics. Fine (1975) states that any type of
expression that is capable of meaning is also capable of being fuzzy: names,
name-operators, predicates, quantifiers, and even sentence-operators. We
should become aware that lesser preoccupation with precise analyses and
greater acceptance of fuzziness would result in more real progress in linguistic
research and any other research involving fuzziness.
Consequently, we have to make our theories (and machines) capable of deal¬
ing with and accounting for fuzziness in natural languages. For example,
the studies of fuzziness are expected to contribute (e.g. provide linguistic
models) to the formalization of natural languages in areas such as soft com¬
puting which is tolerant of imprecision, as opposed to conventional (hard)
computing. It is suggested that an integration of linguistics, logic, and psy¬
chology would be ideal to advance further research on fuzziness, and reach
more powerful solutions.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the issues discussed in this thesis are
complex and controversial. My work here has raised more questions than it
has answered. It is hoped that this study can attract much more attention
to fuzzy phenomena in natural languages, and will inspire more interest in
fuzzy phenomena.
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Appendix 1: Channell's (1983) elicita-
tion test for English FQs
Table 1.1: List of items used in the number approxima¬
tion elicitation test
1 "After the girl had rung up everything I'd bought, I suddenly realised I
only had about 2.00 pounds on me"
2 "You'll need about 4lbs of oranges"
3 "We should be there around 6"
4 "He's producing about ten pages a week and they're all getting published"
5 "There were about 15 people there"
6 "... it's something around the 20 percent mark and it's never changed"
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7 "We sent out two hundred questionnaires and had about 40 replies"
8 "It's going to cost about 500 pounds to fly there and back"
9 "I want to spend about 14,000 pounds"
10 "In a country with a population of around ten million, like Belgium, pro¬
portional representation makes much more sense"
11 "She was wearing a dress costing not less than 150 pounds"
12 "The repair bill certainly won't be less than 500 pounds"
13 "It was a good evening, we must have drunk a bottle or so of wine each"
14 "How much flour shall I put?" "Two spoonfuls or so"
15 "Six or so books will be enough for a week's reading"
16 "There are ten pounds or so of butter in the freezer"
17 "Ten or so litres of wine should be enough for the party"
18 "They hired the de Grey rooms and invited 200 or so people to a cham¬
pagne lunch"
19 "It's okay, I've got 500 pounds or so in my account at the moment"
20 "It'll cost two thousand or so pounds to do this place up reasonably"
21 "There are 3,000 or so students at York"
22 "The Tower of London gets 30,000 or so visitors a year"
23 "You'll need three or four metres of rope"
24 "Yes, but it's still around that four or five regions"
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25 "It takes six or seven hours to drive from Paris to Midi"
26 "The garden extends eight or nine feet beyond the true boundary of the
property"
27 "Eight or ten students were waiting in the entrance"
28 "How many people will turn up for the meeting?" "We usually get
fifteen or twenty"
29 "They had seventy or eighty people with broken bones over just one week¬
end"
30 "He's bought a stereo costing three or four hundred pounds"
31 "Two or three thousand people turned up to hear him speak"
32 "A burst water main in the Hull Road flooded neighbouring streets with
two or three thousand gallons of water"
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Table 1.2: The number approximation test: general re¬
sults
about n
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
No Item title % subjects Mean length Mean center Mode Interval
marking length as % of
interval exemplar no
1 about 2.00 pounds 100.00 .30 1.97 2.00 15.0%
2 about 41bs 73.1 .61 4.OS 4.00 15.1%
3 about 6pm 96.2 .58 6.00 6.00 9.6%
4 about 10 pages 92.3 3.23 9.96 10.00 32.3%
5 about 15 people 100.00 4.65 15.05 14/15 31.0%
6 around the 20% mark 96.2 4.27 20.60 20.00 21.3%
7 about 40 replies 96.2 5.96 40.13 40/41 14.2%
8 about 500 pounds 84.6 51.92 508.00 500.00 10.4%
9 about 14,000 pounds 100.00 1067.30 14,033.65 14,000 7.6%
10 around 10 million 69.2 1.5 million 9,942,307.00 10 million 15.0%
Notes:
1. The Units in Columns 4, 5 and 6 are those specified in column 2 for each item.
2. Standard half-rounding, to two decimal places, has been applied, and for percentages,
to one decimal place.
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Table 1.2 continued: Not less than
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
No Item title % subjects Mean length Mean center Mode Interval
marking length as % of
interval exemplar no
11 not less than 150 pounds 96.2 24.42 162.44 160 16.1%
12 not less than 500 pounds 100.00 54.42 529.00 520 10.9%
N or so
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
No Item title % subjects Mean length Mean center Mode Interval
marking length as % of
interval exemplar no
13 a bottle or so 96.2 .568 1.08 1 56.8%
14 2 spoonfuls or so 96.2 .788 2.30 2.50 39.4%
15 6 or so books 100.00 2.35 6.21 6 39.1%
16 10 lbs or so 8S.5 2.15 10.58 10 21.5%
17 10 or so litres 92.3 1.62 10.63 10 16.2%
IS 200 or so people 100.00 46.15 208.46 200/210 23.1%
19 500 pounds or so SS.5 77.30 560.96 500 15.5%
20 2,000 pounds or so 100.00 550.00 2300.00 2200 27.5%
21 3,000 or so
students 96.2 538.46 3117.30 3000 17.9%
22 30,000 or so
visitors 96.2 4846.00 30923.00 30,000 16.1%
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N or m
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
No Item title % subjects Mean length Mean center Mode Interval
marking length as % of
interval exemplar no
23 3 or 4 metres 96.2 1.10 3.65 3.50 31.4%
24 4 or 5 regions 100.00 3.00 4.71 4/5 66.6%
25 6 or 7 hours 100.00 1.51 6.70 7 23.3%
26 8 or 9 feet 96.2 2.23 8.61 9 26.2%
27 8 or 10 students 100.00 4.42 8.87 8 49.1%
28 15 or 20 people 100.00 8.23 17.61 16/17/18 47.0%,
29 70 or 80 people 100.00 17.15 73.94 75 22.9%
30 3 or 4 hundred
pounds 100.00 90.46 358.17 350/375 25.8%
31 2 or 3 thousand
people 100.00 1260.60 2541.34 2250 50.4%,
32 2 or 3 thousand
gallons 100.00 1177.10 2596.00 2500 47.1%
Note:
3. For n or m approximations, the mean of the two exemplar numbers was taken as the
comparison point for the Mean Interval Length (column 7)
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Table 1.3 Special results for n or m approximations
Item % subjects % subjects .
No. specifying specifying % subjects % subjects
interval cont. int. bounded specifying specifying
both n and m by n and m nos below n nos above m
•23 57.7 76.9 30.8 73.1
•24 100 57.6 50.0 46.1
25 69.4 88.5 42.3 80.8
•26 88.5 73.1 46.2 65.4
27 96.2 77.0 61.5 57.7
'28 92.3 77.0 65.0 69.2
•29 80.8 88.5 57.7 65.4
30 69.2 61.5 30.8 53.8
31 69.2 76.9 41.1 65.4
32 73.1 76.9 57.7 57.7
Mean over —
10 items: 79.6 75.4 48.3 63.5
Table 1.4: Frequency distribution of informant responses
for number approximations
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First of all, I am extremely grateful for your valuable contribution. Please
designate a numerical interval for the following phrases. Take erski yixia
'under 20' as an example, it might be designated an interval, say 15-20,
1-20, or -OO-20.
Group A:
Given a range of 100, designate a numerical interval for the following phrases.
For instance, out of 100 people, one might judge 30-50 as the interval of yixie
ren 'quite a few people': and 70-80 as the interval of duoshu ren'majority of
people'. Also, out of 100 (jin - Chinese weight measure unit, 1 jin = 0.5 kg),
70-80 might be considered as the interval of xuduo (jin) 'many (jin)'.
Phrases Intervals
1 yixie ren 'quite a few people'
2 xuduo ren 'many people'
3 xuduo (jin) 'many (jin)'
4 duoshu ren 'majority of people'
5 shaoshu ren 'minority of people'
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6 bushao ren 'many people'
7 haoxie ren 'many people'
8 haoxie (jin) 'many (jin)'
9 henduo (ge) 'very many'
10 youxie (ge) 'quite a few'
Group B
Here are some hypothetical examples:
Phrases Intervals (hypothetical answers)





xiao 200 ren 180-195
'a bit fewer than 200 people'






11 ji (ge) 'several'
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12 haoji (ge) 'a bit more than several'
13 200 yishang 'more than 200'
14 200 yixia 'fewer than 200'
15 200 ren yishang 'more than 200 people'
16 200 ren yixia 'fewer than 200 people'
17 jiangjin 200 ren 'nearly 200 people'
IS jiangjin 200 (jin) 'nearly 200 (jin)'
19 jiangjin 2,000 ren 'nearly 2,000 people'
20 jiangjin 2,000 (jin) 'nearly 2,000 (jin)'
21 jiangjin 20,000 ren 'nearly 20,000 people'
22 jiangjin 20,000 (jin)'nearly 20,000 (jin)'
23 200 duo ren '200-odd people'
24 200 duo (jin) '200-odd (jin)'
25 2,000 duo ren '2,000-odd people'
26 2,000 duo (jin) '2,000-odd (jin)'
27 20,000 duo ren '20,000-odd people'
28 20,000 duo (jin) '20,000-odd (jin)'
29 200 ren zuoyou 'about 200 people'
30 200 (jin) zuoyou 'about 200 (jin)'
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31 2,000 ren zuoyou 'about 2,000 people'
32 2,000 (jin) zuoyou 'about 2,000 (jin)'
33 20,000 ren zuoyou 'about 20,000 people'
34 20,000 (jin) zuoyou 'about 20,000 (jin)'
35 xiao erbai ren 'a bit fewer than 200 people'
36 da erbai ren 'a bit more than 200 people'
37 erbai lai ren 'about 200 people'
3S baiba (ge) 'about 100'
39 200 ren shangxia 'about 200 people'
40 dayue 200 ren 'about 200 people'
41 shangbai (ge) 'about 100'
42 chengbai (ge) 'about 100'
43 200 (jin) duo yixie '200-odd (jin)'
44 200 (jin) shao yixie 'a bit fewer than 200 (jin)'
45 daban (ge) 'more than half'
46 xiaoban (ge) 'less than half'
47 duoban ren 'majority of people'
48 shaoban ren 'minority of people'
(Note: From 45 to 48, a fraction or percentage should be used.)
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49 liang, san (ge) '2 or 3'
50 san, wu (ge) '3 or 5'
51 shi'er, san (ge) '12 or 13'
52 baishi lai (ge) 'about 100'
53 qianbai (ge) '100 or 1000'
54 qianba bai (ge) '800 or 1000'
55 yiwan (ge) 'hundreds of millions/very many'
56 qianwan (ge) 'ten million/very many'
2S1
Group C
Please give a numerical interval for the phrases dotted.
Example Phrase Interval
bantian (quite a while) 1-2 hours
Phrases Intervals
57 Ta yijing deng le bantian le.
he already wait (particle) quite a while (particle)
'He has already waited for quite a while.'
58 Ta yijing deng le dabantian le.
he already wait (particle) a very long time (particle)
'He has already waited for a very long time.'
59 Juchangzhong daban ren zai guzhang.
in the theatre majority of people in process of applaud
'A majority of people in the theatre were applauding.'
60 Juchangzhong shaoban ren zai shuijiao.
in the theatre minority of people in process of sleep
'A minority of people in the theatre were sleeping.'
(Note: from 59 to 60, a fraction or percentage should be used.)
I would be greatly appreciative if you could enclose your comments. Again, I
thank you sincerely for your contribution, and looking forward to your repe¬
at your earliest convenience.
(The questionnaire ends here)
Notes:
1. Group A: FQs in this group were estimated out of 100.
2. Group C: FQs in this group were tested in a given linguistic discourse, i.e. FQs were
embodied in sentences. The aim was to find out the effect of context.
3. In the questionnaire, subjects were asked to tell their sex and occupation. This was
meant to investigate whether the variables of sex and occupation would result in difference
in performance. It appeared that more science students and professionals gave +oc and
-oo to more than 200 and fewer than 200 than other people. Due to the limited length of
this thesis, I haven't explored this issue; but it would be an interesting topic for a further
discussion.
Table 2.2: FQ approximation test: general results
Notes:
1 There are two modes in Table 2.2, column 6. The mode without brackets represents a
mode number; the other denotes a modal interval.
2. Standard Deviation: Standard deviation is the most frequently used measure of variabil¬
ity or dispersion of a distribution, i.e. of the degree to which scores vary from the mean.
It is standard in the sense that it looks at the average variability of all the scores around
the mean and all the scores that are taken into account. The standard deviation, s, is
calculated by the formula in (10.1).
s =Ete - f)2/(^ -1)]1/2 (io-i)
where xi, x^,...,xn are the observed (accepted) values for a variable in the cases used in
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an analysis. N is the sample size for the variable, and x is the mean. Generally speaking,
the larger a standard deviation, the more variability there is.
3. Skewness: it is an indication of asymmetry. The value should be zero or close to zero to
indicate the normality of the distribution. Outliers may skew the distribution either to the
right or to the left (notated with -). The BMDP programme used here computes skewness,
g1, as
9l = £(x,- - *)3/(Ns3) (10.2)
4- Kurtosis: this refers to a measure of peakness or flatness. A peaked distribution will
have a negative value of kurtosis; and a flat distribution will have a positive value of
kurtosis. Thai is, if the kuriosis of a distribution is significantly greater than zero , then the
distribution is longer-tailed than the normal. The BMDP programme used here computes
kurtosis, g2, as
<72 = X>i-i:)4/(^4)-3 (10.3)
5. Standard half-rounding, to two decimal places, has been applied. Percentage has also
been calculated to two decimal places. In Table 2.2 and 2.3, most figures were calculated
by computer, using BMDP.
6. Only 24 of 60 FQs tested are analyzed below, for the convenience of exposition. More
details on Chinese data can be seen in Chapter 3.
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Group 1:
1 2 3 4 5 6
No Item title % subjects Range Mean Mode
designating (Mode interval)
interval
1 ji (ge) 100.0 10.00 4.95 4
'several' (3-5)
2 yixie ren 100.0 60.00 26.26 20
'quite a few people' (20-30)
3 xuduo ren 100.0 95.00 60.97 70
'many people' (70-80)
4 xuduo (jin) 100.0 95.00 61.73 70
'many (jin)' (70-80)
Group 1 continued:
No 7 8 9 10 11
Skewness Kurtosis Std dev Maximum no. Minimum no.
1 0.45 -0.46 2.13 10 0
2 0.36 -0.46 12.88 60 0
3 -0.34 -0.47 19.75 100 5
4 -0.50 -0.12 19.46 100 5
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Group 2:
(Note: FQs in this group axe represented in percentage.)
1 2 3 4 5 6
No Item title % subjects Range Mean Mode
designating (Mode interval)
interval
5 daban ren SI.48 70.00 68.75 70.00
'majority of people' (60-80)
6 shaoban ren 81.48 60.00 29.37 30.00
'minority of people' (30-40)
7 daban ren 97.78 75.00 66.58 70.00
'majority of people' (60-80)
(in the context)
8 shaoban ren 97.78 45.00 26.52 30.00
'minority of people' (20-30)
(in the context)
Group 2 continued:
No 7 8 9 10 11
Skewness Kurtosis Std dev Maximum no. Minimum no.
5 -0.01 -0.07 12.14 100 30
6 -0.20 -0.52 11.35 60 0
7 -0.25 0.24 12.17 100 25
8 -0.002 -0.43 9.55 50 5
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Group 3:
1 2 3 4 5 6
No Item title, % subjects Range Mean Mode
designating (Mode interval)
interval
9 jiangjin 200 ren 100.0 100 188.88 195
'nearly 200 people' (190-199)
10 jiangjin 2,000 ren 100.0 700 1,869.37 1,990
'nearly 2,000 people' (1,900-2,000)
11 jiangjin 20,000 ren 100.0 20,000 18,766.6S 19,500












9 -1.19 3.22 9.8 250 150
10 -1.13 1.11 115.66 2,200 1,500
11 -1.21 4.82 2,330.31 30,000 10,000
Group 4:
1 2 3 4 5 6
No Item title % subjects Range Mean Mode
designating (Mode interval)
interval
12 200 duo ren 99.23 125 214.17 210
'200-odd people' (205-218)
13 2,000 duo ren 99.26 1,350 2,096.02 2,100
'2,000-odd people' (2,000-2,250)













12 2.55 10.64 14.45 305 180
13 2.81 16.64 124.18 3,000 1,650
14 2.85 0.38 2.626.64 31,000 16,000
Group 5:
1 2 3 4 5 6
No Item title % subjects Range Mean Mode
designating (Mode interval)
interval
15 200 ren zuoyou 100.0 110 200.48 195/200/205
'about 200 people' (190-210)
16 2,000 ren zuoyou 100.0 1,000 1,934.11 1,950/2,000/2,050
'about 2,000 people' (1,900-2,100)
17 20,000 ren zuoyou 100.0 20,500 20,257.32 20,000












15 0.45 2.02 13.42 260 150
16 0.50 •2.91 130.89 2,500 1,500


















18 liang, san (ge) 100.0 6.00 2.94 3(2-3)
'2 or 3'
19 san, wu (ge) 100.0 8.00 4.57 4(3-5)
'3 or 5'













18 0.85 0.75 0.92 7 1
19 0.64 0.26 1.33 10 •2
20 0.38 0.82 1.35 19 10
Group 7:
1 2 3 4 5 6







99.26 N/A N/A 210(200—foo)
22 200 yixia
'fewer than 200'
99.26 •N/A N/A 190(-oo-200)
23 200 ren yishang
'more than 200 people'
99.26 N/A N/A 210(200-300)
24 200 ren yixia
'fewer than 200 people'













•21 N/A N/A N/A +oo 200
22 N/A N/A N/A . 200 -oo
23 N/A N/A N/A +oo 200
24 -0.58 -0.84 58.52 200 0
Table 2.3: Special results for n or m approximations
Item % subjects % subjects
no. specifying specifying % subjects % subjects
interval cont. int. bounded specifying specifying
both n and m by n and m below n above m
18 liang, san (ge) 100 50.36 0.01 49.63
'2 or 3'
19 san, wu (ge) 99.99 42.96 0.01 55.56
'3 or 5'
20 shi'er, san(ge) 99.99 30.37 34.81 63.7
'12 or 13'
Mean over 99.99 41.23 11.61 56.3
3 items:
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Table 2.4: Special results for more than n approxima¬
tions
Item % subjects % subjects
no. specifying specifying % subjects % subjects
u-bound as 1-bound as specifying specifying
positive n 1-bound below 1-bound above
infinite n n
'21 200 yishang '28.36 70.15 0 29.85
'more than 200'
23 200 ren yishang 18.7 58.06 0 41.94
'more than 200 people'
Mean over
2 items: '23.53 64.11 0 35.9
Table 2.5: Special results for fewer than n approxima¬
tions
Item % subjects % subjects
No. specifying specifying % subjects % subjects % subjects
1-bound as u-bound as specifying specifying specifying
negative 71 u-bound below u-bound above 1-bound
infinite 71 71 as 0/1
22 200 yixia •23.88 54 46 0 16.42
'fewer than 200'
"24 '200 ren yixia 0 53.63 46.37 0 •24.81
'fewer than 200 people'
Mean over
2 items: 23.88 53.8 46.2 0 •20.62
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Table 2.6: Frequency distributions of informant responses
Note:
In the following histograms, the Y-axis indicates a domain of appropriate numbers, and
corresponding counts (occurrences). The X-axis indicates a grade of membership using






























'quite a few people'
Count Midpoint One star indicates approximately 2.02 occurrences
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Fig. 2.4




Group 2: FQs in isolation (Figs. 2.5, 2.6) vs. FQs in context (Figs. 2.7, 2.8)
5 daban ren
'majority of people'
























































































Count Midpoint One star indicates approximately 2.26 occurrences
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Group 3: nearly n approximations















































































































10 jiangjin 2,000 ren
'nearly 2,000 people'
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Fig. 2.11
Mode 19500.00 Std dev 2330.31
Skewness -1.21 Range 20000.00
Minimum 10000.00 Maximum 30000.00
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Group 4: n-odd approximations


























































13 2,000 duo ren
'2,000-odd people'
























































































H 20,000 duo ren
'20,000-odd. people'









98 20000.00 I ******************************************
104 20500.00 |********************************************
95 21000.00 | ****************************************
58 21500.00 |**************************
58 22000.00 |**************************
55 22500.00 I ***********************
55 23000.00 |***********************
44 23500.00 I *******************
44 24000.00 |*******************









Mode 20500.00 Std dev 2626.64
Skewness 2.85 Range 15000.00
Minimum 16000.00 Maximum 31000.00
305
Group 5: about n approximations
15 200 ren zuoyou 'about 200 people'

















































Mode 195.00/200.00/205.00 Std dev 13.42
Skesness .45 Range 110.00
Minimum 150.00 Maximum 260.00
307
16 2,000 ren zuoyou
'about 2,000 people'
Count Midpoint One star indicates approximately 9.54 occurrences
10 1650.00 | *
10 1700.00 | *
12 1750.00 | *




135 2000.00 | **************
135 2050.00 |**************
98 2100.00 |**********
20 2150.00 1 **
20 2200.00 1 **
13 2250.00 | *
13 2300.00 | *


















17 20,000 ren zuoyou
'about 20,000 people'
Count Midpoint One star indicates approximately 3.62 occurrences
"
Y
9 15500.00 | **
16 16000.00 I****







135 20000.00 | *************************************
105 20500.00 | *****************************
94 21000.00 | **************************
43 21500.00 | ************
41 22000.00 |***********
31 22500.00 |*********
31 23000.00 | *********
16 23500.00 | ****
16 24000.00 | ****




















Group 6: n or m approximations
18 liang, san (ge)
'2 oFT'



































































































































Group 7: more than n and fewer than n approximations
21 200 yishang
'more than 200'




98 200.00 | *****************************************
104 210.00 |*******************************************
96 220.00 | ****************************************
94 230.00 |***************************************
84 240.00 |***********************************
82 250.00 | **********************************
63 260.00 |**************************
62 270.00 |**************************
62 280.00 | **************************
62 290.00 | **************************
57 300.00 | ************************
41 310.00 |*****************
41 320.00 | *****************






38 + 00 + 1

















Count Midpoint One star indicates approximately 3.11 occurrences
"
Y























+ 1 1 —>
0 0.49 0.97 X
Fig. 2.22
Mode 190.00 Std dev N/A
Skeuness N/A Range N/A
Minimum - oo Maximum 200.00
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23 200 ren yishang
'more than 200 people'
Count Midpoint One star indicates approximately 2.36 occurrences
0 190.00
103 200.00 1 ********************************************
116 210.00 1 *************************************************
109 220.00 1 **********************************************
100 230.00 1 ******************************************
90 240.00 1 **************************************
84 250.00 1 ************************************
64 260.00 1 ***************************
63 270.00 1 ***************************
62 280.00 1 **************************
62 290.00 1 **************************
56 300.00 1 ************************
33 310.00 1 **************
33 320.00 1 **************
33 330.00 1 **************
33 340.00 1 **************
33 350.00 1 **************
33 360.00 1 **************
33 370.00 1 **************
33 380.00 1 **************



















2J, 200 ren yixia
'fewer than 200 people'




33 oo I *********
34 10.00 1 *********
34 20.00 1 *********
35 30.00 1 *********
35 40.00 1 *********
37 50.00 1 **********
37 60.00 1 **********
37 70.00 1 **********
38 80.00 1 **********
38 90.00 1 **********
60 100.00 1 ****************
60 110.00 1 ****************
60 120.00 1 ****************
60 130.00 1 ****************
61 140.00 1 *****************
80 150.00 1 **********************
85 160.00 1 ***********************
93 170.00 1 *************************
115 180.00 1 *******************************
124 190.00 1 **********************************
75 200.00 1 ********************
0 210.00
+ 1 1__>
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«% if£ (7f )
4 (A)
5 m ( A )
6 *•}' ( A )















1 4 200)54 T
1 5 200 (A) >X_fc.
1 6 200 (A)
1 7 #i£200 ( A )
1 8 #i£200 ( ft )
1 9 #i£2,000 ( A )
2 0 #i£2,000 ( ft )
2 1 #i£20,000 ( A )
2 2 #i£20,000 (ft).
2 3 200 j? ( A )
2 4 200£ (ft)
2 5 2,000P (A)
2 6 2,000£ (ft)
2 1 20,000P ( A )
2 S 20,000 (ft)
2 9 200 ( A )
3 0 200 ( ft ) £.£
3 1 2,000 (A) ££
3 2 2,000 ( ft )
3 3 20,000 ( A )
3 4 20,000 ( /r )
3 5 A( A )
3 6 A—"5" (A)
3 7 200£ ( A )
3 8 "S"#. (A)
3 9 200 (A) AT
4 0 A#200 ( A )
4 1 Jib (A)
4 2 A"5" (A)
4 3 200 (A )
4 4 200 (Jf )
4 5 AA ( A )
4 6 AA ( )
4 7 p A ( A)
4 8 A A ( A )
4 9 i?j,X (A)
5 0 , JL ( A )
5 l A~,-=- (A )
5 2 a AA ( A )
5 3 A "5" ( A)
5 4 fAl" ( A )
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